John I. Laskin

An insurer sought to amend its statement of defence approximately nine years after a fire destroyed the insured's restaurant to assert that the insured had deliberately set the fire, rather than relying on its original defence of non-cooperation with the fire investigation.

The motion judge dismissed the amendment motion and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the amendment but reduced the costs award, finding that while the insurer's delay was inordinate and triggered a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted, the conduct did not rise to the level of egregious misconduct warranting substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants' income property was substantially damaged by fire.

They decided to demolish the site and build an eight-and-a-half-storey condominium, claiming replacement cost and building code upgrades under their insurance policy.

The insurer paid only the actual cash value, arguing the condominium was not a 'replacement' of 'like kind and quality'.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy required any replacement to be of like kind and quality to trigger replacement cost coverage.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, detained under the Ontario Review Board for over 30 years, appealed the Board's disposition continuing his detention at St. Joseph's Healthcare.

He argued the Board erred in refusing an adjournment, relying on hearsay evidence, failing to address his sleep deprivation, and refusing a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the adjournment issue moot and no basis to interfere with the Board's substantive decisions, though it noted the Board erred in its approach to the adjournment request and urged it to address the sleep deprivation issue at the next review.

The respondent, a commercial truck driver, was acquitted at trial of importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 39 kilograms of cocaine were found in his trailer at the border.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's 'blind courier' defence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made speculative findings of fact unsupported by evidence and committed a legal error by applying a piecemeal approach to the evidence rather than considering its cumulative effect.

The respondents were wholly successful on the appeal and sought partial indemnity costs totaling over $111,000.

The appellants conceded the respondents were entitled to costs but argued the amounts sought were excessive, proposing a total of $30,000.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs payable by the appellants at $20,000 for Vicentini, $10,000 for Ford Credit, and $10,000 for Personal Insurance, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant was convicted of historic sexual offences committed both as an adult and as a young offender.

The trial judge conducted a single trial for both the adult and youth indictments and admitted evidence across the indictments as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act precludes the joint trial of adult and youth indictments.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in his similar fact evidence ruling by failing to account for the 30-year gap and the appellant's age difference, and erred in admitting a videotaped statement without affording the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness on her demeanour.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with permission to live in the community restricted to supervised accommodation.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to consider a conditional discharge and by requiring supervised accommodation.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant was not yet ready for a conditional discharge, as recent attempts at community living had failed.

The Court also found the Board's requirement for supervised accommodation was reasonable and supported by expert opinion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and kidnapping of an eight-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on post-offence conduct, in admitting a portion of the co-accused's videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, and in failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the co-accused's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidential foundation for an accessory after the fact defence, that the videotaped statement met threshold reliability, and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to omit a Vetrovec warning at the tactical request of defence counsel.

The appellant, who had a history of bringing meritless proceedings against the respondent professional association following his suspension for unpaid fees, sought to appeal a Superior Court order denying him leave to appeal an internal disciplinary decision.

The respondent requested the Court of Appeal dismiss the appeal and related motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal found the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as they attempted to re-litigate previously decided issues.

The appeal and motion were dismissed, and the Court provided new procedural directions for future Rule 2.1 requests.

The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to pay interest on retroactive attendant care and housekeeping benefits to the respondent, who was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the benefits were not overdue until a catastrophic impairment determination was made in 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the respondent had been catastrophically impaired since the accident and that the benefits were therefore overdue from the dates they were initially terminated or capped, entitling her to interest.

The vendor appealed a trial judgment finding that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale terminated on its own terms, entitling the purchasers to a return of their deposit.

The vendor argued the trial judge erred in finding time was not of the essence and in placing the onus on the vendor to set a new closing date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the original agreement lacked a time of the essence clause and the vendor failed to provide a revised occupancy statement or address the purchasers' concerns as promised.

The vendor was estopped from claiming the agreement was not at an end.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting a portion of his uncautioned statement to the police, erred in his Corbett ruling regarding the admissibility of his criminal record, and imposed an excessive period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on the voluntariness of the statement was reasonable, the Corbett ruling was well-reasoned, and the 15-year parole ineligibility period was within a reasonable range.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for murder.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge by denigrating the defence and failing to properly caution the jury regarding inferences about his age.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the charge fair when read as a whole.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's ruling that he was at least 16 and a half years old was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence holistically, including the appellant's appearance, criminal record, and peer group, and reasonably concluded he was over 16.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a brief costs endorsement fixing the costs of Independent Counsel at $60,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes, payable by Canada.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, which included a dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the proceedings and in assessing future risk and the predicate offence for the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings regarding the stay.

The Court also upheld the dangerous offender designation, noting the trial judge properly relied on the appellant's criminal record, expert clinical assessment of high risk for violent recidivism, and history of breaching release conditions.

The predicate offence of robbery at knifepoint was found to constitute an act of serious personal violence.

The appellant abandoned her conviction appeal and appealed her sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in fixing the amount of the fine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the fine amount was supported by expert evidence regarding the company's banking records and the appellant's own admission of theft.

The applicant, convicted of second-degree murder and other offences, applied under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for the appointment of government-funded counsel for his appeal.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was sufficiently complex to warrant counsel but opposed the application on the basis that the applicant had not exhausted his Legal Aid remedies or been transparent about his finances.

The Court of Appeal found that while the applicant lacked candour regarding his historical finances, his current financial situation demonstrated he had no assets or other sources of funding.

The application was granted and counsel was appointed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's credibility findings were not supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's decision to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the defence witness's testimony was reasonable and well-supported by the record.

Following a successful appeal, the parties agreed on appeal costs but could not agree on the costs of the underlying application or the payment of interest.

The Court of Appeal fixed the application costs at $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, taking into account the appellant's offer to settle.

The Court also ordered that interest at three percent per annum is payable on the judgment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after an improper question was asked of the Crown's expert, by admitting a statement he made at the hospital about having swallowed cocaine before, and by refusing an adjournment to call a defence expert on cocaine toxicity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's discretionary rulings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The trial judge's remedial instruction cured the improper expert question, the hospital statement was highly probative to the issue of duress, and the need for a defence expert should have been foreseen.