Allen Philip Welman

The defendant landlord was charged with failing to clean refuse from her property under the Toronto Municipal Code and failing to comply with a Property Standards Order under the Building Code Act.

The prosecution presented electronic evidence of waste accumulation, which the defendant ultimately consented to admitting.

The defendant testified that her tenants prevented her from cleaning the property and repairing appliances, but the court rejected her uncorroborated evidence under the W.(D.) framework.

The prosecution invited the court to dismiss the Building Code Act charge.

The court found the defendant guilty of the Municipal Code charge, concluding she failed to establish a due diligence defence.

This judgment at trial addresses criminal charges against the defendant, Maxim Dorofeev, for incidents on November 7, 2022 (assault, choking, unlawful confinement) and August 25, 2022 (assault).

The court found the defendant guilty of assault and choking under s.267(c) of the Criminal Code for the November 7 incident, ordering a conditional stay for the simple assault count from the same date.

The defendant was acquitted of unlawful confinement for November 7 and assault for August 25.

The court's decision involved a detailed assessment of witness credibility and reliability, particularly concerning the complainant's and defendant's conflicting accounts, and the corroborative value of independent witness testimony and physical evidence.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for aggravated assault and weapon possession, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order at a forensic hospital.

He argued the Board made material factual errors and that he should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Board made mischaracterizations of the evidence, these errors did not impact the reasonableness of its risk assessment or disposition.

The court concluded that the Board understood the correct factual context when its reasons were read as a whole, and that the detention order remained the least onerous and restrictive disposition consistent with public safety, given the appellant's ongoing substance abuse and lack of insight into his mental illness.

The applicants, Anisur and Sharmin Sikder, brought a motion for summary judgment against Carol Jesseau regarding deficiencies in a purchased residential property, for which their insurer sought subrogated reimbursement.

The respondent, Ms. Jesseau, sought leave to amend her pleadings.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial concerning whether consideration was provided for a "Warranties and Bill of Sale" document signed by Ms. Jesseau and whether the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The court granted Ms. Jesseau leave to amend her pleadings and ordered further amplification of the record through viva voce evidence to resolve the enforceability of the Warranty.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The Board had rescinded a certificate of involuntary admission but upheld the physician’s finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment due to inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing antipsychotic medication.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review and the test for capacity under s. 4 of the Act, the court found the Board reasonably concluded the appellant’s delusional beliefs and disorganized thinking prevented her from performing a risk–benefit analysis regarding treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the Board equated mental illness with incapacity or failed to ensure the appellant had been informed about treatment options.

The appeal was dismissed.

A default hearing brought by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office seeking enforcement of arrears of child and spousal support totaling $199,427 as of July 30, 2014.

The payor claimed inability to pay due to depression following his 2008 separation and argued for a motion to change the support order.

The court found the payor's evidence regarding his financial circumstances and the source of substantial lump sum payments ($49,600 and $5,000) made under court order to be entirely lacking in credibility.

The court concluded the payor had demonstrated access to significant funds and was deliberately obfuscating his financial situation.

The court ordered the payor to pay $50,000 within 21 days, annual payments of $50,000 until arrears were satisfied, and ongoing monthly support of $3,644, with imprisonment as the consequence for default.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to treatment and renewing a Community Treatment Order under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal raised issues concerning whether the Board applied the correct statutory test for capacity and whether its decision was unreasonable.

Applying the framework from Starson v. Swayze, the court examined whether the appellant could understand information relevant to treatment and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decision.

The court held that while the appellant understood the information provided, the Board reasonably relied on expert medical evidence that she could not appreciate the consequences of refusing medication.

Given the deferential reasonableness standard applicable to the specialized tribunal, the court declined to interfere with the Board’s findings.