Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, Shane Thomas, appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender.

He had been found guilty of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and uttering a threat, and declared a dangerous offender due to a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour and the brutal nature of his offences, including reoffending while serving a Long-Term Sentence Order (LTSO).

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider another LTSO, relied unduly on risk assessment instruments, and did not consider flaws in the previous LTSO's implementation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's decision, finding that reoffending while on an LTSO was a serious aggravating factor and that risk assessments were appropriately used as part of a multi-factorial analysis.

The appellant, self-represented at trial, was convicted of armed bank robbery.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct himself on a key witness's motive to lie and by relying on the appellant's uncompleted testimony after indicating it would not be used.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding witness credibility but agreed the trial judge erred in using the appellant's testimony for conviction after leading him to believe it would not be used, thereby jeopardizing trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Nicholas Baksh, appealed his convictions for four counts of drug trafficking and three firearm offences.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of similar act evidence across trafficking counts, erroneous limitation of cross-examination on an arresting officer's prior discreditable conduct, and unreasonable firearm verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly distinguished between similar act evidence and cross-count evidence used for identification, properly limited cross-examination consistent with precedent, and that the firearm verdicts were reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

This is an appeal from convictions for threatening, assault, and sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding peripheral Crown witnesses and alleged misapprehension of his own evidence concerning the sexual assault incident.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied the correct legal principles, including those from R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. C.L.Y., and reasonably assessed witness credibility.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the appellant's evidence was improbable and lacked credibility.

The appellant, Guestlogix Inc., appealed a judgment that awarded the respondent, Marina Antchipalovskaia, twelve months' common law notice for wrongful dismissal.

The core issue was whether the motion judge erred in treating the respondent's employment as continuous from 2011 to 2019, despite a termination and re-hiring in 2016 during Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings, which included a court-ordered release of prior claims.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by not giving effect to the 2016 termination and the CCAA release.

However, the court also held that the respondent's prior five years of experience still provided a benefit to the appellant and should be considered in determining the notice period.

The Court of Appeal substituted the twelve-month notice period with a seven-month notice period, recognizing both the effect of the CCAA release and the value of the respondent's previous service.

Farah Rahman appealed a summary judgment dismissing her wrongful dismissal action.

The motion judge had found her employment contracts' termination provisions valid under the ESA and that only one entity, CDAI, was her employer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the "just cause" termination provision in the employment contract violated the ESA by allowing termination without notice for conduct less than "wilful misconduct" rendering all termination provisions void.

The Court also found that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in determining the employer, concluding that the corporate respondents were common employers due to their high level of integration and control over Ms. Rahman.

The case was remitted to the Superior Court for damages quantification.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that held them liable under a guarantee to The Toronto-Dominion Bank.

The central issue was whether an email sent by one of the appellants constituted clear and unequivocal notice to terminate their liability under the guarantee.

The Court of Appeal found that the email, which sought confirmation of no obligation, did provide such notice.

The court distinguished the facts from a prior Supreme Court of Canada decision, noting that the bank had no doubt about the appellants' intent to terminate and did not take actions indicating a continuing relationship after the notice.

The appeal was allowed, reversing the summary judgment against the appellants.

The appellants, former litigation counsel, appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion based on a limitations defence in a solicitor negligence claim.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal, or alternatively, that commencing an action earlier was not an appropriate means to remedy it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the claim was not time-barred, emphasizing that the respondents reasonably relied on their counsel's advice regarding the underlying litigation's legal errors, thus delaying discoverability of the negligence claim.

The appellant franchisors appealed a decision allowing the respondent franchisees to rescind their franchise agreement due to a materially deficient franchise disclosure document (FDD).

The appellants argued the application judge erred by applying an objective test rather than requiring subjective evidence that the deficiencies impaired the franchisees' ability to make an informed decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the test for rescission under s. 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act is objective.

The court upheld the findings that the failure to include financial statement notes, head lease details, and the fact that this was the first non-mall location constituted material non-disclosure.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The respondents sought full indemnity costs, citing contractual language in mortgage actions and the appellants' "reprehensible conduct" and "scurrilous accusations." The appellants argued the claim was excessive and duplicative.

