Gary T. Trotter

The appellant was convicted of one count of break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence, two counts of break and enter and commit an indictable offence, and three counts of possession of break-in instruments, arising from three Subway restaurant break-ins in Sault Ste.

Marie over five days in July 2012.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to connect the appellant to all three incidents.

On appeal, the Court found that the trial judge erred in his use of the appellant's criminal record and made material misapprehensions of the evidence regarding DNA on a balaclava, the appellant's cast on his right arm, and glass particles on his clothing.

These errors were essential to the trial judge's reasoning process and undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon (a lamp) entered by Justice Jane E. Kelly on May 15, 2012.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, and insufficiency of reasons/unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, no reversal of the burden of proof, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the evidentiary concerns and met the functional requirements for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal from a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the conviction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and set aside the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, substituting in its place a conviction for common assault.

The sentence had already been served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant argued that police lacked sufficient grounds for arrest based on information from a confidential informant, contending there was insufficient information regarding the informant's source of knowledge and that inadequate corroboration was provided.

The appellant also alleged the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof on the Charter s. 8 voir dire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the test from R. v. Debot and that the totality of circumstances supported reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death, criminal negligence causing death, and manslaughter.

The court addressed the issue of multiple convictions, conditionally staying manslaughter and dangerous driving causing death, and entering a conviction for criminal negligence causing death.

The court also criticized the Pre-Sentence Report for inappropriate content.

Considering aggravating and mitigating factors, including the accused's youth, lack of prior criminal record, and the absence of alcohol, the court imposed a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, followed by three years of probation, and a 15-year driving prohibition.

This is a voir dire ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by the accused, Anthony Alas, who was charged with second-degree murder.

The primary issue was whether the statements were the product of an atmosphere of oppression, specifically due to the police's alleged failure to provide the accused with stomach medication.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary, concluding that the accused's will was not overborne by police conduct or the circumstances.

The court considered the accused's mental state, the absence of threats or inducements (including any suggestion regarding his partner's potential arrest), and the presence of oppressive circumstances.

Despite some concerns about how the accused's medical needs were handled, the court determined that the overall police conduct was polite and accommodating, and the interview was calm and non-confrontational.

The accused were involved in a large-scale marijuana trafficking operation.

Following guilty findings based on Agreed Statements of Fact, the court proceeded to sentencing.

The primary sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation were emphasized, particularly given the commercial nature and significant profits involved.

The court rejected arguments to delay sentencing based on anticipated changes to marijuana laws, affirming the rule of law.

State misconduct in the investigation, while acknowledged, was deemed to have negligible impact on sentencing.

Credit was given for onerous bail conditions and the efficient conduct of the trial through Agreed Statements of Fact.

Conditional sentences were deemed inappropriate, with penitentiary sentences warranted for all accused.

The Crown sought to quash the preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondent, Justin Allison, on firearms and drug charges via a certiorari application.

The police found a loaded firearm, drugs, and Allison's identification in an apartment he was seen entering with a key.

The preliminary inquiry judge found the evidence of Allison's knowledge and control over the contraband to be speculative.

The Superior Court, reviewing for jurisdictional error, affirmed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, emphasizing the limited scope of review and that occupancy alone is insufficient to establish knowledge.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, Christopher Husbands, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider mistaken belief in consent, insufficient reasons for rejecting the accused's evidence, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no air of reality to the mistaken belief in consent defence given the accepted facts, sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony based on inconsistencies, and no error in applying differential credibility findings as long as the same standard of scrutiny was applied.

The accused drove his vehicle through a red light at a high rate of speed, striking and killing a cyclist who had the right of way in a crosswalk.

Prior to the collision, the accused was speeding, nearly hit a school bus, and took his eyes off the road to adjust his radio.

The court found the accused's conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person, showing a wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death, criminal negligence causing death, and manslaughter.

The accused, charged with kidnapping for ransom and related offences, applied for a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The reviewing judge found that the original bail judge erred in disqualifying the accused's mother as a surety simply because she believed in his innocence.

With a bolstered release plan including a larger financial pledge, an additional surety, and electronic monitoring, the court concluded the secondary and tertiary concerns were adequately addressed.

