Gary T. Trotter

The appellants, holding unsatisfied judgments against a disbarred lawyer, appealed the dismissal of their motion to compel payment from the lawyer's insurer (LawPRO).

The core issues were the interpretation of the insurance policy's aggregate limit for dishonest lawyer coverage and whether LawPRO reasonably expended funds on defence and investigation, thereby exhausting the limit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the $500,000 limit was an aggregate limit and that LawPRO's expenditures were reasonable, dismissing the appeals.

This appeal and cross-appeal concerned a claim of infringement of riparian rights due to the construction of a boat house.

The trial judge found an infringement but held the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal.

While disagreeing with the trial judge's reasoning on the discoverability rule's application to s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, the Court affirmed that the limitation period had expired.

It clarified that discoverability applies to s. 4, but the limitation period began when the boat house was constructed in 1969, as the infringement would have been obvious to the predecessors in title, and an extinguished cause of action cannot be revived by a transfer of property.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, choking, and uttering a death threat, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found trial counsel's representation ineffective due to eliciting highly prejudicial bad character evidence, failing to seek disclosure of an arrest warrant and criminal record for the complainant, and providing inadequate advice on challenging jurors for cause based on racial prejudice.

The court concluded that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict, rendering it unreliable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, convicted of importing methamphetamine, appealed his conviction and 12-year sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged Charter violations (detention, search, voluntariness of statements) due to a particularized drug lookout at the border, and a flawed jury selection process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, affirming that routine border inspections, even with a specific lookout, do not trigger Charter detention until a highly intrusive search or communicated subjective intent to detain occurs.

The court also found the appellant's statements voluntary and the jury selection process valid.

The 12-year sentence for importing 25 kg of methamphetamine was deemed fit and within the appropriate range for large-scale drug couriers.

The court-appointed receiver, KSV Restructuring Inc., moved to quash an appeal by the debtor, 30 Roe Investments Corp., from orders approving the sale of two condominium units. 30 Roe argued the units should be sold en bloc, not individually, and that the sales diminished the "Enterprise" value.

The Court of Appeal found no appeal as of right under BIA s. 193(a)-(c) as the appeal did not involve future rights, did not directly involve property value loss (as the sales were at market price and the en bloc argument was a collateral attack on prior unappealed orders), and was not likely to affect other similar cases.

The court also denied leave to appeal under BIA s. 193(e), finding the issue not of general importance, not prima facie meritorious, and unduly hindering the receivership.

The appeal was quashed, and leave to appeal denied.

The appellants hired the respondents for a backyard renovation project with milestone payments.

After disputes and delays, the appellants terminated the contract and sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' claims, finding no fundamental breach, but awarded damages to the respondents for the balance of the contract despite the lack of a valid counterclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting the contract provided a juristic reason for the payments made.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the damages awarded to the respondents, as the proper party had not filed a counterclaim.

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and represented himself at trial, appealed his first-degree murder conviction.

He argued he was unfit to stand trial and urged the Court of Appeal to overturn or modify the 'limited cognitive capacity' test from R. v. Taylor to require that an accused be capable of making rational decisions in their best interests.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Taylor test, clarifying that while an accused must have a reality-based understanding of their legal predicament and the ability to make decisions, they need not possess 'analytic capacity' to make decisions in their own best interests.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of statements made to a Crown psychiatrist and refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence to substitute a verdict of not criminally responsible.

The appellant appealed a conviction for invitation to sexual touching involving a young child, arguing that the trial judge made improper credibility findings, shifted the burden of proof, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Crown's case relied largely on a video-recorded statement given by the complainant as a child, which was admitted under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and adopted at trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including discrepancies and defence testimony, and repeatedly reminded himself of the Crown’s burden of proof.

Although some factual inconsistencies were not expressly resolved, the trial judge considered them within the reasonable doubt analysis.

The appellate court concluded that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence and disclosed no reversible error.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed at $27,689.52 inclusive of HST on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant was convicted of child luring following an online sting operation.

He appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking to raise the issue of entrapment for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the ineffective assistance claim, finding no reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.

However, the court allowed the entrapment issue to be pursued at a new trial, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in R. v. Ramelson, which provided clearer guidelines for internet sting operations.

