Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, N.H., appealed his convictions for four counts of assault and one count of sexual assault, and his three-year custody sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding counsel's limited role under s. 486.3 of the Criminal Code, failure to pursue exculpatory evidence, and the appellant's seating arrangement at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for the claims of unfair trial or ineffective assistance, concluding that counsel acted competently and went beyond their limited appointment.

The court also dismissed the appellant's complaint about appeal delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Krzysztof Harasiuk, appealed a 24-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to 10 offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in rejecting a joint submission for "time served." The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to "time served." The Court found that the sentencing judge improperly applied a fitness test rather than the stringent "administration of justice into disrepute" standard required for departing from joint submissions.

It emphasized the importance of joint submissions for judicial efficiency and certainty, concluding that the proposed sentence, which amounted to 14 months with credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest, would not have brought the administration of justice into disrepute, especially considering the resource savings from the omnibus plea.

The appellants, Floriano Sylvester Daponte and Vivian Lee Hamilton, appealed their joint convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The convictions stemmed from a search of their farm property where a large quantity of drugs and cash were found.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in assessing an alternative suspect (Mr. Colpaert), finding his access to the residence speculative, and improperly using their failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Daponte's appeal, finding the evidence against him cogent and the trial judge's conclusions reasonable.

However, Ms. Hamilton's appeal was allowed, and acquittals were substituted, as there was insufficient evidence to infer her knowledge or control of the buried drugs, and her connection to the drive shed was tenuous.

Dr. Covant, a veterinarian, appealed a Divisional Court decision that upheld a finding of professional misconduct by the College of Veterinarians of Ontario's Discipline Committee.

The misconduct stemmed from re-selling large quantities of veterinary drugs to human pharmacies, which violated an amended regulation (s. 33(2)(d) of R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1093) restricting such sales to "reasonably limited quantities" for "temporary shortages." Covant argued the regulation was unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad, the misconduct finding was erroneous, and the imposed penalty was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming that the regulation was not impermissibly vague or overbroad, the professional misconduct was properly established given Covant's ongoing sub-distribution enterprise, and the one-month suspension and costs award were fit and reasonable.

The appellant, Canada Christian College (CCC), appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed its application for judicial review.

CCC challenged the Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities' decision not to recommend proclamation of legislation that would grant CCC university status and degree-granting rights, following a negative recommendation from the Post-Secondary Education Quality Assessment Board.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's findings, holding that the Minister's decision to refer CCC's application to the Board was within his authority (intra vires) and that his subsequent decision to delay proclamation was reasonable and not an unlawful attempt to override the Legislature's will.

The Court also found no breach of procedural fairness, clarifying the limits of ministerial discretion regarding legislative proclamation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his drug dealing partner.

At trial, he claimed self-defence, abandoning his initial statements to police that the victim was killed during a robbery by unknown intruders.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter delay application, excluding expert evidence on 'fight or flight' syndrome, and admitting statements made to police.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay or expert evidence rulings, but held that the appellant was psychologically detained at the police station earlier than the trial judge found.

The failure to advise him of his right to counsel violated ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, requiring exclusion of the statements under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, and failing to comply with probation.

The appeal raised numerous grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel, judicial bias, misapprehension of law, failures to assess credibility, non-disclosure, evidentiary inconsistencies, inappropriate limitation of amicus curiae, prejudicial media coverage, insufficient evidence, and Charter s. 11(b) issues.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the entire record and found no error, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of child luring, invitation to sexual touching, possession of child pornography, accessing child pornography, and weapons dangerous, receiving a global sentence of 34 months.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was unfit for a first offender with mitigating factors, and that the trial judge failed to resolve disputed aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the sentence unsupported due to unresolved aggravating factors.

The court substituted the sentence to 28 months (time served).

Additionally, the appellant successfully appealed overly broad terms of a s. 161 order regarding internet access, which the court directed the parties to amend by consent or the court would amend after two weeks.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by imposing a "straitjacket" on the sentencing process by expressing a starting point for the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding that the trial judge carefully explained how a fit global sentence was reached, considering all mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and properly deducted credit for time served.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jerome Derby, appealed his global sentence for firearm-related offences, including discharge of a firearm with intent to endanger life and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

He argued that the trial judge erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for possession while prohibited, having already considered this as an aggravating factor, which constituted double counting.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the approach was erroneous and constituted double counting, and therefore allowed the appeal in part.