The application was granted and the accused was released on strict conditions.

The accused, suffering from schizophrenia and experiencing delusions, stabbed four strangers and brandished a knife at two others.

He was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and weapons offences.

The court found that the accused had the specific intent to kill for the attempted murder charge.

However, based on psychiatric evidence, the court concluded that the accused was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong due to his mental disorder.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and breach of an undertaking, as well as a mandatory lifetime SOIRA order.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on MSN messages to find consciousness of guilt and to reject his testimony.

The Superior Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered circumstantial evidence, including the content of the messages and the appellant's own testimony, to authenticate the electronic correspondence.

The court quashed the sentence appeal, concluding there is no statutory jurisdiction to appeal a mandatory SOIRA order made under section 490.012(1) of the Criminal Code.

The offender, a pastor, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against two young parishioners during a purported religious 'cleansing' ceremony.

The Crown sought a sentence of 3 to 5 months' imprisonment, emphasizing the egregious abuse of trust.

The court agreed that the offences warranted a 5-month custodial sentence to address denunciation and deterrence.

However, the court found that the offender's almost three years spent on stringent house arrest bail conditions, which prevented him from working, had a substantial impact on his life and amounted to a form of punishment.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court granted credit for the house arrest equal to the requested custodial term, imposing a suspended sentence with three years of probation, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and SOIRA orders.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for driving 'over 80', alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

She argued that trial counsel failed to request maintenance and calibration records for the approved instrument and that his failings caused adjudicative unfairness.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel provided reasonable professional assistance by retaining an expert, considering defences, and holding the Crown to its burden of proof, and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The accused appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) made after conviction for dangerous driving, assault with a weapon, and taking a motor vehicle without consent.

The NCR hearing occurred unexpectedly when the accused appeared in court expecting to be sentenced, and newly appointed special duty counsel provided minimal challenge to psychiatric evidence supporting an NCR finding.

The Superior Court held the proceedings lacked procedural fairness and amounted to a miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the NCR application was effectively undefended and conducted prematurely.

The NCR finding was set aside and a new trial ordered limited to the issue of NCR.

The accused brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel after Legal Aid Ontario denied coverage.

The court considered whether the accused had been denied Legal Aid, lacked the financial means to retain counsel, and whether counsel was necessary to ensure a fair trial given the seriousness and complexity of the case.

The charges involved significant financial transactions, alleged fraud and bankruptcy-related offences, and potentially complex evidentiary and procedural issues including third-party records applications.

The court found the accused was indigent, unable to retain private counsel, and that the legal complexity and seriousness of the charges created a real risk of an unfair trial if he proceeded self-represented.

A temporary stay was granted to permit the Crown to arrange funding for defence counsel.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code, alleging the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, erred in applying the law of consent, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The prosecution theory at trial was that the complainant was unconscious due to intoxication and therefore incapable of consenting.

The appellate judge held that the trial judge was entitled to assess the complainant’s credibility, draw common‑sense inferences about intoxication and unconsciousness without expert evidence, and conclude that the Crown had not proven lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also held that the Crown cannot appeal an acquittal solely on the ground that it is unreasonable absent another error of law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration following guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual touching of a minor.

The offender, an Aboriginal man with a hebephilic preference and a history of substance abuse, argued for a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court found that while the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender, there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of his risk in the community through intensive treatment, including sex-drive reducing medication.

The court designated him a long-term offender and sentenced him to an additional 2 years in a federal penitentiary, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a justice of the peace’s order releasing the accused on bail for an attempted murder charge arising from a gang-related shooting.

The Crown argued that detention was required on the secondary and tertiary grounds and that the release decision was clearly inappropriate.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s framework in St‑Cloud governing bail reviews under ss. 520 and 521, the court held that intervention is warranted only for legal error, a clearly inappropriate decision, or material new evidence.

The reviewing judge concluded that the justice of the peace committed no legal error and that the balancing of factors under s. 515(10)(b) and (c) was not clearly inappropriate, particularly given the circumstantial nature of the Crown’s case.

The Crown’s bail review application was dismissed.