Gary T. Trotter

The applicant sought an order in the nature of certiorari to quash a summons issued by a justice of the peace under s. 810 of the Criminal Code for a peace bond.

The applicant argued the summons was invalid based on the merits of the complainant's allegations.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error by the justice of the peace, who properly received the information and issued the summons as required by the statute.

The court noted that arguments regarding the merits must be resolved at the peace bond hearing.

The appellant was convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code after violating an injunction protecting an abortion clinic.

She appealed, arguing that the injunction was unenforceable against her because she was not a named party to the original proceedings, and that she should have been charged with criminal contempt instead of a s. 127 offence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the injunction expressly applied to non-parties and that her argument constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court further held that s. 127 of the Criminal Code is a valid mechanism for enforcing court orders against non-parties, alongside the common law power of criminal contempt.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and the resulting conditional discharge.

He argued that he received ineffective representation from a law student agent at Downtown Legal Services, and that the trial judge erred in various evidentiary and substantive rulings, including the application of the de minimis doctrine.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant received effective representation, the trial was fair, and the sentence was fit given the domestic context of the assault.

The applicant sought release on bail while charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder arising from a group attack on a public street.

Applying the reverse onus provisions and the tertiary ground framework, the court found the applicant had discharged the onus on the primary ground but failed on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court relied on strong surveillance evidence, the applicant's alleged misleading police statement, the inadequacy of the proposed supervision plan, the gravity of the offences, and the likelihood of a lengthy penitentiary sentence.

The bail application was dismissed.

In a criminal prosecution for sexual offences against a child, the accused brought a third-party records application after the Crown inadvertently disclosed a DVD of the complainant's therapy session.

The court held that, because the disclosure was illegal and directly engaged Parliament's concern with protecting the confidential patient-therapist relationship, the DVD had to be returned and any future access determined under ss. 278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the likely relevance threshold, the court found that differences between the complainant's police interviews and preliminary inquiry evidence, together with the fact of multiple therapy sessions, amounted only to speculation.

The application was dismissed and all copies of the therapy session were ordered returned to the court for sealing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault arising from a domestic dispute where he was found to have pushed a garbage bag into his wife's face.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant of more serious assault allegations from the same incident due to credibility concerns but convicted him on the garbage bag incident.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to adequately explain why he could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on one part of the incident but not the other, and expressed concern over the trial judge's application of the standard of proof.

The conviction was set aside and, given the circumstances and time passed, no new trial was ordered.

The accused struck and killed a highly intoxicated pedestrian who was wandering on Highway 401 after being abandoned by a taxi driver.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and 'over 80' causing death.

While the Crown proved the accused was impaired and had a blood-alcohol level over the legal limit, the court found the accused was not the legal cause of the death.

The pedestrian's unpredictable presence on the live lanes of the highway created an unavoidable hazard.

The accused was acquitted of the 'causing death' offences but convicted of the included offences of impaired driving and operating a vehicle while 'over 80'.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault, unlawful confinement, and breach of recognizance arising from allegations made by a complainant in a former intimate relationship.

Although the court rejected the argument that the trial verdict was unreasonable, it admitted as fresh evidence the complainant's later trial testimony giving a materially different account of the incident.

Applying the Palmer framework and recantation authorities, the court held that the later sworn evidence had substantial impeachment value on the decisive issue of credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from a nightclub attack in which the victim was choked and struck in the face with a bottle.

He argued that the trial judge improperly treated his utterances to police, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of a key Crown witness and the defence, and misapprehended aspects of the evidence.

The court held that the impugned utterances were used only to assess the credibility of the appellant's claim that he was acting as a peacemaker, that no uneven scrutiny was shown, and that any alleged misapprehensions were peripheral rather than material.

The appeal was dismissed.

Summary conviction appeal from a conviction for failing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the police failed to make the Approved Screening Device demand “forthwith” because several minutes elapsed before the demand was issued.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly applied the governing jurisprudence and reasonably concluded that the demand, made approximately seven minutes after detention when the device arrived, satisfied the “forthwith” requirement.

Although the trial judge identified technical breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, the breaches did not justify exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction decision declaring him not criminally responsible (NCR) for several offences, including criminal harassment, assault causing bodily harm, uttering a death threat, and breaching a recognizance.

He argued the NCR finding was unreasonable and based on a misapprehension of the evidence.

On appeal, the court admitted fresh psychiatric evidence that was unavailable at trial and which raised significant questions about the NCR conclusion.

Accepting the Crown’s concession, the court held that the fresh evidence could reasonably have affected the result.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered, limited solely to the NCR determination.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving based on “care or control” of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge found the accused intoxicated in the driver’s seat attempting to start a damaged vehicle but concluded there was no realistic risk of danger because the vehicle was inoperable.

On appeal, the court held the trial judge misapplied the presumption in s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Where the accused occupies the driver’s seat and fails to rebut the presumption by proving no intention to set the vehicle in motion, the elements of care or control are deemed established without additional proof of a realistic risk of danger.

The appeal was allowed and a conviction entered.

Sentencing for offences involving possession of a handgun without a licence or registration certificate, carrying a concealed weapon, and multiple breaches of recognizance conditions.

The accused was arrested in a public place with a handgun, ammunition incompatible with the firearm, drugs, and multiple cell phones while on bail.

The court emphasized the importance of denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public in handgun cases, while also considering the offender’s youth, rehabilitative efforts, supportive community ties, and positive pre‑sentence report.

The court rejected a conditional sentence as insufficient to meet sentencing objectives but determined that a penitentiary sentence was unnecessary.

A total custodial sentence of 21 months was imposed, reduced after credit for pre‑sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The appellant appealed a conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code arising from conduct outside an abortion clinic.

The alleged breach involved a civil injunction prohibiting certain activities within 500 feet of the clinic, including intimidation of patients and others.

The appeal court held that criminal liability for breach of an order requires proof that the accused violated a specific term of the order.

The evidence established only peaceful leafleting and silent protest, which did not constitute intimidation or other prohibited conduct within the meaning of the injunction.

The conviction was therefore unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The offender was sentenced after being convicted of impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death arising from a single-vehicle crash that killed a passenger.

The offender, a youthful first offender with no criminal record, had a projected blood‑alcohol concentration between 200 and 270 mg/100 ml and was travelling approximately twice the speed limit when he lost control of the vehicle.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence in fatal impaired driving cases while weighing mitigating factors including youth, good character, community support, and genuine remorse.

Conditional stays were entered on counts of causing death while over 80 and dangerous driving causing death pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence reflecting the seriousness of the conduct and the loss of life.

The accused faced an eight-count indictment arising largely from intercepted communications obtained under a lawful wiretap authorization.

He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in marijuana, while the remaining counts proceeded to a judge-alone trial.

The Crown alleged conspiracies to commit robbery, offers to transfer firearms and ammunition, and possession of a firearm and ammunition discovered during a police search.

The court held that the intercepted conversations demonstrated discussions about criminal conduct but did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had entered into an actual agreement to commit robbery or had made genuine offers to transfer firearms or ammunition.

The court also found insufficient evidence of control over the firearm and ammunition located in another residence.

The accused was convicted only on the count to which he pleaded guilty and acquitted on the remaining counts.

The accused faced charges for trafficking crack cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime arising from undercover drug purchases arranged through a police cold call.

After the Crown’s case, the accused conceded the evidence established guilt but applied for a stay based on entrapment.

The court held that the police lacked reasonable suspicion before contacting the accused because the investigation relied on an unverified confidential tip with no information about reliability, currency, or source credibility.

The undercover officer’s immediate request to purchase a specific quantity of drugs constituted an opportunity to commit an offence rather than a preliminary investigative step.

As the opportunity was provided without reasonable suspicion, the conduct amounted to entrapment and the proceedings were stayed.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following a guilty plea to sexual assault arising from the non‑disclosure and transmission of genital herpes (HSV‑2) during unprotected sexual intercourse.

The sentencing judge had imposed a conditional discharge with one year of probation, emphasizing the offender’s lack of criminal record, guilty plea, remorse, and potential immigration consequences.

The Crown argued the sentence was manifestly unfit and that the sentencing judge improperly minimized the importance of denunciation and general deterrence.

The Superior Court held that the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that the disposition was defensible in the context of a novel “test case” with little appellate guidance.

The Crown’s appeal from sentence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including robbery with a firearm, after robbing a taxi driver and a pedestrian using a BB gun.

The accused admitted to the acts but raised the defence of extreme intoxication due to a combination of alcohol and prescription drugs.

The court rejected the intoxication defence, finding the accused possessed the requisite intent and that section 33.1 of the Criminal Code barred the defence of extreme self-induced intoxication.

However, the court found that the BB gun was broken and could not be readily adapted to fire, meaning it did not meet the definition of a 'firearm' under section 2 of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of the firearm-specific offences but convicted of two counts of robbery.

The Crown sought estreatment and forfeiture of a $30,000 recognizance after the accused breached a house arrest condition by leaving his residence without a surety.

The accused had been released on bail with two sureties and strict conditions addressing substance abuse risks.

One surety temporarily delegated supervisory responsibilities to the other while leaving on vacation, without seeking a formal bail variation.

The court held that sureties cannot unilaterally delegate or restructure bail supervision and must seek formal variation where circumstances change.

Partial forfeiture was ordered against the accused and both sureties, balancing the importance of maintaining the “pull of bail” with the relatively limited harm caused by the brief breach.