Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed a divorce order, arguing improper service of the Notice of Application and alleging the divorce was fraudulent, relying on a signature comparison and postage irregularities.

The Court of Appeal found no credible evidence to support the appellant's claims of fraud or service issues, noting the signatures appeared similar and there was no support for postage irregularities.

The court also considered that the parties had been separated since 2014 and a prior order granted the respondent sole decision-making responsibility for the children.

The appeal was dismissed.

Downing Street Financial Inc. sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the responding parties, which dismissed an action related to a co-tenancy agreement and alleged fraudulent conveyances/preferences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and other provincial statutes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and did not raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

The court upheld the motion judge's findings that the parties dealt at arm's length and that deadlocked shareholders do not have de jure control for the purposes of the BIA, and that there was no intent to defeat creditors.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that found them jointly and severally liable for $120,000 plus prejudgment interest to the respondent.

The appeal primarily focused on the personal liability of one appellant under a personal guarantee related to a joint venture agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the case was suitable for summary judgment despite being a simplified procedure action, and upholding the validity and enforceability of the personal guarantee, which imposed personal liability.

The appellants, purchasers of a residential property, appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to the respondent vendor.

The action, commenced under Simplified Procedure, alleged breaches of warranties in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale concerning the pool, hot tub, and heating systems.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial, concluding the appellants failed to establish liability based on warranty wording and lacked admissible evidence of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings on liability and damages, and upholding the decision that examinations conducted were inadmissible under Rule 76.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondent was awarded costs on appeal.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) motion.

The appellants (defendants in the original action) sought to dismiss Canadian Tire's fraud action, arguing it arose from their expressions related to public interest (complaints about privacy violations and defective products).

The motion judge found the action did not arise from an expression and that the plaintiff's motive was irrelevant at the threshold stage of a SLAPP analysis under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this, holding that a plaintiff's motive is not a relevant factor at the first stage of the SLAPP analysis, which is restricted to determining if the action arises from an expression related to a matter of public interest.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, as the motion judge properly exercised discretion.

This appeal concerned a limitation period defence in an unjust enrichment claim.

The respondent, a hotel, had overpaid hydro costs to the appellant, a condominium, for years due to a flawed utility-sharing formula.

The errors were not discovered until 2017, and the action was commenced in 2018.

The trial judge rejected the limitation defence, finding the errors were not apparent and the respondent exercised reasonable due diligence.

On appeal, the appellant argued errors in the trial judge's discoverability and due diligence analysis, and conflation of actual and constructive knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's findings of fact or legal conclusions, affirming that the errors were not reasonably discoverable and due diligence was exercised.

The Court also rejected arguments regarding juristic reason and equitable set-off.

The appellant, a speech language pathologist, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada as statute-barred.

The action sought damages for intentional infliction of economic harm, interference with economic relations, PHIPA retaliation, and conspiracy, stemming from Sun Life's delisting of her services after an audit dispute.

The motion judge found the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, rejecting arguments for a rolling limitation period and that the discovery of the claim was contingent on a College investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing with the motion judge's analysis on the limitation period and the appropriateness of summary judgment.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and forcible seizure, arguing the trial judge failed to provide assistance in advancing a s. 7 lost evidence claim.

The alleged lost evidence involved WhatsApp messages on phones seized by police, but the appellant repeatedly refused to provide passwords.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no viable lost evidence claim as the evidence remained in the appellant's control and police efforts to access the phones were bona fide.

The court also noted the formidable nature of the Crown's case, including an inculpatory email from the appellant.

This is an appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury charge regarding the sufficiency of cautions on eyewitness identification evidence and an ante-mortem statement, and sought to admit fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it did not meet the Palmer threshold.

It also dismissed the conviction appeal, concluding that the trial judge's jury instructions on eyewitness identification (including photo/in-dock identification and collusion) and the ante-mortem statement were sufficient and did not constitute an error, particularly given that the accused was known to the eyewitness.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal where the trial judge's liability finding was upheld, but the damages award was set aside for a new hearing.

Due to divided success on appeal, the parties agreed to bear their own appeal costs.

