6 total
Application for judicial review dismissed; Board of Arbitration reasonably corrected an oversight in its award.
The applicant sought judicial review of a supplementary award by a Board of Arbitration that granted improved vacation benefits for part-time nurses.
The original award had increased vacation entitlements for full-time nurses but was silent on part-time nurses.
The Board issued a supplementary award, stating the omission was an oversight and rejecting the applicant's argument that it was functus officio.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision that it was not functus officio was reasonable, as the omission was an error in expressing the manifest intention of the Board and the Board remained seized of the implementation of the award under the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act.
Human rights application against Peel Police dismissed at summary hearing for having no reasonable prospect of success.
The applicant alleged discrimination based on race, colour, and ethnic origin against the Peel Police Services Board and the Windsor Police Services Board.
The Peel Police Services Board requested a summary hearing to dismiss the allegations against it.
The Tribunal found that the applicant's allegations regarding racial comments during transport, a phone call to his employer, and comments by an investigating detective had no reasonable prospect of success, largely due to inconsistencies with his prior OIPRD complaint and shifting explanations.
The allegations against the Peel Police Services Board were dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to a hearing on the merits against the Windsor Police Services Board.
The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that an airport transformer easement had expired due to lack of necessity.
The appellants appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice finding that a transformer easement had expired.
The sole issue was whether the easement continued to be required for an approach lighting system for runway 30 at the Windsor airport.
The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellants failed to provide evidence supporting their position that the easement remained necessary.
The appellants' own witness testimony, combined with evidence that the easement had not been required since 1965, long-term plans for runway 30 that did not contemplate the lighting system or transformer, and communications from Nav Canada all supported the finding that the easement had expired.
Transformer easement discharged as expired by its own terms due to technological obsolescence.
The applicant sought an order discharging a transformer easement registered on its property in 1965 in favour of the Crown, which was ancillary to an approach lighting easement for the Windsor Airport.
The applicant argued the easement had been abandoned or had expired by its terms.
The court found that while abandonment was not proven, the easement had expired by its own terms because technological advances, including GPS navigation and self-contained transformers in modern approach lights, rendered the stand-alone transformer obsolete.
The court ordered the easement discharged.
Appeal for permanent injunction denied as damages were an adequate remedy for the admitted breach of contract.
The appellant sold land to the City with an agreement that the City would build a road extension to the appellant's remaining lands along a specific route.
The City later discovered it could not build the road as agreed due to environmental assessment requirements for a rail spur, and admitted breach of contract.
The appellant sought a permanent injunction to compel the agreed route and prevent the rail spur.
The application judge dismissed the application, finding damages were an adequate remedy.
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the appellant failed to plead damages in the alternative.
Appeal dismissed as the appellant could not raise a new statutory argument for the first time on appeal.
The City of Windsor appealed a decision finding it had no interest in land referable to certain parking spaces.
On appeal, the City attempted to argue for the first time that it had statutory rights of enforcement under s. 41.1(10) of the Planning Act.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the new argument could not be raised due to appellate practice and an insufficient factual record.
The court found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the City had no interest in the land.