Gary T. Trotter

An appeal from a Superior Court judgment concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a testator's will.

The deceased's will permitted his common law spouse to remain in his home on the condition that only she and two tenants occupy the residence.

The lower court found that the spouse breached the will's terms by allowing her family to live at the property, terminated her right to remain, and removed the co-estate trustee for conflict of interest.

The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, finding no factual or legal error and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The moving parties sought an order quashing an appeal from a Superior Court judgment on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

The lower court had declared the appellant mentally incapable and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order under appeal was interlocutory in nature, relating to a procedural matter rather than the merits of the proceeding, and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court rather than the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellant's right to apply to the Divisional Court for leave to appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the killing of Kerlon Charles.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Cleavon Springer, a Crown witness of unsavoury character, who testified that the appellant and six others lured the deceased to an apartment and that the appellant killed the deceased in an execution-style shooting.

The appellant denied being present in the apartment.

The trial judge left second degree murder with the jury despite the defence objection, instructing the jury that the appellant could be guilty as a party to the murder even if they had reasonable doubt that he was the shooter.

After conviction, a juror filed an affidavit claiming that another juror made comments about the appellant's criminal record and gang affiliation, and that the juror had sent her websites about the appellant's criminal history after the verdict.

The trial judge declined to conduct a further inquiry into jury deliberations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and dismissed the appeal on both grounds.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his motion for default judgment against the respondent law firms.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found that the order appealed from was interlocutory in nature, as it did not finally determine any issue in the proceeding.

Accordingly, jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellant's right to apply to the Divisional Court for leave to appeal.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to each of the two moving parties.

The appellants sought an injunction against the respondent to prevent the operation of a restaurant at a neighbouring property.

The appellants contended that the property was not zoned for commercial use and that the City of Toronto had acted improperly in issuing a building permit.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that the appellants' objection was based on confusion regarding the property's municipal address.

The legal address was zoned to permit restaurants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the application judge erred in allowing Toronto to appear as amicus curiae because Toronto had been an adverse party in previous proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was proper for the application judge to allow Toronto to make submissions and that there was no merit to the underlying zoning issue.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated April 29, 2016.

The appellant, found NCRMD for sexual assault, challenged the Board's decision to continue his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit rather than place him in a general forensic unit or impose a hybrid order allowing discretionary transfer.

The appellant conceded he remained a significant threat to public safety and that detention was appropriate, but argued the Board erred in: (1) failing to provide reasons for rejecting a hybrid order; (2) misapprehending evidence regarding his low risk for coercive sexual contact; and (3) failing to apply the least restrictive disposition test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the Board's disposition.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempt to obstruct justice, arguing that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of reasonable doubt and that the evidence did not support a finding of intent to obstruct justice.

The trial judge had found that the appellant drove a person to a remote property north of Parry Sound to familiarize him with the location so that a false confession to a marijuana cultivation charge would be credible.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's findings were reasonable on the evidence and that once the trial judge accepted the Crown's evidence regarding the trip to the property, it was open to conclude that the appellant had the requisite intent.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction for mischief to property under $5,000, alleging bias on the part of both the trial judge and the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge.

The applicant had smashed four windows of the CBC building in Ottawa using a sledgehammer to draw attention to perceived historical abuses by government officials and other entities.

The trial judge dismissed the applicant's Charter application to stay proceedings and found him guilty, imposing a suspended sentence and one year of probation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Judge dismissed the subsequent appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no indication of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias, determined the trial was conducted fairly, and refused leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's admission of evidence of a firearm found in a vehicle he was operating.

The appellant argued he was arbitrarily detained and that police violated his Charter rights by failing to immediately advise him of the reason for detention and his rights to counsel.

The trial judge found the detention was not arbitrary, as police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the cumulative behavior of the occupants, and found Charter violations but admitted the evidence under the R. v. Grant test.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's decision.

The appellant was convicted of arson under sections 433 and 434 of the Criminal Code for deliberately setting fire to his two-storey building in Espanola with the intent to collect insurance proceeds.