The court varied the trial judge's costs order, reducing the amount payable by the appellant to the respondent by one-third (from $251,706.10 to $167,804.07), reflecting the partial success on appeal and the uncertainty regarding the original offer to settle.

The costs of the new damages hearing were left to the discretion of the presiding judge.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of producing marijuana without authorization and two counts of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

He appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of mens rea, party liability, or credibility.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit due to the duration of house arrest and electronic monitoring, and set aside the probation order.

The appellant, P.K., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving his 15-year-old niece.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question concerning forensic evidence and the instruction given on the complainant's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's response to the jury's request for a read-back of expert testimony was appropriate, given the practical difficulties and the lack of material prejudice.

The court also affirmed that the instruction on the s. 715.1 statement was correct, as such statements are admissible for their truth and as part of the in-court testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing her action against the Town of Hanover.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by making credibility determinations on conflicting evidence that should have been left for trial, as the issues were inextricably intertwined with those remaining for trial against other defendants, leading to a risk of inconsistent findings and substantive injustice.

The fresh evidence motion was dismissed, and costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) appealed a decision by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that granted David Aliko an absolute discharge after he was found Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for various offences due to mental disorder.

CAMH sought to set aside the absolute discharge and reinstate a conditional discharge, citing Mr. Aliko's significant deterioration and new criminal charges post-disposition.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence detailing Mr. Aliko's post-discharge behaviour and mental state, which indicated a substantial risk of serious harm to the public without Board supervision.

The court found it was in the interests of justice to admit this evidence.

The appellant, Justin Thombs, appealed his convictions for five counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and two counts of possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown conceded one count of possession of proceeds (cash).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for drug trafficking and the remaining property obtained by crime count (stolen license plate), finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to refuse a mid-trial Charter application, her assessment of plain view evidence, or her consideration of inferences.

The court entered an acquittal for the conceded cash count and refused leave to appeal sentence.

This is an appeal from the Divisional Court, which upheld a certification judge's decision that a class action claim for breach of fiduciary duty against investment advisors did not disclose a cause of action.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario examined whether the claim adequately pleaded an ad hoc fiduciary relationship, considering factors beyond just professional rules.

The Court found that the lower courts erred by narrowly interpreting the pleading, and that the claim, taken as a whole, sufficiently pleaded vulnerability, trust, reliance, and discretion, in addition to breaches of professional standards.

The appeal was allowed, declaring that the claim did disclose a cause of action for breach of a class-wide fiduciary duty, and the matter was remitted for redetermination of other certification criteria.

The appellant, convicted of home invasion robbery and declared a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not awarding "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, specifically institutional lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that Duncan credit is discretionary and not an entitlement.

The court found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, which concluded that the appellant's experience in lockdown conditions did not exceed the typical hardships of incarceration already accounted for by the 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

This appeal addresses the application of the open court principle to court-approved settlements involving minors or persons under disability, as required by Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants sought sealing orders for motion records related to these settlements, arguing that such motions, heard in writing, are not subject to the open court principle, or that the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, privacy interests, and solicitor-client privilege justify sealing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, affirming that the open court principle applies to written proceedings and that neither parens patriae nor solicitor-client privilege provides a freestanding basis for sealing orders.

The court found that the appellants did not meet the Sherman test for a sealing order, as the privacy interests were not at serious risk of undermining dignity, and the protection of minors/disabled persons and solicitor-client privilege were not seriously jeopardized by public access.

The appellant, David Griffith, appealed his convictions for possession for the purposes of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained in breach of his Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)).

The trial judge found breaches but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the *Grant* analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the *Grant* analysis, specifically regarding the lawfulness of the pat-down search incident to investigative detention and the application of discoverability.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant (vendor) appealed a trial judgment finding it breached an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for development lands and awarding the respondent (purchaser) over $11 million in lost expected profits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of liability, confirming the vendor's breach for wrongly asserting the purchaser failed to pay a further deposit and that the purchaser was ready, willing, and able to close without tendering.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on damages, ruling that the trial judge erred by departing from the normal measure of damages for real estate breaches (difference between contract price and market value on closing date).

The Court clarified that the remoteness test determines the *type* of loss, not the *measure*, and that market value inherently accounts for development potential.

A new hearing was ordered to assess damages using the normal measure.