Gary T. Trotter

The appellants appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice finding that a transformer easement had expired.

The sole issue was whether the easement continued to be required for an approach lighting system for runway 30 at the Windsor airport.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellants failed to provide evidence supporting their position that the easement remained necessary.

The appellants' own witness testimony, combined with evidence that the easement had not been required since 1965, long-term plans for runway 30 that did not contemplate the lighting system or transformer, and communications from Nav Canada all supported the finding that the easement had expired.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her action against the York Children's Aid Society arising from child protection proceedings involving her daughter.

The appellant claimed she suffered significant losses and damages and sought to continue the action with witness testimony at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal, finding no error in his analysis that certain claims disclosed no cause of action and that others lacked evidentiary support.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that the apartment was the appellant's residence and that he had knowledge of and control over the cocaine found in the freezer.

On appeal, the appellant contended that the verdict was unreasonable and that one could reasonably infer the apartment was his wife's home and that she alone had knowledge of the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding it was reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that the evidence as a whole excluded all reasonable alternatives to guilt.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution against the respondent.

The trial judge had applied the correct legal test from Miazga v. Kvello Estate, which requires proof of four elements: initiation of prosecution by the defendant, termination in the plaintiff's favour, absence of reasonable and probable cause, and malice.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the second, third, and fourth elements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the appellant failed to discharge his evidentiary burden on the balance of probabilities.

The appeal was dismissed.

A self-represented plaintiff sought leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order quashing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The original claim against the defendants sought damages totaling $350,000 but failed to articulate any recognizable cause of action.

The Superior Court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court quashed the subsequent appeal on jurisdictional grounds due to the monetary amounts involved exceeding its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposed restrictions on future motions by the plaintiff without prior written leave from a panel.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that found she was a partner in a law firm rather than an employee.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the control and dependency test established in McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, holding that McCormick does not establish control and dependency as an all-purpose test for determining partnership status.

Instead, courts must examine all surrounding circumstances, the substance of the relationship, the behaviour of the parties, and their intentions.

The trial judge's findings of fact, which supported a partnership relationship, were available on the evidence and no palpable and overriding error was demonstrated.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for attempted murder, unlawful confinement, uttering death threats, and assaulting a police officer.

Although he pleaded guilty, he advanced a mental disorder defence seeking a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The trial judge rejected the NCR defence and imposed a sentence of 20 years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant sought leave to appeal sentence, contending it was manifestly unfit and that insufficient weight was given to his mental illness as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction as abandoned and dismissed the appeal from sentence, finding the 20-year sentence was not manifestly unfit and that the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's mental condition.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5.5 years (66 months) less 25 months credit for time in predisposition custody, resulting in a net sentence of 41 months in federal penitentiary.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, flight from police, and possession of marijuana for trafficking purposes.

The appellant contended the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply restraint as a first-time offender and by imposing a sentence outside the range for similar offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and appropriate given the serious nature of the offences.

The appellant was convicted at trial of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death, and was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment and whether the operation constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent operator.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in adequate evidentiary foundation and entitled to deference.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the six-year term fell within the appropriate range for similar offences.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing his action against the Ottawa Police Services Board for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and Charter infringement.

The appellant had been arrested and charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of explosives.

He was convicted at trial but the conviction was overturned on appeal due to misdirection and inadmissible hearsay evidence.

On retrial, the Crown's case collapsed due to evidentiary difficulties and the appellant was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the committal for trial and the order for a new trial constituted sufficient judicial determinations to support reasonable and probable grounds for the prosecution, absent a fundamental flaw in the criminal proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of assault following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The conduct involved the appellant entering a washroom stall where a three-year-old stranger was standing with his clothing down and pulling the child's sleepers up, making contact with the child's buttocks.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in failing to apply an objective test regarding whether the conduct was within the class of ordinarily acceptable conduct in daily life, and in failing to apply the criminal standard to these issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of assault in section 265(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is exhaustive and does not require proof of socially unacceptable conduct beyond intentional and non-consensual touching.

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered after pleading guilty to carrying a concealed weapon contrary to s. 90(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had elected to proceed by indictment.

The critical issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to receive the guilty plea.

The appellant was entitled to elect his mode of trial under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code, but was never put to his election.

The court found that the failure to comply with the election requirements went to the jurisdiction of the trial court and could not be cured by the procedural proviso.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine, seeking to set aside his guilty plea on the ground that it was uninformed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was not advised of the immigration consequences of his conviction, which rendered him inadmissible to Canada and subject to removal with no right of appeal.

The trial judge had accepted the plea after a complete plea comprehension inquiry, and the sentence was imposed pursuant to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that the appellant was unaware of the immigration consequences and would not have pleaded guilty had he known.

The court found the plea was uninformed and therefore invalid, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing their motion to set aside a reinstated default judgment and authorizing the sale of their property to satisfy the judgment.

The original action was commenced in 2001 and resulted in a default judgment of approximately $86,000.

The judgment was subsequently set aside, then reinstated by Brown J. in 2008 on an ex parte basis.

The appellants moved to set aside the reinstatement, but the motion judge dismissed their motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts when appearing before Brown J. without notice to the appellants, which was a sufficient basis to set aside the judgment.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his conviction for first degree murder in the killing of a victim on June 20, 1981.

The applicant had been tried four times for the offence: the first conviction was set aside on Charter grounds, the second and third trials resulted in hung juries, and the fourth trial resulted in conviction.

The applicant had been on bail for many years during the proceedings and had complied with all bail conditions.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: (1) the appeal is not frivolous; (2) the applicant will surrender into custody; and (3) detention is not necessary in the public interest.

The court found all three criteria satisfied and granted bail pending appeal, increasing the recognizance to $750,000.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision finding that frequent lockdowns at Maplehurst Correctional Complex violated the Charter rights of two remanded inmates under section 12 (cruel and unusual treatment).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge had significantly overstated the frequency, duration, and impact of lockdowns affecting the respondents.

The court concluded that while lockdowns occurred more frequently than ideal, they did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual treatment.

The court also found procedural unfairness in the award of damages without notice to the parties and rejected alternative arguments based on sections 7 and 10(c) of the Charter.

Appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, use of a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, discharge of a firearm with intent, breach of probation, possession of a prohibited firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The appellant was identified as the shooter in surveillance video footage by three witnesses based on recognition from prior acquaintance.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on this recognition evidence despite finding that facial features were not visible on the poor-quality video.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to properly scrutinize the reliability of the recognition evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

Three appellants were convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and committing those offences for the benefit of a criminal organization arising from a drive-by shooting in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from two gang members who testified the appellants confessed to the shooting.

The appellants challenged numerous aspects of the trial including jury selection procedures, joinder of counts, admission of bad character evidence, ballistics evidence, jury instructions on Vetrovec witnesses, and alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Atkins and Riley but allowed Wisdom's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an attempted theft four months after the shooting, which had minimal probative value but significant prejudicial effect.

The appellant was convicted of breaking into and assaulting a 68-year-old woman and breaking into and raping a 54-year-old woman.

He was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of DNA evidence obtained through a saliva sample, arguing his Charter rights were violated.

He also challenged the trial judge's failure to preserve evidence and appealed his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter violations in the DNA seizure, that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion regarding the destroyed evidence, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's high risk of reoffending and consistent refusal to engage in treatment.

This is a costs decision arising from an appeal of an order made under s. 490 of the Criminal Code.

The pawnbroker successfully obtained an order for return of a stolen diamond that had been seized by police during a criminal investigation.

The estate of the original owner appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

Both parties subsequently sought costs of the appeal.

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs, as s. 683(3) of the Criminal Code expressly prohibits the allowance of costs to either the appellant or respondent on the hearing and determination of an appeal.