Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The sole ground of appeal argued that the trial judge improperly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunn by diminishing the weight of the defence evidence because the defence version was not put to Crown witnesses during cross-examination.

The appellate court held that trial judges retain discretion in determining how to address a breach of the rule, including considering the failure to cross-examine when assessing credibility.

The court found that defence counsel had the opportunity to seek recall of witnesses after the issue was raised but chose not to do so.

The trial judge’s treatment of the issue was a permissible exercise of discretion and did not amount to reversible error.

The accused was sentenced following conviction for sexual assault and breach of probation after groping a woman on a public transit vehicle while subject to a prohibition against being on transit property.

The court considered the offender’s extensive criminal record for similar sexual offences and repeated breaches of court orders.

Although the offender argued that treatment for a paraphilic disorder should remain central to sentencing, the court concluded that previous rehabilitative approaches had failed.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public, the court imposed consecutive custodial sentences and a lengthy probation order with transit prohibitions and no‑contact conditions.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the accused, who was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found that the accused's section 7 Charter rights were violated due to excessive force and mistreatment by police officers while in custody.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding a Charter breach and correctly exercised his discretion under section 24(1) to grant a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault with a weapon following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, where an absolute discharge had been imposed.

The case largely turned on the credibility of the complainant, the sole witness.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence suggesting the complainant may have misled the court about whether he had read a letter from his son before providing it to the Crown.

The court admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have been used to impeach the complainant’s credibility and might have created reasonable doubt.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a recognizance contrary to s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code.

The accused had been subject to a bail condition prohibiting him from driving while also serving a 90‑day administrative driver’s licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act.

After the suspension expired and a temporary licence was issued, he drove and was charged with breaching the bail condition.

The trial judge acquitted on the basis that the accused may have honestly forgotten the bail condition and therefore lacked the necessary mens rea.

The Superior Court held that s. 145(3) requires subjective fault and that an honest mistake of fact may raise a reasonable doubt, while a mistake of law cannot.

As there was some evidentiary basis for the trial judge’s reasonable doubt regarding the accused’s state of mind, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction decision finding him not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault and uttering threats after spitting on and threatening a bus driver.

The trial judge had accepted psychiatric evidence diagnosing schizophrenia and concluding that delusional beliefs rendered the appellant incapable of knowing his actions were wrong under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the NCR finding was unreasonable because the expert did not explicitly ask whether he knew his actions were wrong and because he testified that he did.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge reasonably relied on the psychiatric evidence and the appellant’s disorganized testimony to conclude that his delusions prevented him from knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The evidentiary record supported the NCR finding on a balance of probabilities.

The accused was charged with four counts of fraud over $5,000 arising from two real estate transactions involving Toronto properties.

The Crown alleged the accused orchestrated mortgage fraud schemes using straw purchasers and falsified financial documentation to obtain mortgage funds from a bank, which were insured by a federal housing corporation.

The court found that the purchasers lacked the financial means to service the mortgages and that fraudulent employment and financial documents were submitted to secure financing.

Evidence demonstrated that the accused directed the transactions, received substantial proceeds from the mortgage funds, and facilitated the discharge of existing mortgages on the properties.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly participated in and benefited from the fraudulent schemes.

The appellant appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault arising from incidents involving a workplace colleague.

The Crown conceded that two counts were outside the six‑month limitation period for summary conviction proceedings under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal court set aside those two convictions and entered acquittals.

The appellant further argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, improperly relied on a prior consistent statement, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and the accused.

The court rejected these grounds, finding no error in the trial judge’s credibility analysis or use of corroborative evidence, and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded handgun and marijuana while a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police.

He conceded the essential elements of the offences but sought exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) arising from an arbitrary vehicle stop and unlawful search.

The court assessed conflicting evidence from the accused and several police officers regarding the circumstances of the stop, including driving behaviour and the detection of marijuana odour.

The judge accepted the officers’ evidence that the vehicle was being driven in a careless or erratic manner contrary to the Highway Traffic Act, justifying the investigative stop.

The subsequent arrest and searches were also justified after officers detected the smell of marijuana.

Even if Charter breaches had occurred, the evidence would not have been excluded under the Grant framework.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code arising from a collision on Highway 401.

The trial judge relied on a combination of breathalyzer readings below the legal limit and expert toxicology evidence indicating likely impairment, together with findings about the manner of the collision.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to breathalyzer readings, expert opinion, and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court held that while the trial judge did not err in evaluating the collision or the breathalyzer and expert evidence, the analysis of bolus drinking was flawed because it focused improperly on large consumption while driving and involved speculation about the location of a bottle of alcohol in the vehicle.

Given the central role of this reasoning to the finding of guilt, the conviction could not stand.

