Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, Joshua Normand, sought leave to appeal a four-year global sentence imposed for mischief, criminal harassment, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and unsafe storage of a firearm.

The appellant, who is Metis, argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of restraint and did not give sufficient weight to mitigating factors, including his Gladue report.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was fit, noting the serious nature of the offences, the appellant's prior record, and that the sentencing judge had properly considered and applied the principle of restraint and mitigating factors, including the Gladue report.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs based on an unaccepted offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal determined that the offer to settle did not automatically trigger costs consequences or justify an extraordinary award of substantial indemnity costs, maintaining its original order for partial indemnity costs.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexually assaulting two complainants.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged error in dismissing a severance application and the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no injustice in the severance ruling and no palpable and overriding error in the evidence assessment.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and flight from police, arguing errors in principle and demonstrable unfitness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the respondent's prior custodial sentences and mischaracterized her criminal record as unrelated.

The Court concluded that the original six-month custodial sentence was demonstrably unfit given the gravity of the offences and the respondent's high degree of moral responsibility and history of defying authority.

The appeal was allowed, and an additional 18 months less a day of incarceration was imposed.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, child luring, and child pornography offences, appealed three rulings from his trial.

He challenged the trial judge's decision to admit child pornography evidence despite a s. 8 Charter breach regarding the search warrant's scope, her refusal to allow cross-examination of the affiant (Det. Pelletier) on his mental health and disclose his medical records, and the excusal of another officer (Officer D.G.) from testifying.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis, finding no error in balancing the Grant factors.

The court also affirmed the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding cross-examination and disclosure, noting the appellant's failure to lay a proper evidentiary foundation for his Charter applications.

The appellant appealed his convictions and life sentence for terrorism-related offences, including conspiracy to commit murder.

He raised several grounds of appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in handling national security privilege claims during O'Connor and Garofoli applications, failing to sever his trial from a disruptive co-accused, misdirecting the jury on the law of conspiracy, and finding the co-accused fit for sentencing.

He also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on an out-of-court comment by the trial judge praising an undercover agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no procedural or legal errors that compromised trial fairness, and upheld the life sentence as fit for the gravity of the offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a Standing Court Martial for sexual assault, arguing the military judge erred in applying eyewitness identification law and made palpable and overriding errors of fact regarding the complainant's identification of him.

The offence occurred aboard a deployed Navy ship where the complainant routinely served meals to crew members, including the appellant.

The Court Martial Appeal Court held the military judge correctly instructed herself on the frailties of eyewitness and recognition evidence, noting the potential tainting effect of a single photo shown by a colleague, and made no palpable or overriding errors in concluding the complainant reliably recognized the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order dismissing the appellants' motion for summary judgment and declaring that the respondents' action was commenced within the limitation period.

The appellants argued the claim was discovered earlier, based on a 2015 telephone conversation and a 2005 memorandum concerning tax consequences of a trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her application of the relevant statutory provisions and caselaw, particularly Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick.

The court agreed that the information known to the respondents' lawyer was insufficient to ground a plausible inference of liability without expert advice, thus the limitation period began later, making the action not time-barred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed his conviction on two grounds: improper cross-examination by the Crown regarding blood spatter evidence and improper cross-examination regarding a gun.

The Court of Appeal found no error or unfairness in the first ground, ruling that the Crown was entitled to challenge the appellant's version of events with contradictory reliable evidence.

Regarding the second ground, while the Crown conceded the questions should not have been asked, the court found no trial unfairness given the brevity of the exchange, the lack of objection from defence counsel, and proper jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a dispute between an accountant and an accounting firm regarding compensation for work performed and entitlement to work in progress (WIP).

The appellants, the accounting firm and its principal, challenged the trial judge's findings on client ownership, the calculation of the accountant's 2014 compensation, and her entitlement to WIP.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the clients were the accountant's own, but found errors in the calculation of 2014 compensation due to lack of evidentiary support and in the award for WIP due to double-counting.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the compensation owed and reversing the WIP award.

