Marion Jasmine Sweatman

The applicant sought a declaration that powers of attorney for personal care and property, executed by the respondent Ann McDonald in 2018, were valid and compliant with the Substitute Decisions Act.

The powers of attorney did not meet formal requirements because Ann did not sign them in the presence of witnesses; rather, witnesses signed five days later.

The court applied the curative provisions of the SDA, finding that Ann's acknowledgment of her signature and modification of the date to align with the witnesses' signatures demonstrated her true intentions and ratification of the documents.

The court declared both powers of attorney valid and effective, appointing the applicant as sole attorney for both personal care and property.

The court interprets the Will of Yaacov Glickman, deceased, and determines that the gift of the residue of his estate to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem is not void for uncertainty or any other reason.

The court finds that the Will provides for an outright gift to the University, not a formal trust or foundation, and that the "assumptions" in the Will are precatory rather than binding conditions.

The Applicant's concerns about ambiguity are addressed, and the court orders that the residue of the estate be distributed to the Hebrew University in accordance with the Will's guidelines.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant, Linda Palichuk, was entirely unsuccessful on all issues, including an application for leave to appeal a Superior Court costs order.

The appellant had persisted in seeking a guardianship order for Nina Palichuk despite an expert report confirming Nina's capacity.

The respondents were entirely successful.

The court, considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered costs payable to each respondent.

Linda Palichuk appealed a Superior Court decision that found her mother, Nina, capable of managing her affairs and executing various instruments (will, powers of attorney, property transfer), refused a guardianship order, and dismissed Linda's undue influence claim as hypothetical.

The appeal also challenged an order removing Linda from Nina's bank account and a costs award against Linda.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding of capacity, affirming that undue influence claims regarding a living, capable person's executory instruments are premature and hypothetical, and upholding the costs award.

The appellant, a former spouse, appealed the dismissal of her unissued claims against an estate and a costs order.

The appeal addressed whether an alleged dependant has an unlimited right to pursue claims despite procedural misconduct and delay amounting to an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's conduct vexatious, including re-litigating previously determined matters, failing to comply with court orders, and causing extensive delay in estate administration.

The court upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the appellant's claims were moot, dismissed, or procedurally untenable, and that her conduct justified their dismissal as an abuse of process.

The applicant brought a guardianship application regarding one of the respondents, which was dismissed.

The respondents sought costs.

The court found no reason to depart from the normal rule that costs follow the event.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondents, fixing the costs at $56,224.11 for one respondent and $44,000 for the other, payable by the applicant in three instalments.

Two competing applications were brought by family members.

The applicant daughter applied for guardianship over her 90-year-old mother and challenged the validity of her mother's new will, powers of attorney, and the transfer of her home to her other daughter, alleging undue influence and lack of capacity.

The mother applied to remove the applicant daughter as a joint account holder on her investment account.

The applicant daughter moved to consolidate the applications into an action requiring a trial.

The court found that the mother's capacity was the controlling issue and could be decided on the application record without a trial.

Relying on expert psychiatric evidence and the mother's own testimony, the court concluded that the mother had the requisite capacity to manage her property and personal care, grant powers of attorney, make a will, and make an inter vivos gift.

Because the mother had capacity and the impugned instruments were executory, the court declined to direct a trial on the issue of undue influence.

The applicant daughter's application was dismissed, and the mother's application to remove the applicant daughter from the joint account was granted.

The 93-year-old applicant is pursuing financial claims against his deceased wife's estate.

The court expressed serious concerns regarding the lack of priority and cumulative delays in the proceedings, including the applicant's counsel unilaterally scheduling a settlement conference before the file was ready, and the respondent estate commencing a separate action in another branch of the court.

The matter was adjourned to be spoken to, with the court directing counsel to outline practical steps to expedite the resolution of the case.

The court heard two motions for directions regarding the estate of the late musician Peter Appleyard.

The deceased's former spouse, a self-represented litigant, attempted to advance claims for dependant support within the context of an application to pass accounts and remove the estate trustee.

The court dismissed her claims without prejudice, ruling that a claim for dependant support must be brought by way of a proper application under section 58 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court set a 90-day deadline for her to issue the proper application.

The applicant challenged his mother's will, alleging undue influence and lack of capacity, but later abandoned the challenge.

The respondent, the estate trustee and primary beneficiary, moved for substantial indemnity costs against the applicant personally.

The applicant cross-moved for costs from the estate.

The court found no suspicious circumstances warranting the challenge, deemed the applicant's conduct vexatious and improperly motivated, including harassment outside the courtroom.

The respondent's motion for substantial indemnity costs was granted, and the applicant's motion for costs from the estate was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from two orders arising from estate proceedings following her former spouse's death.

