Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant, Knights of Columbus, appealed an order dismissing their motion for a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration.

The motion judge had concluded that the respondent was an employee and that the arbitration clauses in subsequent contracts were invalid for want of fresh consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming its jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, because the motion judge found no valid arbitration agreement existed.

The Court upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no fresh consideration for the contracts containing the arbitration clauses, making them invalid.

It also clarified that the motion judge's preliminary finding on the respondent's employment status was not a final determination for the underlying action.

The appellant, Antonio Doria, appealed the dismissal of his action against the respondents, which was brought after he had already received and collected an arbitration award for the same damages.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d), finding that the plaintiff was attempting to re-litigate damages claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that Section 139 of the Courts of Justice Act does not confer an absolute right to pursue separate actions against jointly liable parties if it constitutes an abuse of process, especially when a full opportunity to adjudicate the claim has already occurred and the award collected.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's request for leave to appeal the costs award.

The appellant, Kevin Nguyen, appealed his convictions for various firearm-related offences.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's Charter ruling regarding an unlawful arrest, an illegal apartment freeze, and the validity of a subsequent search warrant.

The application judge had excluded drugs found on the appellant but admitted a handgun and cash found in his apartment.

The appellant argued errors in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis (failure to consider overall police conduct and D.C. Worth's lack of good faith), and errors in the Garofoli ruling (permitting amplification of the Information to Obtain a search warrant and failing to exercise residual discretion to set aside the warrant).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's decisions on all grounds.

The appellant, a third-party creditor (2401242 Ontario Inc.), appealed an order releasing the wife's share of matrimonial home sale proceeds.

The appellant had obtained a default judgment and filed a writ against the husband, arguing priority over the wife's interest in the jointly held matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a creditor cannot seize the interest of a non-debtor joint tenant.

The court clarified that under Ontario's Execution Act, a writ only binds the debtor's exigible interest in jointly held land, not the entire property, and therefore the wife was entitled to her half-share of the proceeds.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of breach of trust, conspiracy, and attempting to obstruct justice after disseminating confidential police information.

He appealed, arguing that the London Police Service's investigation of its own officer created an inherent conflict of interest amounting to an abuse of process under the residual category.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police service's conduct did not offend societal notions of fair play and decency, and that the failure to transfer the investigation to an outside force earlier did not undermine the integrity of the justice system.

Money Gate Corporation (MGC) brought a motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal and a declaration that it had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), or alternatively for leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The underlying matter involved a receivership where a motion judge had dismissed MGC's claim for payment from the proceeds of a property sale, finding no valid assignment of a second mortgage and that MGC was not the registered owner.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding MGC's grounds of appeal not frivolous and no real prejudice to the responding parties.

Crucially, the court declared that MGC had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA, concluding that the motion judge's order finally determined MGC's economic interests in the property proceeds, distinguishing it from a mere priorities dispute.

Stelco Inc. sought leave to appeal an order from the Superior Court of Justice requiring it to complete the severance and conveyance of a parcel of land (the "Reconveyance Parcel") to Legacy Lands Limited Partnership's nominee, in accordance with a 2018 reconveyance agreement.

Ernst & Young Inc., as court-appointed Monitor in the U.S. Steel Canada Inc. CCAA proceeding, and DGAP Investments Ltd., a purchaser of the land, opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Stelco's motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge did not err in concluding the CCAA applied, and that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious nor did it raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

The court upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to grant specific performance and his finding regarding waiver of MOECC consent.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a child protection case.

The appellant, T.M., sought partial indemnity costs against the individual respondents (parents and aunt) and the Oneida Nation of the Thames.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, guided by the Family Law Rules, declined to award costs against the individual respondents but found it appropriate to order costs against the Oneida Nation.

The court noted that the Oneida Nation's costs submissions contained unsworn, unproven, and disrespectful statements attacking the appellant's character, and that the appellant had to bring a contested motion for continued access pending appeal.

The court ordered the Oneida Nation to pay $10,000 in costs to the appellant.

The appellant, Skyline Real Estate Acquisitions (III) Inc., appealed a lower court decision that dismissed its application for the return of a $3.25 million deposit.

Skyline had refused to close on an agreement to purchase two shopping plazas, alleging the vendor (Peterborough Retail Portfolio LP) failed to satisfy conditions related to key tenant tenancies (Walmart and Dollarama).

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the vendor had made commercially reasonable efforts and provided substantial assurances, while the purchaser failed to act reasonably and in good faith by insisting on strict technical compliance to exit a contract it no longer desired.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was awarded costs.

