Bradley W. Miller

The Hamilton branch of the Royal Yugoslav Army Combatants’ Association in Canada was embroiled in conflict over its governance and assets.

Following a trial, a judgment set out a process for re-establishing governance, including holding an Annual General Meeting (AGM) and electing a new board.

Rival groups held two separate AGMs.

The motion judge declared the December AGM valid and the November AGM invalid.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge misapprehended evidence regarding compliance with the original judgment.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's finding that the December AGM complied with the September 1 judgment was premised on a misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal was allowed, neither AGM was declared valid, and a new AGM was ordered to be held on June 22, 2024, with all previous memberships annulled.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order that set aside a solicitor's account assessment order as statute-barred and ordered payment of outstanding fees.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that all accounts were final and that the first 29 paid accounts were statute-barred.

However, the Court found legal errors in the motion judge's analysis regarding the last three unpaid accounts.

It clarified that special circumstances are not required for assessment of unpaid accounts sought between one and 12 months after delivery, and that Section 3(a) of the Solicitors Act applies to accounts not yet delivered at the time of requisition, thus having no limitation period.

The appeal was allowed in part, referring the last three accounts for assessment.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against pharmaceutical companies for negligently manufacturing valsartan, alleging contamination with NDMA and NDEA, which are potential carcinogens.

The claim was for damages related to an increased risk of cancer, costs of medical services and monitoring, refunds for drugs, and psychological damages.

The motion judge dismissed the certification, finding no viable cause of action based on concrete injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that claims for genotoxic injury (molecular changes without perceptible effect), psychological harm (not meeting the 'serious and prolonged' or 'ordinary fortitude' thresholds), and pure economic loss (as the product was discarded and not imminently dangerous) were not compensable in tort.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims for battery, consumer protection breaches, Competition Act breaches, and unjust enrichment, concluding that the pleadings did not disclose viable causes of action or meet commonality criteria for certification.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, alleging trial judge errors in the jury charge regarding the W.(D.) instruction on consent and the consideration of absence of injury.

The Court of Appeal found no misdirection, affirming that the trial judge's consent instruction, read holistically, was not misleading, and that the absence of injury was not a contradiction given the complainant's testimony and lacked a common sense inference of injury from pain alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his three-year imprisonment sentence.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable due to forensic evidence contradicting the complainant's account and that the trial judge erred in sentencing by attempting to reconstruct the jury's path to conviction and providing insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's fact-finding for sentencing to be independent and sufficiently reasoned.

This is an appeal from a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings on mitigation efforts, the award for lost benefits, and the award of moral damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the determination that the respondent made reasonable mitigation efforts, the calculation of lost benefits, or the award of moral damages, noting that the bases for moral damages were pleaded and the appellants' conduct warranted censure.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that a security interest granted by the appellant's predecessor was oppressive to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the application judge's conclusion that the granting of the security interest was oppressive.

The court affirmed that the application judge's findings aligned with the two requirements for an oppression remedy claim, specifically that the respondents had a reasonable expectation that the appellant's predecessor would not act prejudicially, and that this expectation was violated by corporate conduct that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.

The appellant, Caleb Burgler, appealed his sentence for criminal negligence causing death, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not crediting his unsuccessful rehabilitation attempts and not considering his drug addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming that drug addiction is not a general mitigating factor for such crimes and that the sentencing judge appropriately considered the appellant's efforts and ongoing addiction in assessing reoffending risk and public protection.

The court also upheld the probation terms and weapons prohibition as within the sentencing judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house and his sentence of two years less a day incarceration.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's finding on identity, which was based on circumstantial fingerprint evidence.

The appellant argued a speculative possibility that his fingerprints were on the jewelry box prior to the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that speculative possibilities do not need to be disproven.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge failed to consider rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion, given the serious nature of the offence, its impact on victims, and the appellant's criminal record.

Both appeals were dismissed.

This document serves as a formal header for an appeal decision, primarily noting the imposition and continuation of a publication ban under section 539 of the Criminal Code.

It explicitly states that the full judgment is subject to a statutory non-publication order, pending the outcome of the underlying trial, and is therefore not publicly accessible.

The document outlines the specific provisions of section 539 regarding the restriction of evidence publication from preliminary inquiries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal summarily as an abuse of process.