The offender was sentenced for multiple offences including attempting to procure a person into prostitution, breaches of a s. 810.2 recognizance, breaches of probation, and possession of stolen property.

The most serious offence involved attempting to recruit a 16‑year‑old into prostitution while subject to a recognizance intended to prevent serious personal injury offences.

The court emphasized the offender’s extensive criminal record involving violence, prostitution-related offences, and sexual offences against minors, as well as repeated breaches of court orders.

After crediting 23 months of pre-trial custody on a 1:1 basis, the court imposed an additional two years’ imprisonment followed by a three-year probation order with extensive supervisory and non-association conditions.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

The appellant was acquitted of assaulting his wife following a brief trial where he represented himself.

After the acquittal, the trial judge, acting proprio motu and without inviting submissions, ordered the appellant to enter into a common law peace bond.

When the appellant attempted to speak, the trial judge refused to let him.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice quashed the peace bond, holding that the failure to afford an individual an opportunity to make submissions before a liberty-depriving order is made constitutes a breach of the rules of natural justice and likely section 7 of the Charter.

The court determined, as a preliminary sentencing issue, whether attempted procuring into prostitution constituted a serious personal injury offence under s. 752 of the Criminal Code so as to permit dangerous or long-term offender proceedings under Part XXIV.

Although the offence carried a sufficient maximum penalty, the court held that on the proven facts there was no use or attempted use of violence, no conduct endangering life or safety, and no proof of severe psychological damage.

The complainant refused the proposal, and the evidentiary record, including the victim impact statement, did not establish severe psychological harm within the meaning of the statute.

Sentencing was therefore to proceed in the ordinary course rather than under the dangerous offender regime.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking charges, including the sale of a half kilogram of heroin to an undercover police officer.

He subsequently brought an application to stay the proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing that a police agent induced him to sell the drugs in exchange for documents related to a civil lawsuit.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding that he had a personal financial stake in the transactions and was not induced by the offer of documents.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and discovered a handgun, drugs, and cash.

The accused admitted possession of a quantity of cocaine and proceeds of crime but denied possessing the handgun and a second quantity of drugs, alleging police fabricated evidence.

Applying the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.), the court accepted the evidence of Emergency Task Force officers that the handgun was found in the accused’s waistband during the arrest and rejected allegations of fabrication.

The court found inconsistencies and improbabilities in the accused’s testimony and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the firearm.

However, the court had a reasonable doubt regarding the additional quantity of drugs allegedly discovered in the apartment due to irregularities in the handling and documentation of exhibits, and convicted only on the quantity the accused admitted possessing.

The accused stood trial on multiple charges including human trafficking, sexual assault, and prostitution-related offences involving three young women.

The Crown alleged the accused exploited the complainants' drug addictions to force them into prostitution.

The court found the evidence of the two adult complainants unreliable due to severe crack cocaine addiction and inconsistencies, and accepted the accused's evidence that he was merely their drug dealer, resulting in acquittals on those counts.

However, the court convicted the accused of attempting to procure a 16-year-old complainant into prostitution and breaching his recognizance by being alone with her.

The appellant appealed her conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code, stemming from her breach of a 1994 injunction prohibiting protests outside abortion clinics.

She argued that s. 127 was ultra vires Parliament, overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, and that her prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding s. 127 to be valid criminal law and appropriately tailored.

The court also held that the appellant's attempt to challenge the enforcement of the injunction constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the original order.

During a criminal trial for sexual offences, the Crown sought to admit a video‑recorded police statement given by the accused.

After a blended voir dire, the court found the statement voluntary but concluded that the accused’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter had been infringed because police failed to adequately address obvious language difficulties during the arrest and interview process.

The court held that the officers should have inquired further into the accused’s English comprehension and offered interpreter assistance to ensure meaningful exercise of the right to counsel.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court determined that admission of the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The statement was therefore excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

After being found guilty of multiple counts of possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

The court considered the entrapment framework from R. v. Mack and subsequent appellate authority, including R. v. Imoro, which distinguishes between legitimate investigative steps and providing an opportunity to commit an offence without reasonable suspicion.

The court held that the officer’s initial question during a phone call did not provide an opportunity to commit a crime but was merely an investigative step.

Reasonable suspicion crystallized when the accused willingly engaged in drug-related conversation using recognized slang for cocaine quantities.

The subsequent offences were independently committed by the accused and were not the product of police inducement.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and failure to stop for police, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on the appellant’s silence at the scene as a factor in rejecting his testimony.

The appeal court held that using an accused’s failure to protest innocence at the scene as a credibility factor is impermissible.

Because the trial judge’s reasoning indicated that this improper factor formed part of the chain of reasoning leading to conviction, the court could not conclude that the verdict would inevitably have been the same without it.

The conviction was therefore set aside.

A new trial was ordered on both counts and the conditional stay on the failure to stop charge was lifted.