Gary T. Trotter

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl and appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in jury instructions.

The appellant contended that the judge improperly instructed the jury to assess the complainant's evidence from an adolescent perspective and used value-laden language to characterize her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions, viewed holistically, did not suggest a less stringent standard for the complainant's evidence and that the characterization of her testimony occurred within the summary of the Crown's position, which was clearly delineated for the jury.

The appellant, Marko Tubic, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The court found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient in explaining how after-the-fact conduct evidence justified a murder conviction over manslaughter, and that the trial judge erred by referring to an unconstitutional objective standard of fault ('ought to have known') under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

This is an appeal from a trial decision concerning parenting time and decision-making responsibility.

The appellant father sought to change the shared parenting arrangement, alleging parental alienation, and requested a 90-day "protective separation" for the children to reside solely with him.

The trial judge dismissed this request, finding the existing arrangement to be in the children's best interests, and awarded costs to the mother.

The father appealed the trial decision and the costs award, also seeking to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upheld the trial judge's findings, declined to admit fresh evidence, and refused leave to appeal the costs award, emphasizing the narrow scope of appellate review in parenting disputes and the principle that post-trial events are typically addressed through variation procedures rather than appeal.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an appeal where VAC Developments Limited's counterclaim against Mr. Williams was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed VAC's appeal from that judgment.

Mr. Williams sought full indemnity costs for the appeal and a fresh evidence motion, but the court awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal, finding no grounds for a heightened award.

For the fresh evidence motion, which was occasioned by an unsupported allegation in Mr. Williams' factum, the court awarded reduced costs to Mr. Williams and also to Mr. Lakhani, a third party who intervened, acknowledging their partial responsibility for the motion's necessity.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment ordering payment on a promissory note.

The appellant had defaulted on the loan and filed no evidence on the motion for summary judgment.

The motion judge granted summary judgment and refused to stay execution pending a third-party claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision, as the respondent's evidence supported an independent contract and the appellant failed to provide contradictory evidence.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) disposition.

The appellant challenged the Board's decision to issue a detention order instead of a conditional discharge, and argued that two specific conditions of the detention order were overly restrictive.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it reasonable given the appellant's significant threat to public safety and the joint submission of the parties.

However, the court found two conditions to be unreasonably restrictive: the requirement for "supervised" accommodation and the need for hospital consent for communication with his mother in addition to her own consent.

The appeal was allowed in part, striking the word "supervised" from the accommodation condition and removing the hospital consent requirement from the communication condition.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, willfully altering computer data, and making available intimate images without consent, stemming from a "revenge porn" incident.

He appealed his convictions on three grounds: that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in concluding guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the principles of burden of proof, did not misapprehend the evidence given the strong circumstantial case, and was entitled to find the appellant's text messages constituted implied admissions.

The appellant, Dailean John, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him an active participant rather than a mere bystander.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude he played a culpable role given the evidence of the victim's confinement in his apartment and his awareness and control over her movements.

The appellant also sought to appeal his sentence, arguing it was unfit due to its impact on his Permanent Resident status and potential deportation.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the appeal, holding that reducing the sentence to avoid deportation would result in an unfit sentence given the seriousness and aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant, a school board trustee, appealed the dismissal of his judicial review application challenging sanctions imposed by the Toronto Catholic District School Board for breaching its code of conduct.

The trustee had made inflammatory remarks equating LGBTQ+ individuals with criminals during a public meeting.

The appeal court upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the Board had the authority to reconsider its initial decision (which had not found a breach), that re-litigation doctrines did not apply to the administrative process, and that the Board's decisions reasonably balanced the trustee's Charter rights with its statutory mandate to promote an inclusive school climate.

The media appellants sought full, unredacted access to youth court records concerning eight young persons accused of second-degree murder, arguing that the open court principle (Dagenais-Mentuck test) should grant them presumptive access.

The Youth Court and Superior Court granted only partial, redacted access, holding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) statutory scheme for record access (s. 119(1)(s)) takes precedence over the common law open court principle.

The YCJA requires applicants to demonstrate a "valid interest" and that access is "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" balancing public interest with the young persons' heightened privacy rights and rehabilitation goals.

The Superior Court also declined to hear the appellants' constitutional challenge to the YCJA provisions, deeming the Youth Court the more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the YCJA's specific statutory regime for youth record access is a valid exception to the open court principle and that the media must meet its criteria via a formal application on notice.

It also upheld the discretion not to hear the constitutional challenge at the Superior Court level.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was the complainant's age when the sexual contact began, which determined the validity of consent.