The appellant, Anna Marlena Butryn, appealed a summary judgment order enforcing minutes of settlement in mortgage enforcement proceedings.

She argued she signed the minutes under undue influence and duress from her husband, John Chetti, and without independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no evidence the respondent had knowledge of the alleged undue influence/duress, that the minutes of settlement provided significant benefits to the appellant, and that she was represented by experienced litigation counsel, making independent legal advice from a separate lawyer unnecessary.

The court reiterated that a spousal relationship does not automatically create a presumption of undue influence requiring third-party inquiry unless coupled with a manifestly disadvantageous transaction.

The appellant challenged the appeal judge’s dismissal of her appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision, which had confirmed her involuntary admission to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had been discharged from CAMH.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no live controversy and no special circumstances to warrant exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court rejected arguments that the appeal right would become illusory or that appellate guidance was needed on the interpretation of Box B criteria under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual interference involving two child victims.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, specifically regarding the admission of cross-count similar act evidence and the consideration of unconscious collusion between the complainants.

The appellant also argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the second prong of the R. v. W.(D.) test for reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or application of legal principles, noting that the similar act evidence was used only in the alternative and the trial judge's reasons were clear and owed deference.

This is an appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of his s. 11(b) Charter application, arguing the trial judge erred in characterizing a 60-day period as an exceptional COVID-19 delay without evidence and in double-counting a 7-day defence delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both arguments, affirming the trial judge's consideration of local circumstances for the COVID-19 delay and finding no double-counting.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his 6-month custodial sentence, requesting a conditional sentence.

Leave was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the Court found no error in principle or unfitness.

The accused appealed a finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), arguing procedural unfairness and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Crown conceded the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the NCRMD finding, and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the critical importance of procedural fairness in NCRMD cases due to the significant deprivations of liberty involved.

The appellant, Gerald Sternberg, appealed the dismissal of his action against Cresford Capital Corporation, seeking payment as a guarantor for a vendor take-back mortgage.

Sternberg had sold land to Cresford, which then assigned the agreement and mortgage to a single-purpose corporation that defaulted.

Cresford's name appeared as guarantor on the electronic mortgage registration, but Cresford argued this was an error and that no guarantee agreement existed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to Cresford, finding no guarantee agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that the motion judge correctly interpreted the agreements and that the electronic registration was an error inconsistent with the parties' bargain.

The Court emphasized the high standard of deference to the motion judge's contractual interpretation and found no reversible error.

The appellant, Nicholas Doering, brought a second appeal against his conviction for failing to provide the necessaries of life, after the Court of Appeal had previously affirmed his guilt on that charge and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in not re-opening the case to allow new legal arguments on his conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to re-open the case as the matter was remitted for sentencing purposes only.

The court held that the issue of guilt was res judicata and the current appeal constituted an impermissible collateral attack on its previous order, emphasizing the principle of finality in the appellate process.

The appellant, Rowan Gray, appealed a Superior Court decision that removed him as Executor and Estate Trustee of his mother's estate due to his failure to administer estate assets.

The motion judge had also declined to appoint one of the respondents as a replacement, instead opting for a professional executor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the motion judge's application of the high threshold for removing an estate trustee, the determination that certain claims were not statute-barred under the Trustee Act, or the finding of sufficient corroboration under the Evidence Act.

The court affirmed the motion judge's decision as legally sound and practical, and awarded costs against the appellant personally.

The appellant, Trevor Goble, appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued the motion judge erred in assessing evidence, credibility findings, and that Marie Pyper lacked authority to bring the application for Onyx Community Services, and that there were no prior matters to support the finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of principles or assessment of evidence, including the appellant's long history of vexatious proceedings.

The court also found the application was properly authorized.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a substantial indemnity basis, deeming the appeal frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment.

By the time of the appeal to the Superior Court, her condition had significantly improved, and she had regained capacity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, affirming that capacity is assessed at the time of the Board's hearing and that future capacity assessments are distinct.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal despite its mootness, finding no special circumstances to warrant intervention.