Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, Davoud Tohidy, sought to lay an information against Premier Doug Ford alleging Criminal Code offences related to the provincial government's COVID-19 pandemic response.

After a justice of the peace refused to receive the information and the Superior Court summarily dismissed his application for mandamus and other relief, Mr. Tohidy appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Registrar referred the appeal for summary dismissal under s. 685(1) of the Criminal Code and r. 17 of the Criminal Appeal Rules.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge's reasons, finding the appeal meritless, frivolous, and vexatious, and dismissed it without a full hearing.

The appellant, C.J., appealed a conviction for voyeurism and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the conviction reasonable and the sentence appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the factors considered by the trial judge.

This appeal concerns whether the appellants, who have cared for an Indigenous child (J.T.) since infancy, are entitled to bring an application for parenting orders under the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA).

The motion judge allowed the application, but the appeal judge overturned, finding the appellants were "foster parents" precluded from bringing such an application and that a valid customary care agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal found that Dilico Anishinabek Family Care acted without legal authority by maintaining de facto guardianship after temporary care agreements expired and that subsequent agreements were not valid customary care agreements due to lack of consent from all parties.

The Court held that judicial oversight is required and that the appellants are entitled to pursue their CLRA application, regardless of whether they are characterized as foster parents or customary caregivers, as the CLRA provides an avenue for determining the child's best interests, incorporating national standards for Indigenous children.

This appeal concerned the enforceability of an unlimited and continuing guarantee executed by the appellant, Jaimee Lynn Gdak, in favour of Clearflow Commercial Finance Corp. The appellant, a director and officer of the principal debtor (Trigger Wholesale Inc.), argued she was released from the guarantee due to material changes in the indebtedness, lack of independent legal advice, lack of sophistication, unconscionability, and Clearflow's alleged breach of agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the guarantee valid, binding, and enforceable.

The court affirmed that the appellant had contracted out of common law protections regarding material changes and found no errors in the lower court's findings regarding her sophistication, the need for independent legal advice, or the interpretation of the guarantee.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCRMD), appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) decision to reject a joint submission for his transfer to a less secure facility.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the ORB's handling of the joint submission and that the ORB's decision to deny the transfer was reasonable given the appellant's recent history of aggressive and self-harming behaviour and the receiving institution's objections.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board's jurisdiction, arguing that the Board's finding of a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's decision to maintain a conditional discharge.

The court found that despite some progress, the appellant's recent threatening and physically aggressive conduct, including an offer to pay someone to stab his psychiatrist and multiple Code White incidents involving staff assaults, supported the Board's finding of a significant threat.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's improved mobility and subsequent aggressive behaviour was admitted and considered.

The appellant appealed an 8-year sentence for fentanyl trafficking, arguing it was unfit and that the sentencing judge failed to properly credit pre-sentence custody, including lockdown credit during the early COVID period.

The Court of Appeal found the 8-year sentence was not unfit given the aggravating circumstances of fentanyl trafficking.

However, the court agreed that the sentencing judge's reasons did not demonstrate proper credit for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was reduced by 204 days, reflecting a 1.5:1 credit for 136 days of pre-trial custody.

The court found no error regarding lockdown credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable as the only direct evidence was his fingerprint on a stolen Bluetooth speaker.

He contended the trial judge over-emphasized this evidence and failed to consider the speaker's portability, access by roommates, and alternative perpetrator theories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fingerprint evidence was bolstered by the complainant's testimony that he saw the perpetrator touch the speaker without gloves, lived alone, regularly disinfected the speaker, and that roommates had not been present for a month.

The court deemed alternative theories speculative.

The appellant, Pamela Bader, appealed a summary judgment order that found her liable to pay a mortgage debt to 1250140 Ontario Inc. The core issues were whether the action was barred by the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act (RPLA) and whether Ms. Bader had acknowledged the debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the RPLA applied to the claim for debt based on a mortgage covenant, even after the property's sale, and that Ms. Bader's affidavit constituted a valid acknowledgment of the debt, thereby extending the limitation period.

