Bradley W. Miller

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition.

The Board had rejected both a conditional discharge and a community living clause, despite the hospital's recommendation for the latter for therapeutic and practical reasons.

The Court of Appeal found the Board erred in rejecting the inclusion of a community living clause, as it was deemed therapeutically beneficial and practically necessary for the appellant's progress and access to appropriate care.

The appeal was allowed to vary the disposition to include the community living provision, while upholding the Board's decision against a conditional discharge.

The appellant, a former mayoral candidate, appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his application challenging the validity of the Toronto mayoral election.

The original application, brought under the Municipal Elections Act, alleged issues with media coverage, polling, and exclusion from mayoral debates.

The motion judge had dismissed the application as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that even if the complaints were valid, they could not lead to a finding that the election was invalid.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her dental negligence action via summary judgment.

She alleged procedural unfairness, insufficient disclosure, and conflicting expert evidence regarding the amount of anesthetic administered and resulting injuries.

The Court of Appeal found no procedural unfairness or reversible errors, affirming the motion judge's use of enhanced fact-finding powers.

The court upheld the preference for the respondent's evidence on anesthetic dosage and lack of causation, and the rejection of the appellant's expert evidence due to admissibility issues.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The Crown appealed a $7,500 fine imposed on a corporate defendant for an Occupational Health and Safety Act violation, arguing the lower courts erred in assessing the corporation's size and applying the parity principle between individual and corporate offenders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the lower courts incorrectly restricted consideration of the corporation's economic activity to the local operation and improperly relied on sentencing precedents for individuals.

The fine was increased to $40,000.

The appellant, Nicholas Jenkins, appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's error in admitting lay opinion evidence from five police surveillance officers, who opined that the appellant's observed conduct was consistent with drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found this evidence inadmissible as neither expert nor proper lay opinion.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, emphasizing the heightened risk of prejudice in a jury trial, the prominence of the inadmissible evidence, and the lack of an overwhelming case against the appellant.

A new trial was ordered.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of an agreement of purchase and sale with an ambiguity regarding the calculation of the purchase price, which included Harmonized Sales Tax (HST).

The appellant vendor sought payment of remaining escrow funds.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by failing to properly interpret the agreement according to the principles of contractual interpretation and by relying on inadmissible expert appraisal evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the lower court's judgment and costs order were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different judge.

The cross-appeal was not addressed.

The appellants, a husband and his brother, appealed a trial judge's equalization payment order to the wife, arguing errors in weighing factors under s. 10.1(4) of the Family Law Act regarding an immediate lump sum transfer from the husband's pension, and incorrect prejudgment interest calculation.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, upholding the trial judge's findings that the wife's pension waiver was under duress, the husband and his brother acted in bad faith, and the husband fraudulently conveyed property.

The trial judge's holistic review of financial circumstances and the decision to order an immediate lump sum transfer for equalization were affirmed as fair.

The prejudgment interest calculation from the date of separation was also upheld.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

Steve Kavanagh appealed his conviction for child luring and making sexual material available to a child, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the reasonable steps requirement for mistaken belief in age, and in denying a "lost evidence" application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's charge on mistaken belief in age was correct and that the "lost evidence" application was properly denied as the Charter does not generally apply to foreign officers' conduct.

The Court also granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the nature of the sexual offences against children.

This decision addresses consolidated appeals and cross-appeals arising from a protracted "turf war" between two competing cash-for-gold businesses, operated by Harold Gerstel and Samuel Jacob Berkovits (Jack).

The litigation involved three main actions: the "Murder for Hire Action" (malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress), the "Interference Action" (nuisance, intentional interference with economic relations), and the "Town Crier Action" (defamation).

The trial judge found Jack liable for abuse of process to Maria Konstan (Harold's employee), Harold liable to Jack for nuisance and intentional interference, and Harold liable to Jack for defamation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal granted Jack's appeal, setting aside the finding that he was liable to Maria for abuse of process, by clarifying the stringent "initiation" requirement for private complainants in such torts.

All other appeals and cross-appeals, including Harold's challenges to liability and damages for nuisance/interference, and Jack's cross-appeal for aggravated/punitive defamation damages, were dismissed.

Cory Crockatt appealed his convictions for breaking and entering, possession of stolen property, and failing to comply with release conditions.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of identification evidence, the scope of alternative possibilities considered in the circumstantial case for the break-in, and the reasonableness of the stolen car possession verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning regarding identification evidence or the circumstantial case, and concluding that the verdict for possession of stolen property was reasonable based on the cumulative evidence.

