Gary T. Trotter

Stelco Inc. sought leave to appeal an order from the CCAA supervisory judge concerning the reconveyance of land (the "DGAP Parcel") to LandCo, a precondition for DGAP Investments Ltd. to purchase the land.

Stelco had previously been ordered to specifically perform this obligation but failed to do so.

The motion judge affirmed the court's authority to impose terms for reconveyance if the parties could not agree.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, given prior judicial determinations and Stelco's previous concession that the court could determine the agreements.

The court also considered the significance of the issues to practice and the action, and the undue hindrance that an appeal would cause to the progress of the CCAA proceeding.

The appellant, convicted of drug trafficking and firearm offences, appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of a motion to re-open a Garofoli application, arguing the wrong test was applied and the affiant officer's credibility was in question.

The sentence appeal argued the judge "jumped" the Crown's position without notice and misapprehended his criminal record, leading to an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that while the trial judge applied the wrong test for summary dismissal, the motion was substantively heard on its merits.

The court also found that the sentencing errors did not impact the sentence, which was fit given the gravity of the offences, the appellant's high-level role in a commercial drug operation, and his extensive criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearm offences and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the application judge's ruling on pole camera surveillance or the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the total incarceration period from 18 to 15 years and quashing the delayed parole order.

The court found the trial judge erred by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a first-time offender.

The fine in lieu of forfeiture was upheld.

This appeal concerned a failed real estate transaction where the appellant sought the return of a $70,000 deposit after failing to close due to financing issues, despite the respondent subsequently selling the property at a profit.

The appellant argued that retaining the deposit was unconscionable, citing the respondent's lack of loss and the appellant's alleged lack of capacity due to mental health struggles and bereavement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that it was not unconscionable for the respondent to retain the deposit, as there was no inequality of bargaining power or improvident bargain, and the appellant had intended to close the transaction.

The appellants appealed an order striking their Statement of Defence for failing to comply with interlocutory orders and documentary disclosure obligations.

The motion judge had found deliberate non-compliance over 2.5 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, upholding the striking of the Statement of Defence, finding the motion judge's decision was open on the record, legally sound, appropriate, and proportionate given the lengthy and deliberate delay.

The court also dismissed the argument for a "last chance" order.

However, the court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the costs of the action from $5,000 to $3,000 due to a calculation error.

The appellant, A.V., appealed his conviction for sexual interference under s. 151 of the Criminal Code, committed abroad against his daughter.

The appeal raised three grounds: the constitutionality of s. 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code (overbreadth under s. 7 of the Charter), the trial judge's failure to address reliability concerns regarding the complainant's "flashback" evidence, and the trial judge's alleged improper use of the complainant's prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's finding that s. 7(4.1) is not overbroad, as its purpose is to deter Canadian citizens and permanent residents from engaging in child sexual exploitation abroad.

The court also found that the trial judge adequately addressed the complainant's reliability and properly used prior consistent statements for narrative and to rebut recent fabrication, without relying on their truth for bolstering reliability.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's determination of the parties' separation date, arguing it was 2011 instead of 2019.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's weighing of evidence and credibility findings, specifically regarding income tax returns, residence representations, and domestic violence evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, deferring to the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, which were supported by the record.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Stephen B. Sutherland, appealed the dismissal of his action by a motion judge, who found it barred by res judicata and abuse of process.

The action was identical to a counterclaim previously dismissed in a collection action by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the principles of res judicata and abuse of process correctly prevented relitigation.

The court found no evidence of unfairness or injustice to warrant intervention.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order, raising two issues: the respondent's failure to produce foundational expert documents and the untimely disclosure of a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision not to dismiss or stay the action on either ground.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the settlement agreement did not "entirely change the litigation landscape" and was not a Pierringer agreement requiring disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The respondents brought a medical malpractice action after the plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury from a cardiac arrest during a caesarean section.

The trial judge found the primary obstetrician (Dr. Padmore), the anesthesiologist (Dr. Jamensky), and the hospital liable for negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals of Dr. Padmore and the hospital, finding the trial judge erred in his legal causation analysis regarding their respective pre-delivery acts and omissions.

The Court dismissed Dr. Jamensky's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that he breached the standard of care by prematurely converting the patient to a general anesthetic and that this negligence caused the cardiac arrest.

Dr. Jamensky was held solely liable for the agreed $12 million in damages.

The appellant, Money Gate Corporation, appealed the dismissal of its motion seeking distribution of proceeds from a property sale, asserting an unregistered assignment of a second mortgage.