The Crown's case relied on evidence of motive, planning, preparation, forensic evidence linking the appellant to the fire, and testimony from a disreputable witness who was likely an accomplice.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: that the trial judge improperly used neutral evidence to confirm the accomplice's account, misused the appellant's exculpatory statements as evidence of guilt, improperly excluded relevant evidence through misapplication of the collateral fact rule, and engaged in speculative reasoning inconsistent with the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made some errors, they were not material to the conviction given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

An employee of the Ontario Psychological Association appealed a motion judge's decision striking out paragraphs of her counterclaim that sought contribution and indemnity against six named defendants who were officers and/or directors of the Association.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the six individuals owed no duty of care to the employee.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments that the individuals failed to supervise her properly and that they owed a duty to the Association that, if breached, would result in liability for the appellant's conversion of the Association's money.

Leave to amend was denied.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a family law matter involving division of net family property, child support, and spousal support.

The trial judge ordered an equal division of net family property (proceeds from the matrimonial home), denied child support on the basis that the respondent's income was insufficient and the children had repudiated their relationship with their mother, and ordered the appellant to pay spousal support of $500 per month based on imputed income of $40,000.

The appellant appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias, erroneous denial of child support, improper imputation of income, and failure to order unequal division of family property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the application for fresh evidence.

The appellant moved to review an order dismissing his motion for a stay pending appeal of a Superior Court order that had dismissed his motion to pay monies into court or obtain an injunction preventing the sale of property in Tyendinaga Township by HSBC.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the property sale arose from proceedings between the appellant and HSBC that had been fully and finally resolved on consent.

The appellant's claim based on Simcoe Treaty 3.5 and alleged Métis rights was found to be unsupported by adequate evidence.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a family law matter arising from a 40-year marriage.

The trial judge ordered an equalization payment of $140,000 from the wife to the husband, dismissed the wife's claim for an unequal division of net family property, and awarded costs of $109,248 to the husband.

The wife appealed on three grounds: rejection of her expert evidence regarding farm equipment valuation, failure to award an unequal share of net family property based on alleged reckless depletion, and the quantum of costs awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of expert evidence, his analysis of the net family property claim, or his costs award.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding moral damages of $60,000 for breach of the implied contractual obligation of good faith in the manner of dismissal, along with general damages of ten months' salary in lieu of notice and $25,000 for sexual harassment under the Human Rights Code.

The appellants contended the moral damages award should be reduced to $20,000, arguing the trial judge considered irrelevant factors and that the award duplicated the sexual harassment damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the manner of dismissal holistically, including pre- and post-termination conduct that constituted bad faith.

The court held that moral damages and Human Rights Code damages serve different purposes and do not constitute double recovery.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault for anally penetrating a 19-year-old co-worker at a workplace Christmas party without consent.

The trial judge sentenced him to nine months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada, appealed on the basis that the sentence was unfit, particularly given that a sentence of six months or more would trigger immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, resulting in loss of the right to appeal a removal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and holding that the trial judge did not err in first determining an appropriate sentence and then considering whether immigration consequences warranted reduction.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the Crown's case.

The moving parties argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to directed verdict applications involving circumstantial evidence.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the test remains whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, which involves only a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity and murderous intent for both moving parties, the court dismissed the directed verdict applications.

The accused were charged with second-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, two of the accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of a street encounter with police the day after the homicide, arguing their rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the accused were psychologically detained when four officers approached them, separated them, and questioned them without advising them of their right to counsel.

The court held that the officers' failure to properly record the encounter and their attempts to minimize it as a 'social call' exacerbated the breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the court also noted the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements due to the lack of a reliable record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from an attack on the victim in his bedroom.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder, unlawful confinement, and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the appellant was one of three assailants based on evidence including his association with known assailants before and after the attack, the presence of the victim's blood on the appellant's pants, and corroborating testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected four grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.