Bradley W. Miller

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed the disposition of $30,000 posted by the appellant, Sergio Grillone, as security for costs on appeal, following his bankruptcy.

The appellant argued the funds were assets of his estate to be distributed to creditors, while the respondent, Bluecore Capital Inc., sought payment of outstanding costs from the security.

The court rejected the appellant's submission, concluding that the security for costs was not an asset of the bankruptcy estate but was specifically posted to secure the costs of the appeal and related motions.

The respondent was found entitled to the full amount of the security to cover its outstanding costs.

CentriLogic appealed a trial order requiring it to pay Infor Financial Inc. damages for a financing fee and trial costs.

The appeal centered on the interpretation of an engagement agreement, specifically whether Infor was entitled to the financing fee and if CentriLogic breached a confidentiality clause by sharing Infor's proprietary materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that CentriLogic breached the agreement and that Infor was entitled to the financing fee based on a commercially reasonable interpretation of the contract.

The court also affirmed the substantial costs award, finding no error in principle.

The appellant appealed convictions for firearms possession, arguing the vehicle search was unlawful under the Liquor Licence Act (LLA), the traffic stop was a pretext, and the evidence did not prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search lawful under the LLA, rejecting the pretext argument (including a new racial profiling claim), and affirming the trial judge's finding of possession based on ample evidence.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an appeal where VAC Developments Limited's counterclaim against Mr. Williams was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed VAC's appeal from that judgment.

Mr. Williams sought full indemnity costs for the appeal and a fresh evidence motion, but the court awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal, finding no grounds for a heightened award.

For the fresh evidence motion, which was occasioned by an unsupported allegation in Mr. Williams' factum, the court awarded reduced costs to Mr. Williams and also to Mr. Lakhani, a third party who intervened, acknowledging their partial responsibility for the motion's necessity.

The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) appealed a lower court's interpretation of its standard-form "feed-in-tariff" (FIT 1) contracts with solar energy suppliers.

The dispute centered on whether suppliers breached contracts by "optimizing" their facilities (installing more efficient solar panels) without IESO's consent, specifically regarding changes to DC energy capacity and DC/AC ratio.

The application judge found that consent was only required for features outlined in the application or contract cover page, which did not include DC capacity or DC/AC ratio.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, dismissing IESO's appeal, finding no reversible error in the application judge's reasoning regarding contract interpretation or the impact of optimizations on metering plans.

The appellant, Sergio Grillone, brought a motion to vary a previous decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate any error of law or misapplication of discretion by the motion judge.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

This appeal concerned a dispute over the exercise of options to purchase commercial properties.

The purchase price was to be the midpoint of two appraisals, which were widely divergent.

The Tenant (purchaser) tendered only the amount of its own appraisal, holding the disputed balance in trust with its solicitor, which the Landlord (vendor) refused to accept.

The application judge found the tender sufficient and ordered specific performance.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the Tenant's partial tender constituted a material breach of the purchase and sale contract.

The court found that a purchaser cannot unilaterally withhold a portion of the purchase price, even if disputed, and that the "abatement cases" relied upon by the lower court were distinguishable.

The Tenant's cross-appeal regarding the validity of the Landlord's appraisal was dismissed.

The options were declared null and void, and vacant possession was ordered for the Landlord.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR), appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his continued detention.

The appellant argued the Board erred in assessing his risk of harm, in not ordering a conditional discharge as the least onerous disposition, and in its application of Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the Board's conclusions regarding the appellant's significant risk due to treatment-resistant psychosis and substance use, the lack of suitable community supports for a conditional discharge, and that Gladue principles were appropriately considered by the Board in its analysis, even if they did not lead to a different disposition.

This appeal concerned a failed business venture between the appellants (Corridor Transport Inc. and Corridor Transport Limited Partnership) and the respondents (Vittorio Junior Lentini, LTI Logistics Inc., and Loblaw Companies Limited).

The appellants claimed breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty by a director.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no enforceable contract due to fundamental misunderstandings regarding the parties' identities and entitlement to business proceeds, and no conversion as the appellants lacked a possessory interest in the funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings or error in law, emphasizing the trial judge's reasonable conclusion that no meeting of the minds occurred on essential contractual terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, Orllyn Loney and Yvonne Prouty, appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to correctly name the driver and owner of a tractor-trailer (Michael George Alexander Mills and 564242 Ontario Limited, also known as Liftlock) as defendants, replacing "John Doe" and "ABC Corporation".

The motion was brought almost ten years after the accident and over three years after the action was set down for trial.

The motion judge denied leave, finding no sudden change in circumstances and non-compensable prejudice due to the lengthy, unexplained delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her exercise of discretion.

