John I. Laskin

The appellants sought a new trial arising from a jury verdict in a child pedestrian personal injury action, challenging evidentiary rulings on vehicle brakes, expert human factors evidence, and the fairness of the defence conducted by counsel appointed by an insurer reserving rights.

The court held the trial judge properly excluded late-disclosed participant expert opinion evidence extending beyond the contemporaneous inspection form, properly admitted unobjected-to accident reconstruction and human factors evidence, and committed no error in charging the jury.

The court also held that any alleged insurer-insured conflict had to be raised promptly before trial and that no unfairness in the defence was demonstrated.

The appeal was dismissed on liability and damages, but the costs order was varied so that trial costs payable to successful defendants were payable only by the litigation guardian personally and in that capacity, not by the minor appellants personally.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and was sentenced to six months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a reduction to six months less a day because he was unaware of the significant immigration consequences at the time of his plea and sentencing.

The Crown consented to the reduction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the requested reduction modest and the proposed sentence fit.

The appellant, 407 ETR, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the application of the Limitations Act, 2002 to unpaid toll debts.

The Court of Appeal held that a civil action to collect unpaid tolls is not an 'appropriate means' under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act until the statutory licence plate denial process has run its course and the debtor's vehicle permit expires.

The Court also held that a 15-year limitation period in a transponder lease agreement is enforceable under s. 22(3) of the Limitations Act, even though it is a consumer agreement, because s. 22(3) permits parties to extend the limitation period.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him to Waypoint, arguing it was not the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence supported the Board's disposition as Waypoint would be better able to transition the appellant out of seclusion and provide necessary structure.

The appellant sued her landlord for negligence after suffering serious personal injuries from a fall on a fire escape, alleging it was not kept free of ice and snow.

The trial judge dismissed the action, accepting the superintendent's evidence of daily inspections and finding no snow or ice was present, while rejecting the appellant's evidence on credibility grounds.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the record and there was no basis to interfere with the finding that the standard of care was met.

The Crown sought to appeal the respondent's acquittals for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and flight from a peace officer.

After failing to serve the respondent personally, the Crown applied to the summary conviction appeal court for an order for substituted service.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no jurisdiction to order substituted service under the Criminal Code for summary conviction appeals.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, holding that section 482(1) of the Criminal Code provides sufficient authority for rules governing substituted service in summary conviction appeals.

The appellant appealed his convictions and global three-year sentence for procuring a 16-year-old girl into prostitution, living off the avails of prostitution, and obtaining sexual services for consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the convictions were reasonably supported by the evidence, including evidence of persuasion and encouragement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court emphasizing the gravity of the offences and the vulnerability of the young complainant.

The appellants attended a house party armed with loaded handguns.

During an altercation, shots were fired, resulting in one death and two injuries.

Both were convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for aiding and abetting murder, failed to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence for the aider or abettor, and improperly instructed the jury on the use of post-offence conduct evidence.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant father and respondent mother lived in Germany with their two children.

The mother brought the children to Ontario for a time-limited educational stay with the father's consent.

When the consent period expired, the mother refused to return the children to Germany.

The application judge ordered the children's return under the Hague Convention, finding their habitual residence remained in Germany.

The Divisional Court reversed this decision, finding the habitual residence had changed to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the father's appeal, holding that a parent cannot unilaterally change a child's habitual residence during a time-limited consensual stay, and ordered the children returned to Germany.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge, found the appeal had no merit, and dismissed it with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of physical and sexual abuse against his common-law wife, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and the reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly distinguished between counts where medical evidence did not support the allegations and the two counts where a witness's evidence confirmed the complainant's injuries.

The acceptance of this confirmatory evidence provided a reasoned explanation for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment imposed after a re-trial for dangerous driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

At his first trial, he had been sentenced to two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider the fitness of the original sentence before imposing a greater sentence, as the facts at the second trial were essentially the same.

The appeal was allowed and the original sentence of 18 months for dangerous driving and six months consecutive for failing to remain was restored.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding the respondent bank's refusal to approve a rehabilitation plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bank had the discretion to refuse approval for expenses over $5,000 and that its refusal was reasonable based on the medical opinion evidence.

The court also held that the application judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm, arguing the trial judge's finding was unreasonable and misapprehended evidence regarding his refusal to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the conviction was reasonably supported by evidence of alcohol consumption, an unexplained accident, obstructive behaviour, and the statutory inference from refusing a breath sample.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting that occurred after they were robbed at a flea market.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the jury selection process, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the periods of parole ineligibility and the sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as the trial judge had erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's sentencing position without notice and failing to give adequate weight to the appellants' youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the LCD industry, asserting claims in civil conspiracy and under s. 36 of the Competition Act.

The defendants appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion regarding limitation periods, while the plaintiff appealed the denial of leave to amend its statement of claim to add a direct purchaser.

The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the defendants' appeal on the civil conspiracy limitation issue as the order was interlocutory and leave was not granted.

The Court affirmed that the discoverability principle applies to the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the Competition Act.

The Court also allowed the plaintiff's appeal, granting leave to amend the statement of claim, and confirmed that it is not plain and obvious that a breach of s. 45 of the Competition Act cannot serve as the unlawful means for a civil conspiracy claim.

The parties, who were partners in a land development project, disputed the interpretation of their Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA) and a subsequent 2005 document regarding the allocation of building lots.

The application judge declared the 2005 document enforceable and held that actions against a defaulting partner under Article 8.2 of the LPA required unanimous consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the enforceability of the 2005 document, finding it clarified an unclear term and was supported by functional consideration.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding Article 8.2, concluding that interpreting it to require unanimous consent would render other provisions meaningless and lead to commercially absurd results.

The plaintiff was injured when she fell off an elevated dance floor at a nightclub.

She sued the nightclub, but later learned during discoveries that the landlord may have been involved in renovating the dance floor.

She subsequently sued the landlord, who moved for summary judgment arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the discovery of the nightclub's representative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the landlord's appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the plaintiff had not shown a lack of diligence in investigating the claim.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The convictions rested primarily on the testimony of an accomplice who had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to exercise necessary caution in accepting the accomplice's evidence and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the accomplice's subsequent sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it lacked cogency, and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness and made no reversible error in assessing credibility.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault against his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence solely because he accepted the complainant's evidence, misapplied the burden of proof, and improperly ruled prior out-of-court statements inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, the burden of proof was properly applied, and the trial judge's credibility findings were sound despite the evidentiary ruling on prior statements.