Gary T. Trotter

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions to quash an appeal of a class certification order in a price-fixing conspiracy case involving packaged bread.

The plaintiffs (appellants) argued the certification order, which defined the class, effectively dismissed claims of excluded persons and was thus a final order appealable under the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendants (moving parties) contended it was a certification order governed by the Class Proceedings Act (CPA) and that, under the CPA's transitional provisions, the appeal should lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The court found the certification order was a procedural order, not a final one, as it did not decide the ultimate merits of any claim.

Consequently, the appeal provisions of the CPA applied.

Furthermore, the court determined that the pre-2020 amendments to the CPA governed the appeal because the original proceeding was commenced before the amendments came into force.

The appeal to the Court of Appeal was therefore quashed.

The appellant, R.V., appealed his sentence for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's restoration of his convictions, the case was remitted to the Court of Appeal for Ontario to consider the sentence appeal.

Fresh medical evidence, filed with the Crown's consent, revealed the appellant had terminal cancer with a very bleak prognosis.

In light of these exceptional circumstances, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the original term of imprisonment and probation order, and substituting an 18-month conditional sentence order.

Other orders from the trial judge remained in force.

The appellant, Robert Glegg, appealed judgments declaring him a vexatious litigant and associated costs orders.

The underlying litigation stemmed from his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, with Glegg initiating numerous proceedings, including tort claims against the respondents (family friends and a legal aid clinic with its lawyers), alleging they conspired to assist his daughter's mother in "brainwashing" her.

The application judge declared Glegg a vexatious litigant, stayed his existing proceedings, and barred him from commencing further related proceedings without leave, also ordering full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Glegg's appeal, affirming that his claims were an abuse of process and a collateral attack on previously determined facts, specifically that his daughter acted of her own free will.

The court upheld the vexatious litigant declaration, the permanent stay of actions, the prohibition on future litigation without leave, and the full indemnity costs award.

The appellant, injured in a prisoner transport van, sued for negligence alleging design deficiencies.

After settling with the Province, the appellant pursued the driver and the City of Toronto, primarily seeking punitive damages for alleged callous disregard for prisoner safety.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding no conduct warranting punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment of the punitive damages claim or the factual findings, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

This is an appeal from an order granting the respondent leave to amend his Answer seven years after filing, to advance constructive and resulting trust claims in three properties purchased during the marriage and held in the appellant’s name, but sold before the motion for leave to amend.

The appellant argued prejudice due to timing, that claims were statute-barred, and lack of jurisdiction over foreign land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision that leave to amend was proper, the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied to the trust claims even after property sale, and the in rem jurisdiction issue was not relevant to the leave to amend motion.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment finding the plaintiff, Cassandra Amerato, was wrongly dismissed.

The employer, TST-CF Solutions LP, appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding termination and erred in damage calculation.

Ms. Amerato cross-appealed for lost vacation pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, upholding the finding of termination and the damage calculation method.

The court allowed Ms. Amerato's cross-appeal, finding the trial judge misunderstood evidence regarding vacation pay entitlement under the Canada Labour Code, and awarded the claimed amount.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) declaration.

The OLRB had declared Enercare Home & Commercial Services Limited Partnership, Ganeh Energy Services Ltd., and Beaver Energy Services Ltd. to be related employers under section 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, but not Perras Mechanical Services Ltd. The Divisional Court found the OLRB's decision unreasonable for failing to consider bargaining history and collective agreements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the reasonableness standard of review as set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, and restored the OLRB's original decision.

This appeal concerns the Divisional Court's quashing of three Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decisions, which had declared Tomasz Turkiewicz Custom Masonry Homes (TTCMH) and Brickpol Masonry Corporation (Mr. Turkiewicz's former business) a single employer under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, bound TTCMH to a collective agreement, and awarded damages to the Unions.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred in its application of the reasonableness standard of review, as articulated in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov.

The Court of Appeal held that the OLRB's decisions were reasonable, as the Board properly considered the erosion of bargaining rights as a valid labour relations purpose for the related employer declaration, adequately addressed the hiatus between businesses, and made a reasonable damages award.

The appeal was allowed, and the OLRB decisions were restored.

The appellant appealed a consent order incorporating terms of a separation agreement, alleging the respondent misrepresented his income and failed to provide full financial disclosure, particularly after purchasing a new house.

The respondent had moved under Rule 14 of the Family Law Rules to grant the consent order, providing additional disclosure.

The motion judge granted the consent order and did not order further disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Rule 13 (requiring updated financial statements) was inapplicable given that full disclosure was made at the time of settlement and the consent order had been implemented.

The court also found the use of a Rule 14B motion appropriate, despite opposition, as the matter was deemed "seemingly uncomplicated" and the motion judge had reviewed the evidence.