The appellant sought leave to appeal her sentence for fraud.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence concerning the health of her four-year-old son, who required ongoing care that her partner could not provide.

While the court found the original sentence to be fit, it reduced the carceral portion of the sentence to time served due to these unusual circumstances, while maintaining the three-year probation order and other conditions.

The applicant sought to set aside a single judge's order that dismissed his motion for an extension of time to pursue a motion to set aside an earlier order refusing an extension of time to appeal two costs orders.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the single judge's discretionary decision for legal error or misapprehension of evidence.

The court found no error in the finding of prejudice (which was wider than just legal expense) or in the understanding of the arbitrator's decision regarding costs jurisdiction.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for second-degree murder, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in principle by equating his moral blameworthiness to that of a first-degree murder offender and made a palpable error in finding his mental illness played no contributing role.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of high moral blameworthiness given the premeditated nature of the original plan to kill his ex-wife and the attack on her uncle.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant failed to establish a causal link between his depression and the murder, noting shortcomings in the psychiatric evidence.

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed an error of law by discounting the accused's credibility on the basis that his evidence was "tailored" to fit Crown disclosure or evidence heard in court.

The court reiterated that such an inference is impermissible as it turns constitutional rights against the accused.

The error was deemed prominent in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which was the central issue.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

Maria Amorim appealed a judgment that declared her ineligible for survivor pension benefits under the Pension Benefits Act, based on a finding that she and Daniel Carvalho were living "separate and apart" when he began receiving disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's factual finding that the parties were living separate and apart, which was entitled to deference.

The court found no reviewable error in the application judge's holistic consideration of the indicia for "separate and apart" status.

The appellant, George Olivetti, appealed a four-year sentence for possessing and accessing child pornography, which was imposed following a joint submission.

The appeal court found the original sentence to be fit, considering the large collection of child pornography and a prior criminal record for similar offences, despite the appellant's age, guilty plea, and expressed remorse.

The court dismissed the appeal, stating that updated personal and medical information did not justify a reduction and that such issues are best addressed by the Parole Board of Canada.

The appellant, Bismark Barrett, appealed his 30-month sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He sought a conditional sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge took an unduly narrow view of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on inmates, specifically regarding the risk of infection and the negative impact of institutional measures like lockdowns and program suspensions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's discretionary decision not to reduce the sentence based on Covid-19 related deprivations.

The appellant appealed his sentence following guilty pleas to mischief, possession of a restricted firearm, and possession of methamphetamine.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by not granting 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody due to COVID-19 and claimed he was forced into a joint submission by trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding the credit was part of a joint submission and the ineffective assistance claim was unsubstantiated.

However, the Crown conceded that the 15-month sentence for one count of possession of a controlled substance exceeded the 12-month statutory maximum for a summary conviction.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the sentence on that count to 365 days, less pre-sentence custody.

R.S., a young person, appealed his sentence for two counts of sexual assault, which included an 18-month custody and supervision order.

The appeal raised three grounds: the availability of a deferred custody and supervision order under s. 42(5) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the harshness of the sentence, and the impact of fresh evidence regarding his progress.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had sufficient evidence to conclude that serious psychological harm was caused to the victims, precluding a deferred custody order.

The court also determined that the sentence was not unduly harsh given the serious nature of the offences and their profound impact on the victims, despite mitigating factors and the appellant's rehabilitative potential.

Fresh evidence of the appellant's positive progress post-disposition did not alter the fitness of the original sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The respondents brought a motion for reconsideration of the determination of an appeal, seeking to re-argue issues the court had previously stated it would not entertain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents failed to meet the high hurdle required to reopen an appeal and did not establish an accidental slip or omission under Rule 59.06.

Costs of $6,000 were awarded against the moving parties.

The appellant appealed his sentence for firearms-related offences, arguing it was overly harsh and that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the onerous conditions of incarceration due to COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in principle or misapprehension of facts regarding the sentence's fitness, noting it was well within the available range.

Regarding the incarceration conditions, the court affirmed that the sentencing judge properly factored these as a mitigating circumstance and was not required to provide a mathematical credit.

Both grounds of appeal were dismissed.