The appellant sought to advance claims against the estate for arrears in spousal support, ongoing spousal support, return of property, and unjust enrichment.

The lower court had imposed a requirement that the appellant obtain leave of the court before advancing any claims, based on a prior order made in bankruptcy proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the lower court erred in extending the reach of the bankruptcy order beyond the bankruptcy proceedings and in imposing a vexatious litigant requirement without a formal declaration.

The court allowed the appeal in part, set aside the March 15, 2017 order, and directed the estate trustee to bring a motion for directions to establish a timetable for administration of the estate and determination of the appellant's claims.

The applicant (Saad Elias in the main application) sought an order declaring his mother incapable of managing property and appointing his brother as guardian.

The respondent (Daad Abdulwahid in the main application) brought a motion for security for costs against Saad Elias, who resided in California and had no assets in Ontario.

The court found that Saad Elias failed to demonstrate impecuniosity and that his underlying application for guardianship was devoid of merit, particularly regarding the existence of a valid power of attorney and the lack of evidence for misuse of funds.

The motion for security for costs was granted.

The applicant sought to enforce a settlement agreement reached in an estate dispute.

The settlement was conditional on the applicant's brother not opposing the settlement or the deceased's 2012 Will.

The brother subsequently commenced an application challenging the 2012 Will, which was later deemed abandoned.

The court found that the brother's challenge constituted opposition to the settlement, meaning the condition precedent was not met.

The court dismissed the application to enforce the settlement, holding that it became unenforceable once opposed, regardless of the later abandonment of the brother's application.

A non-party brought a motion seeking compensation for property management services provided to a property owned by the deceased and the respondents.

The Estate objected on the preliminary grounds that the non-party lacked standing because he had not commenced an originating process, and that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Trustee Act.

The court dismissed the preliminary objections, finding that previous court orders had established a procedure for the claim, conferring standing and effectively initiating the proceeding within the limitation periods.

The court also found that the deceased's prior refusal to pay was equivocal, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

The plaintiff was almost entirely successful on a motion to compel answers to nearly 90 undertakings and refusals in an estate litigation matter.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on two offers to settle.

The defendant argued the motion was unnecessary and that costs should be left to the trial judge.

The court found the motion was straightforward but important, and that the plaintiff's claimed costs were reasonable.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $6,600 for fees plus $343.51 for disbursements, plus HST.

Following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to strike portions of the statement of claim, the court received written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on the defendant's delay in bringing the motion and offers to settle.

The defendant argued costs should be left to the trial judge.

The court rejected the defendant's arguments, considered the factors under Rule 57 and the delay under Rule 21.02, and fixed costs payable to the plaintiff at $9,000 inclusive.

This was a costs endorsement arising from competing guardianship applications brought by two daughters concerning an elderly incapable parent with dementia.

After the guardianship issue settled on terms recognizing one daughter as attorney for property and personal care, the court held the moving party had not achieved the position advanced in her application and rejected her claim to success.

Applying Rule 57.01 and the authorities governing costs in capacity litigation, the court emphasized that costs must reflect the best interests of the incapable person and must not unduly deplete the incapable person's estate.

Although the responding party sought over $93,000 on a complete indemnity basis, the court reduced the claim as excessive and awarded $50,000 inclusive.

The award was ordered payable from the incapable person's property rather than personally by the moving party.

Following two interim motions in an estate dispute, the court considered written submissions on costs.

Given the complex legal issues and contradictory affidavits, the court agreed with the estate trustee's counsel and reserved the issue of costs to the trial judge, who will be in a better position to finally determine the issues and any entitlement to costs.

The deceased's widow and the estate trustee brought competing motions regarding the administration of the estate.

The widow sought dependant's relief, interim support, preservation of section 72 funds received by the deceased's parents, and an order for the estate trustee to pass accounts.

The estate trustee sought directions to sell estate properties, including the matrimonial home, and to have the widow vacate the premises.

The court ordered an expedited trial of all issues, directed the estate trustee to pass her accounts, allowed the widow to remain in the matrimonial home and collect rent pending trial, permitted the estate trustee to sell other estate properties, and ordered $60,000 of the section 72 funds to be held in trust pending the trial.

The insured municipality suffered a catastrophic bacterial infection of its water supply, leading to investigations and a class action lawsuit.

The municipality's insurer appointed counsel to defend the civil actions under a reservation of rights.

Dissatisfied with the appointed counsel's advice and the reservation of rights, the municipality retained independent counsel and sought reimbursement from the insurer.

The Court of Appeal held that an insurer is only required to surrender control of the defence and pay for independent counsel if there is a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest.

As the reservation of rights was based on policy limits and exclusions rather than the insured's conduct, no conflict existed.

The insurer was not obliged to pay for the independent counsel.