Gary T. Trotter

Stahle Construction Inc. appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay general damages, out-of-pocket expenses, and costs to its former employee, Roberto Soave, for improper termination of long-term disability (LTD) coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that Mr. Soave was disabled and eligible for LTD benefits prior to a car accident, despite Stahle's arguments regarding evidentiary burden and pleading.

The court found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's mixed findings of fact and law regarding disability and upheld the decision to determine the remitted issue.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal, arguing that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the order dismissing the appellant's motion to compel witness attendance for examination on jurisdictional grounds was interlocutory and did not finally dispose of any party rights.

As such, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, and the appeal was quashed.

The applicant, Songfu Liu, sought an extension of time to appeal the dismissal of his medical malpractice action against Dr. Jonathan Chan.

The original action alleged fraud and misrepresentation regarding a prostate cancer diagnosis and subsequent surgery.

The motion judge had dismissed the applicant's claims, finding no evidence of fraud and that the applicant's own expert supported the respondent's medical care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that while the delay was short and excusable (due to a common self-represented litigant's mistake about appeal period commencement), the proposed appeal was entirely devoid of merit, seeking to re-argue factual findings without identifying legal errors.

The court emphasized that the "justice of the case" required an end to the unfounded allegations.

This decision concerns a motion to quash an appeal of a "Transition Order" that converted a proposed class action into multiple joinder actions.

The moving parties (defendants) argued the Transition Order was interlocutory and thus appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave.

The responding parties (plaintiffs) contended the order was final in some aspects or, alternatively, so interrelated with other appeals (refusal of class certification and dismissal of action against certain parties) that the Court of Appeal should hear it under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion to quash, finding a significant interrelationship between the appeals, which meant leave would have inevitably been granted, allowing the Court of Appeal to assume jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal that partially reduced damages awarded to the respondents at trial.

The appellants argued that the reduced award, falling below their pre-trial Offer to Settle, should significantly impact the trial costs.

The court, considering the divided success at trial, the unrealistic claims made by both parties, and the prolonged litigation, set aside the trial judge's costs award and ordered that the parties bear their own costs for the trial level.

The appellants were awarded agreed-upon costs for the appeal.

The appellant, George Nnane, appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonable professional judgment, specifically by failing to adequately cross-examine a key witness, projecting disbelief of the appellant's testimony during examination-in-chief, and delivering an ineffective jury address.

Despite a strong Crown case, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of counsel's conduct undermined the fairness of the trial.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

Lee Marrazzo appealed his conviction for trafficking in narcotics and his four-year global sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that circumstantial evidence left open an innocent inference that he did not know the transaction involved narcotics, suggesting he believed it was a loan-sharking deal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to infer Marrazzo's knowledge of the drug transaction based on his actions and intercepted comments.

For the sentence appeal, Marrazzo argued the trial judge erred in assessing his role and failed to credit him for medical hardships in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the assessment of his role but agreed that the trial judge failed to adequately address his unmet medical needs when calculating Duncan credit.

Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a reduced global sentence of 46 months.

The appellant, J.S., appealed convictions for sexual offences against three step-grandchildren and the imposed global sentence of 30 months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to intervene.

The sentence appeal was partially allowed, reducing a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order to 20 years with the Crown's consent, and imposing conditional stays of proceedings on three sexual assault counts, without altering the overall 30-month sentence.

The appellant, Noah King, appealed his convictions for 12 serious offences and a 7-year imprisonment sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

However, the court found the 7-year sentence to be demonstrably unfit, noting the trial judge's unclear reasoning for the sentencing range despite properly identifying Gladue principles.

The sentence was reduced to 5 years' imprisonment, with specific reductions applied to various counts.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges including sexual assault and robbery.

The trial judge had found reasonable doubt due to credibility issues with both the complainant and the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by relying on stereotypical reasoning about how a sexual assault victim should behave and by failing to properly consider confirmatory evidence.

