Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed convictions for robbery-related offences and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding surveillance video, which was critical to the similar act evidence application.

This misapprehension led to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for all robbery-related counts, while the conviction for possession of stolen property was upheld.

The appellant appealed convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for first-degree murder, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions on contemporaneity and mens rea for murder.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea for attempted murder, as it failed to specify the requirement of a specific intent to kill.

The court substituted the attempted murder conviction with aggravated assault.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to deny a mistrial application, finding that the remedial instructions were sufficient to cure any prejudice from a witness's improper reference to a previous conviction.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order lifting a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and amending a default judgment to declare the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) BIA, on the basis that it arose from misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The underlying action involved breach of statutory trust under the Construction Act for unpaid construction materials.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the refusal to admit extrinsic evidence contradicting deemed admissions from the default judgment, nor in considering the appellants' non-compliance with enforcement orders.

The court upheld the finding that the judgment debt arose from misappropriation or defalcation, emphasizing that the deemed admissions, including an award of punitive damages, demonstrated intentional wrongdoing and conduct markedly departing from ordinary standards of decent behaviour, satisfying the "moral turpitude or dishonesty" threshold for s. 178(1)(d) BIA.

This appeal concerned a post-closing dispute over HST liability following the sale of a mixed-use property.

The purchasers' counterclaim, alleging HST liability, was dismissed at trial on the basis that they suffered no loss and arguably benefited from a windfall.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the purchasers suffered no loss, which justified the dismissal of the counterclaim.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and it was deemed unnecessary to address other legal arguments regarding the Excise Tax Act or post-closing readjustment.

Hydro One Networks Inc. appealed a decision denying its claim for a permanent prescriptive easement over a road on the respondent's land, which provides access to its transmission lines.

The application judge had found Hydro One's use was not "as of right" or "continuous." The Court of Appeal found that the application judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the frequency and nature of Hydro One's use, which was sufficient to meet the "continuous" requirement.

The Court also determined that Hydro One's post-2008 interactions with the respondent, aimed at accommodation, did not negate the "as of right" character of its use established prior to the land's registration under the Land Titles Act in 2008.

The appeal was allowed, and the prescriptive easement was declared.

The appellant, Armen Petrosian, appealed orders permitting the respondent, Hasmik Tovmasyan, to relocate to California with their two children, and awarding child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Children's Law Reform Act regarding relocation, including the onus under s. 39.4(6), and no error in the imputation of income for support calculations.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that the date of separation for an equalization claim under the Family Law Act was February 2015.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in making credibility findings by failing to address alleged inconsistencies in the respondent's evidence and in making findings of fact based on conflicting affidavits not subject to thorough cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence and credibility, and no unfairness in the trial procedure regarding witness cross-examination, noting the appellant had requested the limited cross-examination.

This appeal concerned the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a trial judge's order dismissing a contempt motion and ordering therapy and counselling.

The Court determined that the dismissal of the contempt motion was an interlocutory order, as the appellant had other avenues for relief.

The order for therapy and counselling was a final order made under the Children's Law Reform Act, which properly lies with the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction over both components of the appeal.

The respondent's motion to quash the appeal was granted, and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellants sought to stay an action in favour of arbitration, arguing that two share purchase agreements contained arbitration clauses.

The motion judge refused to stay the action, finding that one of the agreements (National Trade Agreement) never existed due to lack of incorporation and consideration, thus no arbitration agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that where an agreement is void ab initio (never existed), the arbitration clause within it also does not exist and cannot survive under s. 17(2) of the Arbitration Act.

The Court also found the motion judge correctly limited his analysis to the National Trade Agreement.

The appellant, Stephen Tello, appealed his convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime, and his 15-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's instructions on multiple counts, the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, or the PGP messages.

The court also refused to allow a new Charter issue regarding the PGP messages to be raised on appeal, finding the decision not to raise it at trial was tactical and no miscarriage of justice would result.

The sentence was deemed fit, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for large-scale drug offences.

The appellants, suspected of defrauding the respondents of over US $71 million, entered into a settlement agreement requiring them to return assets in exchange for the respondents discontinuing various global civil proceedings.

