Gary T. Trotter

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting his half-brother in the back with a shotgun.

The appellant admitted to the shooting but claimed he only intended to scare his brother and shoot at the computer or stereo, not to kill him.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions on the mens rea for murder contained serious legal errors, particularly regarding the treatment of evidence of mental illness and the distinction between a legal presumption and a permissible inference.

The trial judge incorrectly suggested that evidence of mental illness could only be relevant to sentencing and failed to properly instruct the jury that such evidence could negate the mental element required for murder.

The court also noted deficiencies in how the trial judge responded to the jury's request for clarification on the state of mind required for murder.

A new trial was ordered.

Appeal from conviction for arson and possession of incendiary material.

The appellant, an unrepresented accused in custody, was convicted after a two-day trial.

The appeal raised issues concerning the Crown's disclosure obligations to an unrepresented accused and the trial judge's duty to assist such an accused.

The Crown failed to ensure the appellant received a substantial disclosure package of over 500 pages containing witness statement transcripts and fire investigation photographs, which was couriered to the custodial institution but not properly communicated to the appellant.

The trial judge failed to adequately inquire into disclosure issues when they became apparent during trial.

The court found both a breach of the right to disclosure and inadequate judicial assistance, resulting in impairment of the right to make full answer and defence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, five counts of aggravated assault, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and reckless discharge of a firearm arising from a shooting at the Eaton Centre.

The sole ground of appeal concerned the jury selection procedure.

The trial judge directed that the truth of challenges for cause be determined by static triers without a proper application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had expressly and repeatedly declined to make such an application and sought rotating triers instead.

The Court of Appeal found this constituted jurisdictional error, as the default rule requires rotating triers and static triers may only be ordered upon satisfaction of statutory conditions precedent, including an application by the accused.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a review motion and appeals in a family law matter involving guardianship and estate issues.

The court awarded costs to the successful party, Michael Childs, on a partial indemnity basis.

The costs were to be paid from the assets of the incapable person (Eileen Childs) through her guardian, BMO Trust Company, with the amounts to be offset against any inheritance received by the unsuccessful parties.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of armed robbery, four counts of forcible confinement, and breaking and entering a dwelling house to commit an indictable offence following a home invasion robbery.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's Charter application challenging the admissibility of statements made to police before consulting with counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in multiple respects regarding the requirement to provide a Prosper warning.

The trial judge incorrectly found that the appellant was not reasonably diligent in seeking legal advice by choosing to wait until the next day to speak to his lawyer of choice, failed to recognize that an apparent change of mind about seeking counsel without delay triggers the Prosper warning requirement, and erred in finding that a standard police caution was an adequate substitute for a Prosper warning.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the appellant's statements should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Without these statements, the Crown's case could not proceed, and the convictions were quashed with acquittals entered.

The appellant, a rapper performing under the name Avalanche the Architect, appealed the dismissal of his libel action against a newspaper and its reporter.

The action was struck as statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The core issue was whether the Act's notice and limitation periods apply to online newspaper articles.

The court held that the Act applies to online versions of newspapers, that the limitation period begins when the libel comes to the plaintiff's knowledge, and that the plaintiff's initial complaint did not constitute proper notice under the Act as it merely complained of factual errors without asserting libel.

The appeal was dismissed.

Members of Branch 1-7 of the Polish Alliance of Canada sought to withdraw from the organization and take with them a property held in trust for the branch members.

The trial judge found that 100% of the branch members had voted to leave and applied the "clubman's veto" doctrine, permitting them to depart with the property.

The Polish Alliance of Canada appealed, arguing that the clubman's veto did not apply because PAC was incorporated under the Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the clubman's veto applied to the unincorporated branch and that there was no statutory displacement of the common law rule.

An appeal concerning the validity of a continuing power of attorney for property executed by an elderly woman in favour of one of her twin sons.

The appellant challenged the validity of the power of attorney on grounds of undue influence and suspicious circumstances, arguing that the respondent son had coerced the grantor into executing the document by restricting her access to funds needed for basic living expenses.

The motion judge upheld the validity of the power of attorney, finding no evidence of undue influence or suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the transaction was rational and explicable by the parties' relationship, and that the motion judge correctly applied the law.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between two cottage owners on Lake Erie.

The respondents constructed a road and steps on what they believed was their property to improve access to the lakeshore, permitting the appellant and other neighbours to use these improvements.

Upon discovering that much of the work had been performed on the appellant's adjacent lot, the appellant sued for trespass damages.

The respondents counterclaimed for title by adverse possession.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's trespass claim and granted the respondents title to approximately 3,400 square feet by adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by granting the adverse possession claim without making an explicit finding that the respondents had effectively excluded the appellant from possession.

The evidence demonstrated the opposite—the respondents had permitted the appellant and others to use the road and steps freely.

The respondent brought a claim for unjust enrichment to recover money she paid to acquire and renovate a house registered in the appellants' names.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent, finding unjust enrichment and awarding her $221,914.11.