The appellant, an Imam, appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against the respondent under an anti-SLAPP motion.

The defamation claim arose from a petition shared by the respondent alleging the appellant's lack of transparency and accountability regarding a property sale.

The motion judge found the claim lacked substantial merit and that the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, deferring to the assessment of the claim's merit and the balancing of public interests, and dismissed the appeal.

This appeal concerned convictions for sexual offences where the appellant, S.M., challenged his convictions on the basis that in-chambers discussions between the trial judge and counsel, without his presence, violated his right to be present at his trial under s. 650 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had expressed concerns about the Crown's case on one count and encouraged a guilty plea, which the appellant subsequently entered for four of five charges.

The in-chambers meetings were not recorded or disclosed to the appellant until years later.

The Crown conceded the breach of s. 650.

The Court of Appeal found that the exclusion of the appellant from these substantive discussions, especially given his self-represented status and the lack of disclosure, constituted a serious procedural irregularity.

Applying the Simon framework, the court determined that the breach could not be saved by the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code, as it prejudiced the appearance of the due administration of justice.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered on the sexual assault counts.

The appellants, construction lien claimants, appealed a Divisional Court decision that granted priority to a vendor-take-back mortgage, including interest and enforcement costs, over their lien claims.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's ruling, holding that the priority of prior mortgages under s. 78(3) of the Construction Act extends to arrears in interest and enforcement costs, consistent with long-standing judicial interpretation and practice, and that a vendor-take-back mortgage constitutes an "advance" for the purposes of the Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, alleging misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence evidence, and erroneous reliance on the complainant's apparent lack of animus.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's memory and exculpatory text messages, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence, and improperly used the complainant's apparent lack of animus to bolster her credibility.

These errors, in their cumulative effect, detrimentally impacted the reasoning process and rendered the conviction unsafe.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants sought a permanent stay of the plaintiffs' action, arguing that the plaintiffs' failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with a former defendant, Sean Antonello, fundamentally altered the litigation landscape.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the settlement did not significantly change the adversarial relationship between the parties.

The court held that the motion judge's determination was entitled to deference and that the drafting of affidavits by plaintiffs' counsel and a non-disparagement clause did not, by themselves, demonstrate an improper cooperative relationship.

The appellant/moving party sought to review a previous order granting security for costs and motion costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no reversible error in the original decision.

The moving party was ordered to post security for costs and pay specified motion costs within 30 days, failing which her further review motion would be automatically dismissed by the Registrar.

The appellant was convicted of forgery-related offences and tax fraud arising from his operation of a fake identification business and failure to report income.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by preventing him from reopening his case, improperly finding him vicariously liable as a 'directing mind', misapplying the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule, relying on inadmissible affidavits, unevenly scrutinizing evidence, reversing the burden of proof for tax fraud, and dismissing a stay application for pre-charge delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no legal errors, properly assessed the evidence, and correctly concluded that the appellant directly controlled the illegal business and deliberately evaded taxes.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion by 94 former employees (proposed interveners) to intervene as an added party in an appeal between 2505243 Ontario Limited and Princes Gates GP Inc. The employees sought to protect a $2.063 million fund set aside for their potential termination claims by the trial judge.

The motion was opposed by Princes Gates GP Inc., while 2505243 Ontario Limited took no position.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that although the proposed interveners had a direct financial interest, their submissions would largely duplicate those of 2505243 Ontario Limited and risked introducing a new, unlitigated issue (common employer) from a separate class proceeding.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of a 23-month reformatory sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that the appeal had sufficient merit, particularly regarding the availability of a conditional sentence order for sexual assault under the Criminal Code.

The court noted that while Superior Court decisions had found the relevant Criminal Code provision unconstitutional, the Court of Appeal had not yet definitively addressed the issue, creating a legal quagmire for the applicant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking and possession of fentanyl and heroin, and his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal against conviction was an alleged s. 8 Charter infringement when police impersonated a drug dealer via text messages to facilitate a drug transaction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that there was no s. 8 Charter breach, finding that while the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his electronic communications, the police actions were justified by exigent circumstances related to public safety due to the presence of fentanyl.

The court also dismissed appeals regarding the reasonableness of the verdicts (continuity of evidence) and the sentence, affirming that the presence of fentanyl is an aggravating factor regardless of the offender's specific knowledge of its proportion.

This is an application for bail pending appeal of a prison sentence for manslaughter.

The applicant, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter after initially being charged with murder, was sentenced to 51 months' imprisonment for killing his friend with a machine gun.

The Crown conceded leave to appeal and that the applicant was not a flight risk.

However, the court dismissed the application for bail, finding that the appeal lacked sufficient merit to cause unnecessary hardship, and that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest given the aggravating features of the offence and the slim chances of a substantial sentence reduction on appeal.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted.