Gary T. Trotter

This appeal arose from a civil jury trial concerning a collision between a motorist and a pedestrian, Jasmine Jarvis, who suffered severe brain injuries.

The jury at trial found the motorist not liable.

The appellants (plaintiffs) appealed, arguing the trial was unfair due to the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial bad character evidence (Ms. Jarvis fleeing a taxi without paying fare) and inflammatory remarks by respondent counsel.

The Court of Appeal found the taxi fare evidence inadmissible and its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value.

The court also found respondent counsel's jury address inflammatory and the trial judge's instructions inadequate to cure the prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal (on costs) was dismissed, and a new trial was ordered.

This appeal concerned the equalization of net family properties following marriage breakdown, specifically addressing the division of precious metals and cash.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the retention of assets and a mathematical error in the equalization payment calculation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings on asset retention and jurisdiction but found a mathematical error in the post-separation adjustment, leading to a reduction in the equalization payment owed by the appellant.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement on costs and minor revisions to its January 26, 2024 disposition of an appeal and cross-appeal.

The primary issue was whether Buduchnist Credit Union Limited (BCU) breached a Mareva Order and the consequences.

Trade Capital Finance Corp. (Trade Capital) was substantially successful on the breach and remedy issues, leading to BCU losing priority as a secured creditor and being unable to immediately enforce its judgment.

The court also addressed BCU's request for minor factual revisions to the previous reasons, adopting some and rejecting others.

The appellant, a former law firm employee, appealed her convictions for fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, and her total 18-month imprisonment sentence.

The convictions stemmed from unauthorized cheques totaling nearly $100,000 and a fraudulent divorce order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence or error in assessing motive or credibility.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the trial judge's mistaken belief that the appellant was a licensed paralegal did not impact the fitness of the sentence, as the breach of trust and abuse of position within a law firm were the primary aggravating factors.

The sentence was found to be within the appropriate range.

The Crown applied for a sealing order and related relief in an appeal to protect the identity of two jurors.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the order, finding it necessary to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system by safeguarding juror anonymity and privacy.

The court determined that the carefully tailored order minimized impact on the open court principle, and its salutary effects clearly outweighed any minimal deleterious impact.

The appellant, convicted of break and enter, theft, and weapons offences, appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged excessive force by the arresting officer.

The appellant claimed misapprehension of evidence regarding the "one plus one policy" and his "want to die" statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on reasonable force, stating the "one plus one policy" was not misused and the appellant's statement did not alter the emergency situation.

The court affirmed the appellant failed to prove the force used was unreasonable.

The respondents, facing multiple class actions related to the manufacture and distribution of opioids over a 20-year period, sought coverage for defence costs from their successive primary and excess liability insurers.

The application judge allowed the respondents to select a single primary insurer to fund the entire defence, permitted the exhaustion of self-insured retentions (SIRs) using payments from other insurers, granted relief from forfeiture for pre-tender defence costs, and required insurers to sign a Defence Reporting Agreement (DRA) to receive privileged defence information.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurers' appeals in part, holding that defence costs must be allocated on a pro rata time-on-risk basis, that the insureds must exhaust each applicable SIR before an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, and that relief from forfeiture was unavailable for pre-tender costs.

The Court upheld the DRA requirement for insurers seeking to associate in the defence to mitigate reasonable apprehensions of conflict of interest.

The appellant, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter and flight from police, appealed his sentence regarding the credit applied for time spent in Providence Continuing Care Hospital.

The sentencing judge had applied a 1:1 credit instead of the usual 1.5:1 enhanced credit, citing the appellant's treatment for substance abuse and mental health issues.

The Court of Appeal found the reasons for departing from enhanced credit insufficient, emphasizing the quantitative rationale of `R. v. Summers` credit.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted an additional 214 days of credit.

The Crown appealed a decision by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court (SCAC) that had allowed the respondent's appeal of his "over 80" and impaired driving convictions, ordering a new trial and excluding breathalyzer results.

The SCAC found errors in the trial judge's s. 10(b) Charter compliance findings and the adequacy of reasons for the impaired driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding no s. 10(b) breach by the police and that the trial judge's reasons were adequate.

The "over 80" conviction was restored, and the stay on the impaired driving charge was maintained.

The appellant, Jamil Ahmad Qureshi, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and death, arguing the trial judge erred in her legal analysis of the mens rea element.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied principles regarding momentary lapses and conflated civil and criminal negligence standards by failing to adequately explain how the appellant's conduct constituted a "marked departure" from the standard of care.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, but declined to order an acquittal, finding the verdict was not otherwise unreasonable.

The appellant, Matthew Lewis, appealed convictions for obstruct justice, uttering death threats, and two counts of breach of recognizance.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by misapprehending the victim's motive to lie, approaching defence evidence piecemeal, and misapprehending defence witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, noting the case turned on credibility and that the trial judge's observations regarding defence witnesses and the victim's lack of motive to fabricate were supported by the record.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, J.R., appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the touching of the complainant's leg to be of a sexual nature.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's legally and factually sound reasons.

The appellant also raised an issue regarding the complainant's age in institutional records, but the trial judge had already found that the complainant's age (under 18) was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing purposes.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

A publication ban order under ss. 486.4 or 486.6 of the Criminal Code remains in effect.

The appellant appealed a 5-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the sentencing judge failed to sufficiently account for harsh presentence custody conditions and made other errors.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge correctly considered the harsh conditions as a mitigating factor, resulting in a sentence at the low end of the range.

However, the court agreed with the appellant that he was improperly denied enhanced R. v. Summers credit for a 32-day period due to a missed court appearance, as his explanation was unchallenged.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted an additional 16 days of presentence custody credit.

The appellant, Romaine McBean, appealed convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by stating that the appellant compelled the complainant to engage in sexual touching by abusing a position of power and authority, claiming there was no basis for such a finding.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the trial judge's reasons did not hinge on the complainant's inability to consent due to a power imbalance, but rather on the complainant's subjective lack of consent stemming from fear induced by the appellant's actions, including preventing her from leaving, threatening her, and making demands for sexual activity.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's approach to consent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Joseph Hodgkin, appealed his sentence for accessory after the fact to murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to explicitly apply R. v. Gladue principles.

However, the Court concluded that despite this error, the sentence would have been the same had a specific Gladue analysis been conducted, given that the sentencing reasons adequately addressed the appellant's background and Indigeneity.

The appeal was dismissed, but a correction to the warrant of committal was ordered regarding a Long-Term Offender finding.

The appellant, a professional truck driver, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and three counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 401.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's prolonged inattention constituted a "marked and substantial departure" from the standard of care.

However, the Court granted the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence from seven years to five years, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit due to an overemphasis on denunciation and general deterrence, and insufficient consideration of the appellant's positive personal circumstances and low risk of recidivism.

This appeal concerned the breadth of the court's jurisdiction to address a breach of a Mareva order and abuse of process.

The appellant, Trade Capital Finance Corp., appealed a distribution order in favour of the respondent, Buduchnist Credit Union Limited (BCU).

BCU had made advances to clients in breach of a Mareva order and subsequently obtained consent judgments.

The motion judge found BCU breached the Mareva order, disallowed its secured claim for post-Mareva advances, but allowed it to enforce as an unsecured judgment creditor.

Trade Capital argued the enforcement should be delayed.

BCU cross-appealed its loss of priority.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in limiting his discretion.

It held that the court has broad inherent jurisdiction to respond to a breach of its orders, including delaying enforcement of claims arising from such breaches.

The Court allowed Trade Capital's appeal, ordering that BCU's judgment enforcement for post-Mareva advances be delayed until Trade Capital's action is determined, with both parties collecting pari passu if Trade Capital succeeds.

The cross-appeal by BCU was dismissed.

The issue of specific Woodland Property advances was remitted for further adjudication.

The appellants, a foster parent and his daughters, appealed a motion judge's decision to strike their claims against Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region (FCS) and two of its employees.

The claims included breach of statutory duty, breach of duty of care, breach of fiduciary duty, and defamation, stemming from an FCS investigation into sexual abuse allegations.

The motion judge struck the claims, granting leave only for misfeasance in public office.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that child welfare agencies do not owe a duty of care or fiduciary duty to foster parents, as their paramount duty is to the child, which would create an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

The Court also upheld the striking of claims against individual employees, finding the allegations of bad faith insufficiently particularized to overcome statutory immunity under s. 15(6) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, D.A., appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended material evidence and erroneously treated the complainant as a child witness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three material factual errors regarding the appellant's credibility, which formed a substantial basis for rejecting his evidence.

These misapprehensions were central to the verdict.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The court did not need to address the "child witness" ground of appeal.

The appellant, a condominium unit holder, appealed the dismissal of his application against the condominium corporation regarding noise complaints from an adjacent unit.

The original application sought relief under the Condominium Act, primarily an oppression remedy (s. 135), and damages.

The application judge found the corporation's response to the complaints reasonable and dismissed the application, noting that the unit owner causing the noise was not a party, precluding certain remedies.

On appeal, the appellant's new counsel attempted to re-frame the argument to focus on a compliance order under s. 134 (nuisance).

The Court of Appeal refused to entertain this new argument, emphasizing that it was not properly raised below and would require fact-finding.

The Court affirmed the application judge's finding that the corporation's conduct was not oppressive, as it had taken reasonable steps to address the complaints, and that the requested remedy of unit renovation could not be ordered without the affected unit owner being a party.

The appeal was dismissed.