The appellant sought a reduction in his six-and-a-half-year sentence for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider his difficult upbringing, that the sentence was comparatively too high, and that the lack of cash seized indicated his motivation was addiction rather than profit.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons, noting the admitted quantity of fentanyl supported an inference of trafficking, including a financial motive, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding alleged improper cross-examination by Crown counsel concerning the appellant's attraction to the complainant, and claims of uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the cross-examination permissible given the specific circumstances of the case, which involved a non-physically forced relationship with an underage teenager.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility or the fairness of the trial.

Regarding the sentence, the court affirmed that the six-year and six-month imprisonment for sexual interference was not demonstrably unfit, considering aggravating factors such as breach of trust, grooming, and the victim's age, consistent with sentencing principles for child sexual offences.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of aggravated assault on his intimate partner and sentenced to seven years imprisonment, appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence, including video footage, overwhelming and the defence of necessity lacking an air of reality.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found the sentence fit given the egregious nature of the assault, despite the appellant's arguments regarding mitigating factors.

The court did, however, correct errors in the imposition of weapons prohibition orders under the Criminal Code.

This is an appeal from a sentence of 22 years, less presentence custody, imposed for grave crimes.

The appellant also sought to set aside a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons to be error-free and the sentence fit.

The court also determined that the application to set aside the SOIRA order was not properly before it, directing the appellant to the Superior Court of Justice for a Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms remedy.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment that created a novel tort of 'family violence' and awarded the respondent wife $150,000 in damages for intimate partner violence during their marriage.

The Court of Appeal held that while tort claims can be brought in family law proceedings, the trial judge erred in creating a new tort because existing torts—battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—adequately address the pattern of physical, emotional, and financial abuse.

The Court also declined to recognize a proposed tort of 'coercive control'.

The Court upheld the $100,000 award for compensatory and aggravated damages but set aside the $50,000 punitive damages award, finding the other damages sufficient to achieve condemnation.

The appellants, 36 former employees and shareholders of NexJ Systems Inc., appealed an application judge's order approving a plan of arrangement under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The plan compelled them to sell their shares in NexJ Systems Inc. and NexJ Health Holdings Inc. to N. Harris Computer Corporation, and included a broad release of claims.

The appellants argued the plan was not fair or reasonable, breached prior agreements, denied procedural fairness by releasing claims without trial, and that the judge exceeded jurisdiction by including shares of a related company (NexJ Health).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, upholding the application judge's interpretation of the 2011 agreements, confirming jurisdiction over the related company's shares as necessary for the financing, and affirming the valid business purpose of the plan.

The appellant, Mohinder Saini, appealed his conviction for four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, as well as his six-year sentence.

The collision involved 17 vehicles, resulting in four fatalities and nine serious injuries.

At trial, the appellant claimed momentary inattention due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and "microsleep" but the trial judge rejected this, finding his conduct a marked departure from the standard of care.

On appeal, Saini argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to defence evidence, the sentence was unfit, and his s. 14 Charter right to an interpreter was breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and while some interpretation errors occurred during the reading of sentencing reasons, they were not material to the trial's fairness or the appellant's ability to participate, ordering a certified translation of the reasons as a remedy.

This appeal concerned the jurisdiction of a provincial court judge to hear references under s. 74 of the Firearms Act.

The respondents, firearms owners, initiated these references after receiving letters from the RCMP/Registrar stating their firearm registration certificates were "automatically nullified" due to new regulations (SOR/2020-96).

The Attorney General of Canada argued these letters were merely informational and did not constitute a "revocation" triggering s. 74 jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that the nullification of registration certificates occurred by operation of law (the new regulations), not by an individualized decision or revocation by the Registrar.

Consequently, the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction under s. 74 of the Firearms Act, and the disclosure order issued by the reference judge was invalid.

The Court of Appeal heard motions to quash an appeal from a trial judge's order approving a sale process for a family business.

The court found the approval order to be interlocutory, serving as a mechanism to implement remedies from the trial judgment, and thus not determining substantive issues.

The correct appeal route for such an order is to the Divisional Court with leave.

Consequently, the motions to quash the appeal were allowed, and the appellants were granted an extension to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant, a representative plaintiff in a class action, appealed the dismissal of his motion to certify a class action against Olympia Trust Company.

The action alleged that Olympia Trust, as a custodial trustee for syndicated mortgage loans (SMLs) held in registered savings accounts, breached trust and fiduciary duties by failing to ensure the SMLs were "qualified investments" under the Income Tax Act.

The motion judge found it plain and obvious that the claims for breach of trust and fiduciary duty could not succeed, and that other certification criteria were not met.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the Income Tax Act provisions and the Declaration of Trust did not impose the extensive "gatekeeping" or "watchdog" duties alleged by the appellant on Olympia Trust.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.