The appellants appealed, arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate given conflicting evidence regarding the parties' agreement and that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment, finding that the motion judge failed to adequately explain how she resolved conflicts in evidence, made insufficient credibility findings, and failed to properly analyze the equities and mutual benefits exchanged between the parties.

Four appellants appealed their convictions for fraud over $5,000 and conspiracy to commit fraud, as well as a count of knowingly contributing to an activity of a criminal organization.

The convictions arose from a large-scale telemarketing advance fee scheme operating from multiple "boiler rooms" in the Toronto area, where telemarketers defrauded American residents by falsely promising loans from fictitious lenders and demanding advance payments.

The Crown's case relied on fingerprint evidence, surveillance evidence, and the appellants' presence at the locations.

The appellants challenged various aspects of the trial, including jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's conduct or instructions, and concluding that the verdicts were reasonable on the evidence.

Two consolidated appeals concerning guardianship and personal care arrangements for an elderly woman with Alzheimer's disease.

The applications judge appointed one daughter as guardian of personal care and a trust company as guardian of property, with compensation awarded to the daughter for past care services.

A subsequent motion to vary the guardianship order was heard based on changed circumstances.

The appellants challenged the guardianship appointments, the compensation award, and alleged judicial bias and misconduct by the section 3 counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no error in the applications judge's decisions and rejecting allegations of bias and misconduct.

The appellant was convicted of child abduction contrary to section 282 of the Criminal Code after taking her seven-year-old daughter to China in December 2010 without the knowledge or consent of the child's father and refusing to disclose the child's whereabouts upon return to Canada.

The trial judge imposed a seven-year sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, raising 14 grounds of appeal including allegations of illegality, perjury, and judicial misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial was conducted fairly and the evidence overwhelmingly established guilt.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part regarding pre-sentence custody credit, which was recalculated at a 1.5:1 ratio rather than 1:1, resulting in a reduction of the sentence by 14 months.

The Crown brought a motion for directions seeking to abridge time, dismiss the appellant's appeal from conviction and sentence, and issue a warrant for the appellant's arrest.

The appellant had been convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud and falsely obtaining a refund or credit under the Income Tax Act, and was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment.

Released pending appeal with a surrender date of May 1, 2017, the appellant failed to surrender and lost contact with counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted all three orders, finding the appellant in breach of his recognizance and deeming his failure to surrender as an abandonment of his appeal.

The appellant appealed a 15-month jail sentence imposed for two counts of making false statements contrary to the Canada Small Business Financing Act and three counts of fraud contrary to the Criminal Code.

The appellant had exploited the Canada Small Business Financing Program by using false documents to secure loans for his own business and seven other business entities, resulting in over $1 million in loans advanced and $409,000 in losses to Industry Canada.

The appellant extracted $192,000 in fees and obtained $100,000 through his own company.

The sentencing judge imposed imprisonment after finding that a conditional sentence would not sufficiently advance general deterrence and denunciation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and breach of probation.

The victim was his teenage daughter, from whom he had been estranged for many years before reconnecting in 2010.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessments and claimed the trial judge applied inconsistent standards of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were entitled to deference and were supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, as was the abandoned sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant had driven across three lanes of oncoming traffic at high speed on a major highway, collided with another vehicle, and crashed into the median.

The appellant argued that the accident may have resulted from falling asleep at the wheel and challenged the trial judge's finding of impairment by alcohol.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments.

While the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the evaporation rate of alcohol, the court applied the proviso, finding that the overwhelming evidence supported the conviction regardless of this error.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing a 2½-year-old child in his care and assault causing bodily harm.

He was acquitted of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the jury instructions were inadequate, that the murder conviction was unreasonable, and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the jury was properly instructed, that the evidence supported the murder conviction, and that the verdicts were reconcilable based on their different elements and temporal distinctions.

On sentencing, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of his Aboriginal status, which was admitted but found insufficient to warrant a reduction in the 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of his motion to set aside a settlement and consent order dismissing his action.

The appellant acknowledged signing the settlement but argued he did so following a lengthy examination while suffering from a headache and other ailments, claiming incapacity.

The motion judge found the appellant had not met his burden of proof and there was no legally justifiable reason to set aside the settlement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, finding the evidence fell short of establishing incapacity.

The appellant also challenged the costs award, but the court found the official transcript supported the formal order and declined to interfere.

A pawnbroker brought an application under s. 490(7) and (9)(c) of the Criminal Code seeking return of a diamond seized by police during a criminal investigation.

The diamond had been stolen from the deceased and pawned to the pawnbroker, from whom police seized it.

The application judge granted the order without notice to the estate of the deceased, who had an ownership interest in the diamond.

The estate appealed, arguing it was entitled to participate in the application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that although the pawnbroker met the statutory notice requirements by notifying the Attorney General, the application was made on an ex parte basis and the pawnbroker failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, including the estate's competing claim to the diamond.