The court emphasized the importance of adhering to limitation periods and the actual prejudice caused by the delay, including the loss of timely discovery opportunities for the proposed defendants.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment order that dismissed her spousal support claim, ordered a trial for child support, and dismissed both parties' property claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the spousal support claim, finding the statutory definitions of "spouse" and "parent" distinct.

However, it allowed the appeal regarding the property claims, concluding that the motion judge erred in dismissing them without sufficient factual findings or legal application.

The issues of child support and property damages were ordered to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was the complainant's age when the sexual contact began, which determined the validity of consent.

The trial judge found the contact started when the complainant was 15 and the appellant was in a position of trust.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability findings, arguing reliance on illogical assumptions regarding the complainant's behaviour and the implausibility of the appellant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges on credibility and reliability, and finding no palpable and overriding error or ungrounded assumptions.

The appellant, an unsecured creditor, appealed a motion judge's order authorizing a pooled distribution of assets under a receivership, which included both individual and corporate debtors.

The appellant objected to sharing corporate assets with creditors of only the individual debtors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in piercing the corporate veil to pool assets, as the corporate assets were derived from fraudulent transfers by the individual debtors to defeat creditors.

The court also found no procedural unfairness in determining the issue on a motion for directions and upheld the disallowance of certain interest charges claimed by the appellant.

The appellant, 2649360 Ontario Inc., appealed a motion decision that granted Grant Thornton Limited, as Trustee in Bankruptcy for Aiden Pleterski and AP Private Equity Limited, relief from forfeiture of a $500,000 real estate purchase deposit.

The deposit was paid by Pleterski using misappropriated investor funds for a property that was subsequently not purchased due to bankruptcy.

The motion judge applied the two-part test for relief from forfeiture (disproportionate to damages and unconscionable to retain) and ordered the deposit returned to the Trustee for the benefit of creditors.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by considering creditor interests and by characterizing Grant Thornton as "innocent." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the motion judge was entitled to consider the full commercial context, including the source of funds and the benefit to creditors, and that a party causing breach is not absolutely barred from relief from forfeiture.

The court found no error in the discretionary decision.

This is an appeal from an anti-SLAPP motion.

The appellant, VAC Developments Limited, sought to overturn the dismissal of its $1.5 million defamation counterclaim against the respondent, Agin Williams.

Williams had publicly alleged that VAC failed to address racist threats and dismissed him in reprisal for involving the police.

The motion judge dismissed VAC's counterclaim under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding VAC had not shown substantial merit or sufficiently serious harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting Williams' expression.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that VAC failed to demonstrate sufficiently serious harm, which is a critical component of the public interest balancing test in anti-SLAPP motions.

The appellant, Stayside Corporation Inc., appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for specific performance of an agreement to purchase land.

The agreement was conditional on the severance of a 50-acre parcel, which the appellant was responsible for pursuing.

The motion judge found that the appellant had repudiated the agreement by failing to diligently pursue the severance application, despite multiple extensions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding of anticipatory breach, applying the factors from Spirent Communications of Ottawa Limited v. Quake Technologies (Canada) Inc., and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

Stahle Construction Inc. appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay general damages, out-of-pocket expenses, and costs to its former employee, Roberto Soave, for improper termination of long-term disability (LTD) coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that Mr. Soave was disabled and eligible for LTD benefits prior to a car accident, despite Stahle's arguments regarding evidentiary burden and pleading.

The court found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's mixed findings of fact and law regarding disability and upheld the decision to determine the remitted issue.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal, arguing that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the order dismissing the appellant's motion to compel witness attendance for examination on jurisdictional grounds was interlocutory and did not finally dispose of any party rights.

As such, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, and the appeal was quashed.

The parties entered into a contract in 1999 for the provision of market pricing data.

The appellant, a custodial bank, redistributed the data to its numerous affiliates without authorization.

The respondent discovered the breach in 2016 and sued.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the contract and awarded damages based on a rateable approach, but also awarded damages for sharing data with a specific affiliate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, concluding the contract only authorized the appellant itself to access the data.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to change his unentered judgment and rejected the appellant's limitations defence.

On damages, the Court struck the award relating to the specific affiliate as double compensation but otherwise upheld the damages assessment, including an adverse inference drawn against the appellant for spoliation of evidence.

This appeal concerns the applicable limitation period for an equitable trust claim against a deceased's estate.

The respondent, a common-law spouse, brought a claim for constructive trust and unjust enrichment against the estate more than four years after the deceased's death.

The motion judge applied a ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act (RPLA).

The Court of Appeal, applying a holistic statutory interpretation approach, determined that the two-year limitation period under section 38(3) of the Trustee Act applies to equitable trust claims against estates, as "wrong" in section 38(2) encompasses unjust enrichment.

The Court found that the longer RPLA period does not apply to general estate claims, emphasizing the legislative policy for expeditious estate administration.

Consequently, the respondent's equitable trust claim was statute-barred and dismissed.