Gary T. Trotter

This appeal involved cross-appeals concerning the recognition of an Omani foreign divorce and the Superior Court's jurisdiction over parenting issues for the parties' child.

The Court of Appeal upheld the recognition of the Omani divorce, finding that the applicant had attorned to the Omani court's jurisdiction by voluntarily participating in the proceedings on the merits.

The court also upheld the Superior Court's finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over parenting matters, determining that the child was habitually resident in Ontario at the relevant time, and that the Omani divorce order did not oust this jurisdiction.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of drug possession and possession for the purposes of trafficking, appealed his convictions.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the police used excessive force in violation of section 7 of the Charter, and whether evidence seized from the appellant's jacket should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter due to a section 8 breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police force was justified under section 25(4) of the Criminal Code, accepting the trial judge's factual findings regarding the officers' actions.

Regarding the search, the Court agreed with the trial judge that while the search of the jacket violated section 8, the evidence was admissible under section 24(2) due to the likelihood of inevitable discovery.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Daniel Tiessen, appealed his conviction for conspiracy to kidnap and related offences, and his three-year sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the admissibility of intercepted communications, arguing that initial investigative orders (tracking, number reader, data recorder warrants) were improperly made due to inadequate Information to Obtain (ITOs) and that evidence derived from them should have been excised from the wiretap application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the motion judge's findings that the initial orders met the "reasonable grounds to suspect" standard, the wiretap order met the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard, and the "investigative necessity" requirement was satisfied.

The court found no error in the motion judge's assessment of the ITOs or the trial judge's sentence.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and invitation to sexual touching, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention and transfer to a medium security hospital.

The appellant argued the Board erred in rejecting the evidence of his psychotherapist and in finding he remained a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the Board to prefer the considerable body of expert evidence from other witnesses, and that the Board's disposition was reasonable.

The respondents in an appeal moved for security for costs against the appellant, a Nevisian bank with no assets in Ontario.

The underlying action, dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, was initiated by the appellant against the respondents for defamation and breach of confidentiality.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion for security for costs, finding good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, and noting the appellant's lack of connection to Ontario and the context of criminal charges against its beneficial owner.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a 1975 cost-sharing provision in a Subdivision Agreement between a developer's assignee (appellant) and a municipality (respondent).

The appellant sought payment for infrastructure costs from the municipality, arguing that the provision was triggered by a new subdivision on adjacent lands.

The application judge found that the cost-sharing obligation was only triggered if the adjacent lands derived a benefit from the appellant's infrastructure, and no such benefit was proven.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, agreeing that the agreement, when read holistically and with commercial sense, required a benefit to be conferred for the cost-sharing to apply.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's decision not to designate the respondent, who pleaded guilty to child pornography offences, as a dangerous or long-term offender.

The sentencing judge erred by requiring a "direct" or "root cause" of psychological harm for Serious Personal Injury Offence (SPIO) designation and by misinterpreting the risk of re-offending for long-term offender status.

The Court of Appeal clarified that child pornography offences can constitute SPIOs based on a broader causation standard and that the long-term offender criteria do not necessarily require a risk of violent re-offending.

The appeal was allowed, and a new hearing was ordered.

The moving party, Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 550, brought a motion to quash an appeal by the Del Ridge defendants.

The appeal concerned a motion judge's order that denied variations to previous relief regarding expert reports and denied a motion for a stay of the underlying action based on the non-disclosure of a Pierringer Agreement.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence aspect of the order to be interlocutory, but the denial of the stay related to the Pierringer Agreement to be a final order, thus appealable to the Court of Appeal.

Given the interrelatedness of the issues, the court decided to hear both aspects of the appeal together.

The motion to quash was denied.

The appellant, Rosetta Commisso, appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing her claims against her former mother-in-law, Evangelia Karatzoglou.

Commisso alleged that Evangelia held two properties in trust for her former spouse, Philip Karatzoglou, which should be included in his net family property for equalization purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that there was no evidence of beneficial ownership by Philip in either property (Rainbow Valley or Bullock Drive) and that Commisso lacked standing to advance a trust claim on behalf of her former spouse for equalization purposes.

The court also found summary judgment appropriate in this family law context.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their defamation action under an anti-SLAPP motion, which arose from the respondent briefly sharing a Facebook post alleging theft of charitable funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest and that the appellants failed to demonstrate sufficient harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court emphasized the lack of evidence of actual harm beyond a legal presumption and the brief duration of the impugned post.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for damages related to an oil spill caused by a corroded oil filter.