The appellant, Donald Hughes, had appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary a default judgment granted in a mortgage action.

The Court of Appeal found that while the order dismissing the motion to vary was a final judgment, making it appealable to the Court of Appeal, the appeal itself constituted an abuse of process due to lengthy and unexplained delay, prejudice to the respondent, and a lack of judicial economy, especially given that the proper venue for disputing the debt was the bankruptcy court.

The appellant, Luigi Falsetto, appealed a lower court decision that rejected his claim for a purchase money resulting trust over a 50% interest in a property legally titled to his son and former daughter-in-law.

Luigi had provided half the purchase funds and borne half the expenses, intending the property as an investment.

The daughter-in-law was placed on title to avoid a merger of titles under the Planning Act.

The application judge found Luigi intended a gift, but the Court of Appeal found this an error of law and fact.

The Court held that the presumption of resulting trust applied, and the intention to avoid statutory consequences did not negate the actual intention to retain a beneficial interest, especially given the overwhelming evidence of an investment purpose and ongoing financial contributions.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action without prejudice to her ability to begin a new action that explains her case.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's endorsement, noting that he provided a clear roadmap for the appellant to follow and granted leave to bring a more comprehensible claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a formerly licensed lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his $15 million action against his former counsel for negligent legal advice and ineffective assistance during contempt proceedings.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 21.01(3)(d) as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on previous contempt findings.

The court also upheld the motion judge's finding regarding the limited scope of the retainer, which did not obligate counsel to adduce the additional evidence the appellant claimed was missing, and concluded that such evidence would not have altered the original contempt finding based on the appellant's collusion with his former client.

The appellant, S.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault related to a second sexual encounter with the complainant.

The complainant, heavily intoxicated, had no memory of this encounter.

The Crown's case relied significantly on Facebook messages exchanged between the appellant and the complainant's boyfriend (impersonating the complainant), where the appellant described overcoming resistance and not taking "no" for an answer.

The appellant argued these messages were exaggerated due to impairment and an attempt to sound "macho." The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation, finding the messages to be a truthful account demonstrating the complainant's non-consent and the appellant's knowledge or recklessness regarding it.

On appeal, S.W. challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment and reliance on the messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's reasoning or her application of legal principles regarding consent and credibility.

The appellant, Paccar Leasing Company Ltd., appealed a motion judge's order that Royal Bank of Canada's perfected security interest in a debtor's property prevailed over Paccar's unperfected security interest in leased commercial trucks.

Paccar argued that its "true lease" meant it retained title, giving it priority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the 2007 amendments to the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) prioritize perfected security interests over common law notions of title, even for true leases, if the lessor fails to perfect their interest.

The appellants, a landlord and its beneficial owner, appealed a motion judge's decision that a subrogated action by the landlord's insurer against the tenant for fire damage was barred by the commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that the tenant's contribution to the landlord's fire insurance precluded such an action, despite an indemnity provision, as the lease did not explicitly state otherwise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the motion judge's interpretation of the lease, his holistic reading of its terms, or his consideration of relevant case law.

This appeal concerned the dismissal of a proposed class action against Capital One and Amazon Web following a data breach.

The motion judge had struck the appellants' pleadings without leave to amend and dismissed their certification motion, finding the case 'doomed to fail'.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the pleadings failed to disclose viable causes of action for data misuse (intrusion upon seclusion, misappropriation of personality, conversion, breach of confidence/trust/fiduciary duty) and data breach (negligence, statutory claims).

The Court also upheld the decision to deny leave to amend the pleadings, citing repeated opportunities and the defective nature of the claims.

The appellants' motion for an extension of time to appeal costs was also dismissed.

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a class proceeding claiming damages against the Crown for negligence related to the presence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada between 2003 and 2008.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding it barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, and also that no duty of care was owed and no negligence occurred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, focusing solely on the application of section 9.

It found that various government programs providing financial assistance to cattle farmers in response to the BSE outbreak constituted "compensation" under section 9, thereby barring the negligence claim as it sought double recovery for the same factual basis of loss.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted against them on a personal guarantee.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not explicitly considering the three inquiries proposed in Malik v. Attia for partial summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge implicitly considered all relevant factors, and that partial summary judgment was appropriate as it resulted in cost savings, resolved a significant discrete issue, and avoided inconsistent findings.