The appellant, Bill Allison, appealed his conviction for firearms trafficking offences, including conspiracy and offering a restricted firearm for sale, in association with a criminal organization.

The case relied on circumstantial evidence from intercepted telephone communications, which the appellant argued were ambiguous and did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant claimed the firearms were for personal use or that conversations related to drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that her methodical assessment of the evidence, including expert testimony on coded language and Jamaican Patois, was exemplary and that the verdict was not unreasonable despite some ambiguities.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal and dismiss a related motion for leave to appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, applying principles from *Iris Technologies Inc. v. Rogers Communications Canada Inc.*, which held that under s. 17(9) of the *Arbitration Act, 1991*, there is no further right of appeal from a Superior Court judge's decision reviewing an arbitrator's preliminary jurisdictional ruling.

The Superior Court had overturned an arbitrator's decision regarding the validity of a lease and its arbitration clause.

Consequently, both the appeal and the motion for leave to appeal were quashed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for aggravated assault and weapon possession, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order at a forensic hospital.

He argued the Board made material factual errors and that he should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Board made mischaracterizations of the evidence, these errors did not impact the reasonableness of its risk assessment or disposition.

The court concluded that the Board understood the correct factual context when its reasons were read as a whole, and that the detention order remained the least onerous and restrictive disposition consistent with public safety, given the appellant's ongoing substance abuse and lack of insight into his mental illness.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years imprisonment for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, which was consecutive to a prior four-year sentence for similar offences.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the totality principle, resulting in an unfit total sentence of eleven years.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge did consider the totality principle and that the combined sentences were fit, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the quantity of drugs, commercial gain, and the commission of new offences while on release.

The appellant, Liquid Capital Exchange Corp., was defrauded in a factoring business scheme by WF Canada Ltd.'s principals.

Liquid Capital sued Frank Zito, an Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. employee, alleging his participation in the fraud, and sought to hold Enbridge vicariously liable.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding Liquid Capital had not proven Zito's involvement and, even if he was involved, Enbridge would not be vicariously liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no reversible error in refusing to find Zito liable and no error in the costs award.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was denied.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment order that dismissed some of his claims (spoliation, intentional infliction of mental suffering) but directed a mini-trial for others (defamation, breach of contract).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory aspects without leave from the Divisional Court, that the appeal was improperly framed, and that it was premature as the summary judgment motion was not yet complete.

The court emphasized judicial economy and the need to avoid fragmented proceedings.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a commercial lease, specifically the allocation of risk for fire damage.

The landlord, James Dick Construction Limited (JDC), sued its tenant, Courtice Auto Wreckers Limited (CAW), for damages after a fire destroyed one leased building and damaged another.

JDC alleged CAW breached the lease by failing to maintain the sprinkler system.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the landlord's covenant to insure the buildings allocated the risk of fire loss to the landlord, even if the tenant was responsible for sprinkler system repair expenses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming that while a covenant to insure generally implies risk allocation to the covenantor, this is not an absolute rule and requires a holistic interpretation of the entire contract and surrounding circumstances.

The Court found no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the law.

This appeal arose from a failed residential real estate transaction where the appellant purchasers breached the agreement.

The respondent vendors obtained summary judgment for damages, which the appellants challenged, arguing that the vendors failed to mitigate damages by selling the property at an improvident price and that the matter was unsuitable for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that a trial was unnecessary.

The appellate court found that the appellants failed to satisfy their onus to establish improvident sale, noting their failure to adduce expert evidence or cross-examine on affidavits during the summary judgment motion.

The appellant, Jordan Osborne, appealed his first-degree murder conviction on two grounds: the voluntariness of his police statement and alleged abuse of process by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police statement was voluntary, concluding that no implicit inducement or misrepresentation rendered it involuntary, and that the confession was made due to the strength of the case.

The court also dismissed the abuse of process argument, finding no inconsistency in the Crown's position at trial compared to a co-accused's guilty plea, and no compromise to trial fairness or judicial integrity.

The moving parties, Maryanne Carmela Bogdan and Clinton DesJarlais, sought to set aside an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal who denied their motion to extend time to appeal a Superior Court order.

The Superior Court had dismissed their motions, which claimed they were the actual parents of a child, asserted fraudulent US court orders, and sought to declare Douglas Leonard's second marriage a nullity.

The Superior Court found no jurisdiction as the child resided in Michigan and was subject to Michigan orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Motion Judge's decision to refuse an extension, noting the obvious lack of merit in the appeal, particularly regarding jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act and the marriage declaration.

The motion to set aside the order of the Motion Judge was dismissed.