The motion judge found the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the source of funds for the alleged assignment, concluding no enforceable assignment was acquired.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision to dismiss the motion or in the discretionary costs order, noting the appellant's failure to file a cost outline.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, Hopeton Wright, appealed his convictions for three counts of sexual interference and three counts of sexual assault (stayed) in relation to two of his common-law partner’s children.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence from another child of his common-law partner, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to admit the similar fact evidence, which was highly probative of a specific propensity, and no consequential error in the jury instructions regarding prior inconsistent statements.

This appeal concerned the constitutionality of section 12 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, which limits parliamentary privilege, specifically freedom of speech and debate, for members of the Committee regarding the disclosure of classified information.

The application judge had declared section 12 ultra vires Parliament.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that Parliament possesses the plenary legislative authority under section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to define and limit its own privileges, including freedom of speech and debate, without requiring a constitutional amendment.

The court found that section 12 is intra vires the federal Parliament, emphasizing that Parliament can legislate to define the scope of its own powers and privileges, especially when members voluntarily accept such limits.

The appellant, T.C., appealed his convictions for five counts of assault and one count of sexual assault, and his five-year sentence.

The appeal against convictions was based on two alleged errors by the trial judge: allowing the Crown to recall a complainant after closing its case, and failing to sufficiently instruct the jury on prior inconsistent statements.

The sentence appeal argued that the assault sentences should have been concurrent rather than consecutive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to allow the recall of the witness for a limited purpose, no error in the jury instructions regarding inconsistencies, and no error in principle in the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for an offence under s. 172.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes agreeing or arranging to commit enumerated sexual offences against a person believed to be under a certain age.

The respondent had communicated with an FBI agent posing as a mother of young girls, discussing sexual acts and travel arrangements.

The trial judge acquitted, finding the Crown failed to prove the respondent intended to follow through with the plan, characterizing the communications as fantasy role-play.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in interpreting the mens rea, clarifying that the mens rea is the intent to agree, not the intent to carry out the underlying offence.

The court further clarified that the actus reus requires a "true consensus" or genuine agreement on the part of the accused, even if the other party is an undercover officer.

As the trial judge's reasons were unclear on whether the actus reus was proven under the correct legal test, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered on the relevant count.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime, arguing the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by admitting evidence obtained from warrants based on a redacted Information to Obtain (ITO).

The trial judge found a s. 8 Charter breach due to insufficient grounds in the redacted ITO but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in the application of the Grant criteria.

The court clarified that the Crown's litigation choice to proceed under Garofoli step five (redacted information), rather than step six (unredacted information), does not automatically imply bad faith for the purpose of the s. 24(2) analysis, especially when the Crown took active steps to provide a summary and the defence consented to its use.

The appellant appealed convictions for offences related to a shooting incident where shots were fired at a parked truck.

The case against the appellant was circumstantial, with key issues at trial being perpetrator identification, timing of the shots, and the continuity of firearm and shell-casing exhibits.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the continuity of shell casings.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was clearly aware of and addressed the continuity arguments, and was not required to refer to every aspect of the evidence in his reasons.

The court also rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable, as it was dependent on the continuity argument which was dismissed.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

This appeal concerns a failed real estate transaction where both parties mistakenly believed the property was subject to a prescriptive easement.

The purchaser, Roalno Inc., refused to close without a price abatement or extinguishment of the supposed easement.

The vendors refused these terms.

Roalno sued for specific performance with an abatement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding Roalno breached the agreement by refusing to close.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, concluding that Roalno had anticipatorily breached the contract by demanding new terms based on a legally erroneous belief, and that the vendors had accepted this repudiation, thereby ending the contract.

The court also clarified that statutory rights under the Road Access Act do not constitute an easement or right-of-way under the agreement's warranties.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and appealed, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), and seeking exclusion of evidence.

The trial judge found a minor s. 10(b) breach but no ss. 8 or 9 violations, and declined to exclude the handgun evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for the appellant's detention and search, and that any Charter breach was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a comprehensive homeowners insurance policy's "Personal Excess Liability Policy" endorsement, specifically its interaction with the insured's automobile insurance policy (OPCF 44R) and whether the primary auto policy limits needed to be exhausted before recourse to the excess endorsement.

The motion judge had dismissed the action against the insurer, finding that the tortfeasor was not an "inadequately insured motorist" under the OPCF 44R definition and that the OPCF 44R limits had to be exhausted.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in applying the OPCF 44R definition of "inadequately insured motorist" to the Excess Endorsement and in requiring exhaustion of the OPCF 44R limits, as the Excess Endorsement was intended to provide additional"stacking" coverage.

The appeal was allowed, and the motion dismissed.