The court, while acknowledging contractual full indemnity, exercised its overriding discretion due to the complex and overly litigious nature of the case, finding both parties contributed to procedural skirmishes.

The court fixed costs payable by the appellants to the respondents at $170,000, all-inclusive, a reduction from the $190,372 claimed.

Michael Mills appealed a six-month conditional sentence for fraud under $5,000, seeking a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by requiring an "exceptionality" threshold for a discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code.

Considering Mills' lack of prior record, guilty plea, remorse, restitution, minimal financial gain, and significant impact on employability due to the conviction, the Court determined an absolute discharge was appropriate and in the public interest, allowing the appeal and imposing the discharge.

The Crown applied under s. 683(5) of the Criminal Code to suspend two conditional sentence orders (CSOs) imposed on the respondents, who were convicted of failing to provide necessaries of life.

The Crown argued that serving the CSOs before the appeal hearing would prejudice its sentence appeal, which sought penitentiary sentences.

The respondents opposed, arguing the Crown had not shown merit and that suspension was not in the interests of justice.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the "interests of justice" did not favour suspending the CSOs, noting that re-incarceration after a sentence is served is not inevitable and that the impact of served house arrest conditions could be considered on appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of 9 months in custody, plus 12 months’ probation, for indecent assault.

He argued that the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence, particularly given his health issues and fear of contracting COVID-19 in prison, and by failing to give sufficient weight to rehabilitation and specific deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's decision.

The court affirmed that the principles of denunciation and deterrence were paramount in this case, outweighing mitigating factors, and reiterated that concerns about incarceration conditions due to health or COVID-19 are best addressed by correctional and parole authorities, not by disproportionately reducing a fit sentence.

The appellant, Cameron Laming, appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a weapons dangerous charge.

He argued procedural irregularities during the NCRMD hearing and sought to adduce fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting his mental state was due to drug-induced intoxication rather than a mental disorder qualifying for NCRMD.

The Court of Appeal found significant procedural deficiencies, including the appellant not having read the NCRMD report, equivocal consent, and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The fresh evidence, which cast doubt on the NCRMD diagnosis, was admitted.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, M.S., sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of five counts of sexual interference and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

The application was dismissed as the court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender, the public confidence component under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code was engaged due to the serious nature of the child sexual abuse offences and the weak grounds of appeal.

This decision addresses the appellant's desire to abandon his appeal, raising concerns about his current mental capacity.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined it has the discretion to reject a Notice of Abandonment if the appellant lacks capacity, likening the test to that for entering a guilty plea.

The court decided to proceed to a second stage of analysis to determine whether to accept the abandonment, setting a case management conference to explore the evidentiary record on capacity and offering to appoint counsel for the appellant for this limited purpose.

The appellant, Steve D’Silva, appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving a 12-year-old victim.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, particularly regarding the victim's testimony that she informed the appellant of her age, and the application of the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant had actual knowledge the victim was underage.

The court emphasized the high level of appellate deference owed to trial judges' credibility assessments and found no error in the trial judge's reasoning or application of legal principles.

Medcap Real Estate Holdings Inc. appealed a bankruptcy order made against it, arguing the application judge erred in not exercising discretion to dismiss the application under s. 43(7) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Medcap claimed it could pay its debts, the application was improperly motivated, and a bankruptcy would serve no purpose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding Medcap failed to prove its ability to pay all debts, that the applicants had an improper motive, or that a bankruptcy would be purposeless, thereby upholding the application judge's discretionary decision.

The appellants appealed the motion judge’s dismissal of two actions and an application via summary judgment.

The motion judge had found the proceedings to be an abuse of process, that the claims had been previously released, and that they were barred by statutory limitation periods.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no errors in his assessment that there was no evidence of fraud tainting prior settlements or releases, and that the claims were indeed barred by abuse of process, releases, and limitation periods.

The court affirmed that summary judgment was an appropriate tool for addressing these threshold issues.

The mother appealed trial orders granting the father sole custody and supervised access, and requiring her to undergo a psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the children's best interests and the jurisdiction to order the assessment.

The Court admitted a late psychiatric report as fresh evidence but gave it little weight due to its timing and lack of proper context, noting the mother's history of non-compliance with court orders.