The appellant argued that the respondent's oil burner technician (OBT) breached the standard of care by failing to replace the filter, citing manufacturer instructions for annual replacement, the Ontario Installation Code for Oil-Burning Equipment, and a duty to 'tag out' the filter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the OBT was not obligated to replace the filter if it was in good condition, that manufacturer instructions were recommendations rather than requirements under the Code, and that the 'tag out' requirement did not apply as the OBT deemed the filter in good working order.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial judge's factual findings.

This appeal concerns a share-purchase transaction under a unanimous shareholders' agreement (USA) that went awry.

The appellants, Leeder Automotive Inc. and 2786818 Ontario Inc., sought to compel the respondent, Douglas Warwick, to sell his shares.

The application judge dismissed their application, finding that Leeder had repudiated the share-purchase agreement by failing to comply with the USA's valuation provisions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding of repudiation, although it corrected her legal error by clarifying that the share-purchase transaction constituted a standalone contract capable of repudiation, rather than merely an implementation of the USA.

The Court found that Leeder's failures to obtain an independent real estate appraisal and to prepare financial statements in accordance with GAAP, including the improper exclusion of a significant settlement, amounted to fundamental breaches, justifying the respondent's acceptance of repudiation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions brought by the respondent, Maranello Sports Inc. o/a Ferrari of Ontario.

The first motion sought to dismiss or stay an underlying appeal and set aside or vary a consent order.

The second motion sought to set aside a Registrar's order that permitted Ronald Hitti to continue the interest of co-appellant 285 Spadina SPV Inc. in the appeal.

The court granted both motions, finding that Hitti lacked authority to act on behalf of 285 Spadina SPV Inc. due to a prior Superior Court order.

Consequently, the appeal was deemed moot and without merit.

The consent order was set aside under Rule 59.06(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure due to Hitti's fraudulent concealment of the February 2023 Order.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Gaurav Tewari, appealed the dismissal of his action for lack of jurisdiction and associated costs orders.

He claimed intellectual property rights violations and breach of agreements.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario, no attornment, and that the appellant, acting in a personal capacity, could not rely on a corporate non-disclosure agreement for jurisdiction.

The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence (earlier agreements) on appeal, which was denied due to lack of due diligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings on jurisdiction and denied leave to appeal the costs orders, finding no palpable and overriding error or error in principle.

The Toronto Star and journalist Morgan Bocknek appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to quash a subpoena for journalistic notes related to an interview with a sexual assault complainant.

The subpoena was sought by the accused, Bruce Timothy Cavey, under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for potential prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision not to grant certiorari, finding that the trial judge was the appropriate forum to address issues of journalistic privilege and relevance within the s. 278 application process.

The appellant, D.M., appealed his conviction and sentence for making child pornography and making arrangements to commit sexual offences against children.

The conviction appeal, based on the voluntariness and unequivocal nature of his guilty plea, was dismissed, with the court finding the trial judge had properly addressed any equivocation.

The sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider significant mitigating factors, including the appellant's early guilty plea and difficult background, and by not addressing Gladue principles due to the issue of Indigeneity not being raised at trial.

Despite the lack of a formal Gladue report on appeal, the court considered the appellant's progress in embracing his Indigenous identity in prison.

The original three-year consecutive sentence was reduced to 30 months.

The appellant, Shaquille Collins, was previously convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the attempted murder conviction was set aside and a conviction for aggravated assault was substituted.

This decision addresses the sentence to be imposed for the aggravated assault.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, including the planned attack and use of a firearm, and the appellant's criminal record and misconduct.

Despite the appellant's youth, the court found that the principles of denunciation and general deterrence necessitated a sentence outside the typical range for aggravated assault with a firearm.

The court imposed the maximum sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the life sentence for first-degree murder, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, Pierre Senatus, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and other charges, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed his trial counsel failed to introduce exculpatory social media posts and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias against the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that the alleged evidence was either not provided to counsel, lacked evidentiary value, or that counsel's actions were competent.

The court also determined there was no basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant, Brent William Diehl, appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes in assessing credibility and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis, which correctly applied the principles of credibility assessment and reasonable doubt, and did not engage in stereotypical reasoning or uneven scrutiny.

The trial judge's assessment of the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, and the appellant's account as illogical, was upheld.

The appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of uttering threats, claiming he was pressured due to being in custody and unable to afford trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plea was informed and voluntary.

The court noted that while pressures exist when pleading guilty in custody, the plea comprehension inquiry conducted by the trial judge, coupled with the appellant's representation by counsel and lack of voiced concerns at the time, indicated a clear and informed waiver of his right to trial.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed as the sentence had already been served.