The appellants brought a motion to compel the respondents to also withdraw Interpol Red Notices and discontinue criminal proceedings in Iran, or alternatively to set aside the settlement.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the respondents only agreed to request the withdrawal of criminal proceedings, as they had no authority to unilaterally dismiss them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the settlement agreement and dismissed the appeal.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant, Linda Palichuk, was entirely unsuccessful on all issues, including an application for leave to appeal a Superior Court costs order.

The appellant had persisted in seeking a guardianship order for Nina Palichuk despite an expert report confirming Nina's capacity.

The respondents were entirely successful.

The court, considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered costs payable to each respondent.

The respondent in an appeal sought to dismiss the appeal under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the appellant's conduct in related lower court custody proceedings, including removing children from the jurisdiction in defiance of court orders, constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that while the appellant's conduct in the Superior Court was problematic, it did not amount to an abuse of process in the context of the appeal itself.

The court clarified that Rule 2.1 is not intended to address issues of non-compliance with lower court orders unless such conduct directly abuses the appellate process.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to advance personal claims for damages and increase the prayer for relief, stemming from an explosion in an apartment building they previously owned through a numbered company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision.

The court found the motion to amend was brought too late, would cause presumed non-compensable prejudice to the defendants by materially altering the factual framework and requiring new evidence, and that the proposed personal claims by shareholders lacked a proper legal foundation as they did not demonstrate a personal cause of action separate from the company's claims.

Stahle Construction Inc. appealed a judgment ordering it to pay damages to Roberto Soave for improperly terminating his long-term disability benefits.

The trial judge found Soave was still employed and entitled to benefits.

On appeal, Stahle challenged the trial judge's refusal to admit an insurance policy, the weight given to an insurer's denial letter, and the interpretation of the Mercon Booklet regarding benefit eligibility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions on evidence admission and weight but found palpable and overriding errors in the interpretation of the Mercon Booklet's eligibility requirements for long-term disability benefits.

The court clarified that eligibility depended on disability at the time work ceased or becoming totally disabled during a leave if required by law, not merely continuation of coverage.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the matter remitted to the Superior Court for reconsideration of Soave's eligibility based on the correct interpretation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation involving a 13-year-old complainant.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in applying the "mistaken belief in age" defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, specifically whether the appellant took "all reasonable steps" to ascertain the complainant's age.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to take all reasonable steps, considering various contextual factors such as the age difference, complainant's appearance, living situation, and the appellant's suspicions about her online profile.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of sexual offences, appealed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing he was deprived of his right to re-elect a judge-alone trial.

Counsel missed a statutory deadline for re-election, and the Crown subsequently withdrew consent.

The Court of Appeal found counsel's performance fell below the professional standard by missing the deadline and providing erroneous advice regarding options to rectify the situation.

This resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as the appellant genuinely desired a judge-alone trial and felt he had no choice but to proceed with a jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered before a judge alone.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion that found the appellants liable for knowing assistance and knowing receipt in a fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by drawing unwarranted inferences of liability based largely on the mere rejection of the appellants' evidence, rather than requiring positive proof.

The motion judge also made speculative and stereotypical findings regarding the appellants' credibility and financial arrangements.

The Court held that the rejection of a witness's evidence does not amount to positive proof of the opposite proposition.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and the case remitted to the Superior Court for trial.

This is an appeal from a decision dismissing an action for abuse of process due to the appellant's failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement.

The appellant, Skymark Finance Corporation, entered into Minutes of Settlement with a key defendant, Lorraine Smith, which fundamentally altered the litigation dynamics by changing an adversarial relationship into a cooperative one.

Skymark failed to disclose this agreement for eight months, only doing so after being threatened with an abuse of process motion.

The motion judge stayed the action, and the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, reiterating the strict obligation for immediate disclosure of such agreements and confirming that the absence of prejudice does not excuse non-compliance.

The appellants, holding unsatisfied judgments against a disbarred lawyer, appealed the dismissal of their motion to compel payment from the lawyer's insurer (LawPRO).

The core issues were the interpretation of the insurance policy's aggregate limit for dishonest lawyer coverage and whether LawPRO reasonably expended funds on defence and investigation, thereby exhausting the limit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the $500,000 limit was an aggregate limit and that LawPRO's expenditures were reasonable, dismissing the appeals.