These errors materially affected the assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Daniella Marciano, appealed her conviction for possession of stolen goods, arguing that as a self-represented litigant at trial, she did not understand how evidence was to be presented and that the trial judge failed to adequately ensure her understanding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had adequately explained the evidentiary process, interjected with appropriate explanations, and ensured the appellant understood the implications of not testifying.

The court concluded that the trial judge fully discharged his obligation of providing a fair trial to the unrepresented accused.

The appellant, convicted of firearms offences including intentional discharge of a restricted firearm, appealed his conviction and sentence.

He challenged the trial judge's W.(D.) instruction and treatment of defence expert evidence in the jury charge, arguing they were inconsistent with the defence theory and confusing, especially given the Crown's closing submissions.

Alternatively, he sought leave to appeal the five-year custodial sentence, contending the trial judge erred by not considering a sentence below the mandatory minimum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible error in the jury charge or the sentencing decision.

The appellant, Ghana Ariharan, appealed his sentence for fraud over $5,000 and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The sentencing judge imposed an 18-month custodial sentence (less pre-sentence credit) and a concurrent three-month sentence, along with a restitution order and fine in lieu of forfeiture of $81,995.00.

The appellant argued his restitution efforts were not adequately considered and the breach of undertaking sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal found the restitution efforts insignificant and the breach sentence not excessive.

However, the court agreed the trial judge erred in calculating the restitution and forfeiture amounts, adjusting them to $77,795.00.

The appeal was allowed to this extent and otherwise dismissed.

The appellant, Dellen Millard, brought an appeal.

The court rejected his argument that a judge's mere presence on a panel that previously ruled adversely against him raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the court granted his request for an adjournment to prepare written submissions, putting the matter over to a future Kingston inmate sitting.

Mr. Stephens, convicted of mischief and failing to comply with a probation order in 2009, sought to reopen his appeal to argue for a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) defence.

He had previously been found NCR for unrelated 2011 offences.

His summary conviction appeal of the 2009 convictions was dismissed in 2014, and subsequent motions to reopen were also dismissed.

He brought a new motion relying on a 2024 psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the new report lacked the cogency to establish an NCR defence or to justify reopening the appeal, especially given the applicant's own inconsistent factual account of the events.

The appellant, convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to three and a half years, appealed his sentence, questioning the sufficiency of "Downes credit" and seeking a further reduction based on post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal deferred to the trial judge's decision on Downes credit, finding no error in principle, and determined that the post-sentencing rehabilitation, while commendable, did not warrant an additional sentence reduction in this case.

This appeal concerned a failed agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a residential development, where the appellant (buyer) had an express obligation to obtain severance approval but failed to communicate or take steps for almost five years.

The respondent (seller) subsequently refused access to the property, deeming the APS terminated.

The appellant sought declarations that the APS was valid and for specific performance.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's application, finding the appellant in breach due to inordinate delay and the respondent justified in treating the APS as ended.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that where an APS has no fixed deadline, performance must occur within a reasonable time, and that inordinate, unexplained delay can constitute a fundamental breach justifying termination without a prior notice of a new deadline, depending on the circumstances.

The appellants, convicted of murder, appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and violation of their right to be present.

The trial judge repeatedly encouraged guilty pleas in chambers and directly to the accused, expressing strong opinions on the evidence and linking rulings to plea outcomes.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and infringed the accused's right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, compromising the fairness and integrity of the trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and child pornography, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in attributing certain periods of delay to the defence and in inferring waiver.

Correcting these errors, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling for provincial court cases, leading to a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, Shaun Rootenberg, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000 and his six-year sentence.

The conviction appeal raised two issues: the unreasonableness of the verdict regarding the dishonest diversion of funds, and the trial judge's refusal to grant a stay of proceedings due to alleged section 8 Charter violations from strip searches during pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding the fraud conviction overwhelmingly supported by evidence and no Charter breach in the strip searches, or if there was, it did not warrant a stay.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's prior fraud convictions and the devastating impact on the complainant.