Bradley W. Miller

The appellant challenged an application judge's determination of liability and damages for failure to timely discharge a mortgage, which allegedly deprived the respondent of financing for a secondary property purchase.

The appeal raised four issues: causation (respondent's reliance on equity), remoteness (loss on secondary transaction), mitigation (promptness of court application), and date of damage assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's findings that the loss was foreseeable given the appellant's knowledge of the respondent's real estate business, that the respondent adequately mitigated, and that the date of assessment was appropriately chosen.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to extinguish spousal support arrears and costs, and to be reimbursed for support paid.

He alleged the original support orders were based on the respondent's false claims and an incorrect premise about his business involvement.

The motion judge found no new evidence and no jurisdiction as the matter was finally adjudicated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that no new evidence was adduced, only additional case law, and that the spousal support issue had been finally resolved in prior proceedings, including a previous appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal from a summary judgment order in a real estate dispute.

The appellants (purchasers) argued that the motion judge's reasons were inadequate for meaningful appellate review, specifically regarding the breach of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS), the improvidence of the subsequent sale, and the enforceability of a 20% contractual pre-judgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient, as they merely summarized positions and stated conclusions without providing insight into the reasoning or factual findings.

Shuvanga Khanal pleaded guilty to three counts of Dangerous Driving Causing Death.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the multiple deaths and the extreme dangerousness of the driving (175 km/h in a 60 km/h zone, running a red light), and mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea, community support, and the offender's own serious injuries.

The Crown sought 5-6 years custody, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a four-year period of incarceration followed by a ten-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence over rehabilitation in this severe case.

Annisha Sergeant appealed her conviction for assaulting her daughter, primarily on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (alleging counsel ignored instructions to testify or gave incompetent advice) and, alternatively, that the trial court erred by convicting her of assault with a weapon when the findings only supported simple assault.

The court found that while counsel's conduct could have been better, the advice not to testify was reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance.

However, the court agreed there was an error in the verdict, as the trial judge's reasons only supported a finding of simple assault, not assault with a weapon, creating sufficient uncertainty.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a "life of mine" supply contract for sodium cyanide used in gold mining.

The appellants, Kinross Gold Corporation and its subsidiaries, sought a declaration that their contract with the respondent, Cyanco Company, LLC, for liquid sodium cyanide did not prevent them from sourcing solid sodium cyanide elsewhere.

The trial judge dismissed Kinross's action, concluding that the contract obligated Kinross to purchase sodium cyanide exclusively from Cyanco if the mines were operating and required liquid sodium cyanide.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding error in the interpretation of the contract, the consideration of surrounding circumstances, the application of related contracts principles, or the assessment of commercial reasonableness.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Ms. White, appealed a trial judge's order varying a separation agreement, specifically challenging the imputation of income to her of $35,000 per year and the refusal to impute higher income to the respondent, Mr. White.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's discretionary decision regarding income imputation.

The trial judge's findings were based on the separation agreement's terms requiring Ms. White to make reasonable efforts to support herself, and evidence concerning Mr. White's job loss and efforts to find new employment.

The appellant, MGW-Homes Design Inc., appealed an order vacating a writ of enforcement related to an adjudicator's determination under the Construction Act.

The primary issue was whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which depended on whether the order constituted a "judgment" under s. 71(1) of the Construction Act, in which case the appeal would lie to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal, interpreting "judgment" broadly consistent with prior case law and the Act's purpose of efficiency, found that the order was a "judgment" under s. 71(1).

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as it properly belonged in the Divisional Court.

This is an appeal concerning the interpretation of a pollution exclusion clause in a commercial general liability insurance policy.

The appellant insurer argued that the clause applied to property damage caused by a liquid chlorine leak from the respondents' premises, asserting that the storage of chlorine constituted a known pollution risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the exclusion did not apply, agreeing that for the clause to be triggered, the irritant or contaminant must enter the natural environment and necessitate clean-up costs.

The court concluded that the claim was essentially for negligence in the course of regular business, not an inherent pollution risk, and therefore the insurer had a duty to defend.

The appellant sought to appeal from a motion judge’s endorsement setting aside her noting in default and striking her amended statement of claim, along with an associated costs order.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, arguing that no orders had been issued and that the matters were interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal found that the matters under appeal were indeed interlocutory and did not preclude the appellant from pursuing her claim.

Consequently, an appeal lies only to the Divisional Court with leave.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted, and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant, Domarina Malek, appealed a Superior Court order that enforced a settlement agreement and dismissed her claim, denying her request for an adjournment.