The trial judge found the contact started when the complainant was 15 and the appellant was in a position of trust.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability findings, arguing reliance on illogical assumptions regarding the complainant's behaviour and the implausibility of the appellant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges on credibility and reliability, and finding no palpable and overriding error or ungrounded assumptions.

This is an appeal concerning a fraudulent conveyance claim.

The appellant sought to enforce a default judgment against properties held in the name of the respondent's deceased wife, alleging a beneficial interest and fraudulent conveyance.

The trial judge found no fraudulent conveyance of real property but concluded that the respondent had a beneficial interest in cash transferred to his wife, which was used for mortgage payments, attributing half of the unexplained funds ($217,000) to fraudulent conveyances based on an adverse inference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in attributing only 50% of the unexplained deposits to the respondent, as the adverse inference should have applied to the entire unexplained amount given the wife's failure to disclose sources.

The Court increased the amount of fraudulently conveyed cash to $434,000.

The appellant, a de-designated firearms instructor, appealed a costs order from a motion that struck and stayed parts of his second action (2022 Action) as duplicative of an earlier action (2018 Action).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the cumulative costs award fell below the $50,000 threshold specified in the Courts of Justice Act, which applies when the costs order itself is the subject of the appeal.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment that found an insurer liable for underpaid contents claim following a fire.

The insurer (appellant) argued that the insured's failure to submit a sworn proof of loss was fatal, that an appraisal process under the Insurance Act was mandatory, and that the trial judge erred in assessing the actual cash value (ACV) of the lost property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the insurer had waived the sworn proof of loss requirement and that relief from forfeiture was appropriate.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretion to decline an appraisal under s. 128 of the Insurance Act, noting that the court was in a position to assess the ACV and that an appraisal would cause further delay and expense.

The assessment of ACV by the trial judge was also found to be free of palpable and overriding error.

The applicant sought a review of a motion judge's order dismissing her request for an extension of time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from a Superior Court decision in a family law matter.

The Court of Appeal panel applied the well-established principles for extensions of time, including the "justice of the case" test, and the deferential standard of review for discretionary decisions.

The panel found no errors in the motion judge's analysis, which concluded that an extension was not warranted due to the lack of merit in the leave application and the need for stability and finality for the child.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her lawsuit against the Ontario Provincial Police, alleging breaches of common law and statutory duties, mental anguish, privacy violations, defamation, and Charter rights violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's reasoning regarding the claims, the decision to proceed without further discovery or summary trial, or the conduct of the hearing, including the order for an in-person attendance and the denial of an adjournment.

The court also upheld the costs award against the self-represented appellant.

This is an appeal from an anti-SLAPP motion.

The appellant, VAC Developments Limited, sought to overturn the dismissal of its $1.5 million defamation counterclaim against the respondent, Agin Williams.

Williams had publicly alleged that VAC failed to address racist threats and dismissed him in reprisal for involving the police.

The motion judge dismissed VAC's counterclaim under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding VAC had not shown substantial merit or sufficiently serious harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting Williams' expression.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that VAC failed to demonstrate sufficiently serious harm, which is a critical component of the public interest balancing test in anti-SLAPP motions.

The appellants appealed an order for summary judgment in a mortgage action.

The respondents on appeal moved for an order dismissing the appeal based on the appellants' failure to satisfy a prior court order to pay outstanding costs totaling $46,280.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had not complied with the previous order and that their arguments against dismissal, including claims of unfairness and inability to pay, lacked merit.

The respondents, investors in Hetti Group Inc., obtained summary judgment against Hetti Group and its controlling minds for misappropriated loan funds, with the corporate veil pierced and the claim found not statute-barred.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: the motion judge erred in finding the Sugi Defendants were agents for the Hetti Group for the purpose of a key email, the acknowledgment of debt was insufficient for limitation purposes as no amount was specified, and the motion judge erred in piercing the corporate veil.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings on agency, the interpretation of the Limitations Act regarding debt acknowledgment (that a specific amount is not required), and the appropriateness of piercing the corporate veil due to substantial evidence of fund misappropriation.

The appellant, Stayside Corporation Inc., appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for specific performance of an agreement to purchase land.

The agreement was conditional on the severance of a 50-acre parcel, which the appellant was responsible for pursuing.

The motion judge found that the appellant had repudiated the agreement by failing to diligently pursue the severance application, despite multiple extensions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding of anticipatory breach, applying the factors from Spirent Communications of Ottawa Limited v. Quake Technologies (Canada) Inc., and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.