The appellant sought to appeal a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had properly applied legal principles and that the imposed short period of incarceration was not unfit.

The court noted the trial judge's adherence to the principle of restraint and consideration of significant mitigating factors, including the appellant's addiction.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, I.S., convicted of various sexual offences and uttering threats, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the appeal was frivolous and that detention was necessary in the public interest due to the seriousness of the offences and residual public safety concerns.

The court, applying the criteria under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, found that the appeal was not frivolous, meeting the "very low bar" established by R. v. Oland.

Despite the serious nature of the offences, the court determined that public safety and flight concerns were negligible, and the public interest in reviewability outweighed the interest in enforceability.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

This is a motion to quash an appeal from a trial judge's costs order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario quashed the appeal, finding that leave to appeal was required for an appeal solely from a costs order under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, and the appellant had not sought leave.

The court also directed the distribution of security for costs previously posted by the appellant, awarding a portion to the respondent for prior appeal costs and the current motion costs, with the remainder returned to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion regarding an appeal that arose under the Construction Lien Act.

The moving parties (respondents) argued that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.

The court agreed, finding that jurisdiction for such matters lay with the Divisional Court, and that the question of whether the underlying order was final or interlocutory was for the Divisional Court to decide.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving parties.

The moving party sought a stay of an order finding her in contempt and requiring her to vacate an estate property by an accelerated date.

The motion judge had found the moving party in contempt for failing to cooperate with the Estate Trustee During Litigation and denying access to the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no arguable merit to the appeal, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the Estate Trustee.

The applicant sought release pending his appeal of convictions and a 36-month sentence for weapons offences.

The Crown opposed bail on the public interest criterion, citing the applicant's history of weapons offences and breaches of release terms.

The motion judge found that the proposed release plan, which relied on the applicant's mother as a surety, was inadequate given her past inability to supervise him and prevent violations.

Concluding there was a strong likelihood of breach and a real risk to public safety, the court dismissed the application for release pending appeal.

The applicant, S.M.J., sought to reopen his appeal against a 2011 dangerous offender designation, which he had abandoned in 2014.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, finding it was not in the interests of justice to reopen the appeal.

The court rejected the applicant's claim that he abandoned the appeal due to duty counsel's advice, finding his abandonment was firm and voluntary.

Furthermore, the court found no merit in the proposed appeal, specifically addressing the applicant's argument that the trial judge erred by failing to consider treatability and intractability (a "Boutilier error") at the designation stage.

The court concluded that the trial judge's analysis, read as a whole, was faithful to the principles of treatability and intractability, and even if there was an error, the curative proviso would apply as the designation was inevitable.

The appellant, a kin caregiver for a First Nations child, appealed an order dismissing a child protection proceeding and denying her motion to be added as a party.

The motion judge had dismissed the proceeding based on a customary care agreement signed by the biological parents, the child's aunt, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society, which excluded the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant met the statutory definition of a 'parent' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and was entitled to party status.

The Court further held that the proceeding could not be dismissed on consent without the appellant's participation and a proper analysis of the child's best interests.

Metrolinx brought a motion to quash an appeal by the Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) from an order dismissing its motion for an interlocutory injunction, and also sought to set aside an interim injunction granted by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

Metrolinx further raised a preliminary allegation of reasonable apprehension of institutional bias against the court.

HDI, in turn, sought an extension of the interim injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Metrolinx's bias challenge, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court then granted Metrolinx's motion to quash the appeal, concluding that the lower court's order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal lay with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged errors in jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence and the relationship between intoxication and accident, and the unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's comprehensive and fair instructions on after-the-fact conduct, which were vetted by the parties and relevant to the appellant's state of mind.

The court also found no reversible error in the intoxication instructions, noting that the jury was properly equipped to consider all evidence.

Finally, the court concluded that the second-degree murder verdict was reasonable, as there was sufficient inculpatory evidence for a properly instructed jury to reach that conclusion.

The appellant, J.C., appealed five convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his former domestic partner, BOH, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons deficient but determined that for four of the five counts (assault and assault with a weapon involving a frying pan and knife), the convictions were supported by the record and the deficiencies did not preclude meaningful appellate review.

However, for the conviction of assault with a drill, the court found the reasons critically insufficient as the conviction was not supported by unambiguous, independent, and contemporaneous confirmatory evidence, making it impossible to discern the trial judge's path to the verdict.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the conviction for assault with a drill and ordering a new trial on that count, while dismissing the appeal for the other four counts.