The court found that the record did not definitively show compliance with these new guidelines and that the Crown would not suffer procedural prejudice by allowing the issue to be heard.

The conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered solely on the issue of entrapment.

The appellant, Corey Hurren, sought leave to appeal a six-year sentence for seven firearms offences and one count of mischief, arising from crashing his truck into Rideau Hall gates with loaded firearms to confront the Prime Minister over government policies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, this error did not impact the fitness of the sentence given the serious aggravating factors, including armed aggression against the government and ongoing risk.

The court also found no error in the weight given to the appellant's depression or suicidal ideation, as these were tempered by the concern for future risk.

The appellants, inmates at a medium-security penitentiary, appealed their convictions for assault, sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and robbery against another inmate.

One appellant also appealed his indeterminate sentence following a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, sufficient reasons for credibility findings, and no Charter breach from missing security footage.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community on a long-term supervision order.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to dismiss a defamation counterclaim brought by the respondent.

The motion judge found that the respondent had suffered sufficient harm and that the public interest in permitting the counterclaim to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the appellants' expression, noting the strategic nature of the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no reviewable errors in inferring harm from the serious allegations or in conducting the weighing exercise.

The court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary award of partial indemnity costs to the respondent.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, who had been charged with sexual assault.

The Crown argued the military judge erred in concluding that the complainant, who was highly intoxicated, was capable of consenting to the sexual activity.

The majority of the Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the military judge's assessment of the evidence and his conclusion that the Crown failed to prove lack of capacity or lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the military judge failed to conduct a proper cumulative assessment of the evidence.

Linda Palichuk appealed a Superior Court decision that found her mother, Nina, capable of managing her affairs and executing various instruments (will, powers of attorney, property transfer), refused a guardianship order, and dismissed Linda's undue influence claim as hypothetical.

The appeal also challenged an order removing Linda from Nina's bank account and a costs award against Linda.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding of capacity, affirming that undue influence claims regarding a living, capable person's executory instruments are premature and hypothetical, and upholding the costs award.

The appellant, Helder Sousa, appealed a 10-year sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal considered three grounds: failure to consider potential immigration consequences, treating denial of the offence and lack of remorse as aggravating, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The court dismissed the first two grounds, affirming that immigration consequences are discretionary and denial of the offence relates to rehabilitation, not aggravation.

However, the court found the 10-year sentence demonstrably unfit, particularly for a first offender, despite the egregious nature of the crime.

Applying principles of parity, proportionality, and restraint, and comparing it to similar cases, the court reduced the sentence to eight years' imprisonment (seven years, eight and a half months after credit for presentence custody).

The appellant, John Jackman, appealed his conviction for manslaughter and his life sentence.

He was found guilty of manslaughter after setting fire to a mattress in a rooming house, which resulted in the death of another resident.

The main issues on appeal were the sufficiency of the trial judge's oral reasons for admitting similar act evidence (a prior arson conviction) and the fitness of the life sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's oral reasons were brief, they were sufficient for review, and the admission of similar act evidence was proper.

The court also found the life sentence, though maximum, was warranted given the appellant's high moral blameworthiness, the context of the offence, and his extensive criminal record and high risk of re-offending.

The appeals against both conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for arson, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue her conditional discharge with reduced requirements, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Board had determined she remained a "significant threat" to public safety due to partial insight into her illness, attempts to negotiate medication reductions, poor sleep hygiene, and a recent involuntary hospitalization with symptoms similar to her index offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion was reasonable and amply supported by the evidence, and that the Board properly considered all evidence, including factors favouring the appellant's absolute discharge, and reduced restrictions accordingly.

The appellant, Andrew Myles, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in her assessment of credibility and reliability by relying on stereotypical reasoning, finding fabricated evidence, and implicitly finding tailored evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's factual findings were rooted in the evidence and did not constitute impermissible stereotypical inferences or improper findings of tailored evidence.

The court emphasized the high degree of appellate deference owed to trial judges on credibility assessments.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in analyzing the statutory fault element, rejecting the mistake of age defence, and misusing the complainant's prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions regarding the appellant's knowledge or recklessness as to the complainant's age, the rejection of the mistake of age defence due to lack of reasonable steps, and the credibility/reliability findings concerning the complainant's drug use and prior consistent statements.