Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to stop at the scene of an accident, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, operation of a motor vehicle while over 80 causing bodily harm, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding in-dock identification evidence from eyewitnesses; and second, that the trial judge erred in noting that a passenger may have had an interest in the outcome due to her friendship with the appellant.

The appellate court found no error in either ground and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for assault against his girlfriend.

The appellant was convicted under s. 265 of the Criminal Code and received a suspended sentence with nine months of probation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed his appeal.

The appellant argued that leave to appeal should be granted because the Summary Conviction Appeal Court erred in relying on aggravating factors not considered by the sentencing judge and in misapplying the law regarding immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that any errors were inconsequential and that both the sentencing judge and Summary Conviction Appeal Court properly considered the appellant's immigration status.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against the two daughters of his former girlfriend, with offences alleged between 2002 and 2004.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's denials and accepted the complainants' evidence.

The appellant was sentenced to two years less one day imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, finding that counsel failed to review a police statement with the appellant, failed to prepare him for cross-examination on that statement, and failed to intervene during cross-examination.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of an illegal weapon, challenging the trial judge's finding that the firing pin for the weapon was "readily sourced and available." The appellant argued this conclusion was speculative and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidentiary record, including evidence that the gun was common in the United States where parts were readily available, and that smuggling of parts into Canada occurs despite legal prohibitions.

The appellant appealed a 12-month prison sentence imposed for fraud over $5,000 contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, an accountant and real estate agent, had prepared 292 false tax returns using clients' personal information without consent between 2009 and 2012, obtaining $35,321 through fraudulent tax refunds while attempting to obtain $343,840.

The sentencing judge rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation as paramount in fraud cases involving breaches of trust.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider his offer of restitution.

The Court of Appeal found the failure to consider restitution was an error in principle but held it did not impact the sentence imposed, as restitution must take a secondary role to deterrence and denunciation in large-scale fraud cases involving breaches of trust.

The appellant, a self-employed eavestrough installer, purchased disability insurance from the respondent insurer.

After suffering injuries from a fall in 2007, he received disability benefits until November 2011, when the insurer terminated payments.

The insurer's lawyer sent a letter in January 2012 explaining the termination.

The appellant did not commence an action until April 2015, more than two years after the termination.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the insurer breached its duty of good faith by failing to inform him of the applicable limitation period when it terminated his benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an insurer's duty of good faith does not require it to give notice of a limitation period to its insured.

The appellant husband appealed the trial judge's decision to set aside a separation agreement on the grounds of material misrepresentation regarding the value of his company, Renegade Capital Corporation, at the date of marriage.

The husband had valued Renegade at $7.6 million using book value, when the trial judge found it was worth nil based on market value analysis.

The trial judge also recalculated the equalization payment and awarded retroactive child support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the husband had breached his disclosure obligations and materially misrepresented his assets.

The court affirmed that the duty to disclose includes the duty to fairly value assets, and that the onus is on the party disclosing to establish the recipient's actual knowledge of any falsehood.

The appellant slipped on ice in the parking lot of an apartment building and broke his leg.

The landlord, Cemcor Apartments Inc., had contracted with Myles Property Management Inc. to clear snow and ice from the parking lot.

The appellant sued for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The trial judge found that Cemcor had a reasonable winter maintenance policy in place and that the parking lot was adequately cleared at the time of the accident, with the appellant's fall occurring on an isolated slippery spot.

The trial judge dismissed the claim.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the factual findings regarding the condition of the parking lot and alleged reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's numerous interventions during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no factual error and rejecting the bias allegation.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment involving the surreptitious downloading of the victim's cell phone data and threats to distribute intimate photographs, which he subsequently carried out by sending explicit images to the victim's son.

The trial judge rejected a joint sentence submission of 9-12 months and imposed three years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the trial judge properly followed the procedure for rejecting a joint submission as established in R. v. Anthony-Cook and that the three-year sentence was justified given the appellant's extensive criminal record, pattern of violence and harassment, and lack of response to prior interventions.

The appellant mortgagee appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation and effect of a forbearance agreement between the mortgagee and mortgagor.

The application judge found that the forbearance agreement gave the mortgagee complete control over the mortgaged property and its business operations, including control over sale, capital improvements, tenant relations, and cash flow.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings, holding that the forbearance agreement, as interpreted and applied by the parties, resulted in the mortgagee obtaining total control over the property.

The court emphasized that its findings were limited to the specific facts of the case and that not every forbearance agreement places a mortgagee in control.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment in a contractual dispute involving milestone-based payments for technical work.

The trial judge found that the appellant had repudiated the contract and awarded damages to the respondents.

The appellant raised three arguments on appeal: (1) that the trial judge failed to consider mutual repudiation; (2) that deficiencies in the respondent's work should have been considered as a set-off; and (3) that the trial judge was inconsistent in his treatment of a specific milestone payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three arguments, finding that the trial judge had properly addressed the respondent's conduct, had correctly applied the milestone-based payment structure, and had made distinguishable findings regarding the specific milestone in question.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed his appeal from a conviction for assault, criminal harassment, and mischief to property.

The charges arose from an altercation with his girlfriend following a Raptors game, during which he spat on her, subsequently destroyed her property worth approximately $1,000, and engaged in threatening communications.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial with appointed counsel assisting in cross-examination, raised grounds including failure to provide reasonable assistance to a self-represented accused, reasonable apprehension of bias, and failure to consider essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the issues lacked significance for the general administration of justice and that the summary conviction appeal court judge had correctly articulated the governing legal principles and properly rejected each ground of appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving while disqualified from the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The applicant proposed to argue that the courts below failed to properly address eyewitness identification issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave application, finding that the legal issues did not raise questions of significance to the general administration of criminal justice and that no clear legal error was disclosed.

The summary conviction appeal court judge correctly articulated the applicable legal principles and properly resolved the weaknesses in the identification evidence.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault against his former girlfriend's 15-year-old daughter.

The case turned entirely on credibility.

The complainant had recanted her allegations under oath in an affidavit after receiving independent legal advice, then withdrew the recantation at trial.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge erred in curtailing cross-examination of the complainant in a key area, the curative proviso applied.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) the summary conviction appeal court erred in applying the curative proviso on its own motion without Crown submission, and (2) the trial judge's reasons disclosed a reasonable apprehension of bias through intemperate, condescending, and sarcastic language expressing disdain for the appellant and defence witness while subjecting their evidence to greater scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter of a dwelling house, two counts of assault, and uttering a death threat arising from a single incident in which he and an accomplice broke into a basement apartment occupied by his former girlfriend and her new partner.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: misuse of his accomplice's guilty plea, misapprehension of evidence, erroneous credibility findings, and improper reliance on the complainant's demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claims for equalization of net family property and a beneficial interest in the former matrimonial home.

The parties had separated in 2006, settled all matters through a Minutes of Settlement in 2007, and reconciled at the end of May 2007.

Upon reconciliation, the wife received a disability payment which was deposited into the husband's account and used to pay household bills and mortgage.

The husband later transferred the home to his mother.

The trial judge upheld the validity of the Minutes of Settlement and dismissed the wife's claims.

The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Minutes of Settlement clearly expressed the parties' intention to exclude future property from equalization upon reconciliation, and that the wife failed to establish a resulting trust claim.

On appeal from convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession, the appellants challenged the trial judge's findings.

The appellants, common law spouses, were convicted of two counts of possession of oxycodone and Percocet for trafficking purposes, and one count of simple possession of methadone.

The trial judge found both appellants in joint possession and guilty of trafficking.

The appellants appealed on grounds including misuse of prejudicial evidence regarding child endangerment and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding the trial judge improperly admitted and relied upon evidence of child endangerment to infer trafficking intent, and that there was insufficient evidence of the mens rea required for the respondent's conviction.

Appeal of a motion judge's decision dismissing a father's motion to change a custody order.

The father sought sole custody and primary residence of the parties' child, alleging a material change in circumstances based on the failure to implement a parenting coordinator as ordered by the trial judge.

The motion judge found no material change in circumstances and, in the alternative, would not have granted sole custody due to risk of parental alienation.

The appellate court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the ongoing conflict between the parties and the failure to appoint a parenting coordinator were anticipated by the trial judge and did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The court noted that a parenting coordinator was subsequently appointed and the plan had not failed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that dismissed his appeal of a small claims court judgment.

The small claims court had awarded damages to the respondent arising from a margin trading account dispute, finding the appellant's defence had no basis in fact or law.

The Divisional Court upheld the judgment, and the appellant failed to file his notice of motion for leave to appeal within the prescribed 15-day period.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time.

The panel affirmed this dismissal, finding the defence had no merit and the appeal lacked any scintilla of merit.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of an Offer to Lease.

The appellant moved into the respondent's rental property but vacated after three weeks, claiming either no contract existed or the respondent had fundamentally breached it.

The trial judge found a binding agreement existed, rejected claims of fundamental breach, and awarded damages of $233,146.30 with 12% annual interest compounded monthly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on liability and the discretionary award of interest.