Malek, who became self-represented after her counsel withdrew, argued she was under duress and mentally incapacitated when agreeing to the settlement.

The motion judge denied the adjournment, citing the long-standing litigation and Malek's failure to secure new counsel or provide medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's denial of the adjournment was a reasonable exercise of discretion, given the contextual factors including the duration of the litigation, lack of explanation for not retaining new counsel, absence of medical evidence, and failure to attend a pre-trial.

The appellant, Andre Appleton, was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated assault following a stabbing incident.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect (Ibrahim Muhia) was irrelevant and in effectively directing that another individual (SHG) was the second man involved in the fight.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly restricting the jury's consideration of evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt about the appellant's guilt, particularly concerning the identity of the stabber and co-participants.

The Court held that no formal third-party suspect application was required as the Crown had already made Muhia's potential involvement a live issue.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The respondent corporation, 1819472 Ontario Corp. ("9472"), alleged fraud by its former principal and others, leading to an action to recover funds.

The appellants sought summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred due to the limitation period.

The motion judge dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding the action was not statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the limitation period began when the respondent gained control and knowledge of the claim, which was after the PPSA foreclosure process was completed, not when initial suspicions arose.

The court also confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the appeal as a final order.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment, appealed an Ontario Review Board order requiring his transfer from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) to Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care (Waypoint).

The transfer was necessitated by the appellant's persistent harassing and stalking behaviour towards female staff at CAMH, which had exhausted CAMH's resources and posed a significant risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the Board's decision-making process, no reasonable apprehension of bias from the panel's composition, and that the Board's decision to transfer was reasonable given the safety risks and the exhaustion of CAMH's resources, particularly the need for a male-only unit.

This appeal concerned the interpretation and breach of a "Buyback Provision" (BBP) in an agreement for the transfer of property.

The appellant, Mr. Quinn, argued that the BBP was an option requiring strict compliance, which the respondents, Ms. Jones and Mr. Jones, failed to meet.

The Court of Appeal characterized the BBP as an option but found that Mr. Quinn's agent acted in bad faith by obstructing the respondents' attempts to exercise the option.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the lower court's order for specific performance of the buyback, with a minor clarification regarding the return of items.

The First Nations moved to vary costs awards against the Estate of William Albin Herold, seeking to make Jeffrey S. Herold, the Estate Trustee, jointly and severally liable for over $190,000 in costs.

This motion was brought under Rule 59.06(2)(a) after the First Nations discovered that Mr. Herold had personally received a transfer of Lot 35, the property forming the basis of the Estate's claim to certain islands, a fact not disclosed during the original litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion regarding Supreme Court of Canada costs, stating it lacked authority, but granted the variation for its own costs awards.

The court found that the non-disclosure was a material fact, not a mere irregularity, and that Mr. Herold was the true litigant, satisfying the "person of straw" test for imposing costs on a non-party.

The appellant, Jerry Revolus, appealed his 18-month custodial sentence for fraud over $5,000 and conspiracy to commit fraud, seeking a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence to be very low given the seriousness of the orchestrated fraud scheme, which involved over $330,000 from 80+ victims, coercion, and threats of violence, including a handgun.

The court rejected the argument that a conditional sentence was unavailable due to the appellant's Québec residence, stating that even if there was an error in that determination, a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offences and the appellant's central role.

The court also found no parity with a co-accused who received a conditional sentence, citing significant differences in their roles and circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000, arguing three grounds: improper judicial notice of a psychological theory, reasonable apprehension of bias from the trial judge's comments, and insufficient reasons for judgment regarding credibility and mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reference to psychology was merely shorthand for finding the appellant's explanation implausible, his comments did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, and his brief oral reasons were sufficient to explain the rejection of the appellant's evidence and the finding of fraudulent intent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder using a firearm, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the victim's provocative conduct in assessing the specific intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons demonstrated a proper consideration of all circumstances, including the victim's actions, when determining whether the Crown had proven intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also dismissed the application for leave to appeal sentence due to lack of submissions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal concerning a "Lender Fee" in a multimillion-dollar loan agreement.

The motion judge had ruled that the balance of the fee was an unenforceable penalty clause and granted relief against forfeiture, also suggesting it was not earned as the loan was not advanced.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the Lender Fee was consideration for obtaining the loan commitment, not a stipulated remedy for breach, and therefore the doctrines of unenforceable penalty clauses and relief against forfeiture did not apply.

The court further clarified that the fee was not contingent on the loan being advanced based on the contract's terms.

The appeal was allowed, ordering the balance of the fee to be paid to the lender.