Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant was convicted by a jury of several firearm offences and assault.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included challenges to witness credibility due to inconsistent statements and alleged improper Crown cross-examination.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge erred in principle by treating the statutory minimum sentence as a "straitjacket" and failing to adequately consider mitigating factors and rehabilitative prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's handling of witness credibility and the Crown's cross-examination, and upholding the sentence as a careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed an order striking out claims against individual defendants and allegations of fraud, malice, and bad faith against the corporate defendant.

The motion judge's order was silent on leave to amend.

During the appeal, the respondents conceded that the order did not bar the appellant from seeking leave to amend the statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs and without prejudice to the appellant's right to bring a motion for leave to amend in the Superior Court.

This appeal concerned whether a "Royalty Purchase Agreement" constituted an advance of credit subject to the criminal interest rate provisions of section 347 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, Hybrid Financial Ltd., argued that a buyout option payment under the agreement resulted in a criminal rate of interest.

The application judge had dismissed Hybrid's claim, characterizing the agreement as an equity investment and finding the payments not to be 'interest' or triggered by a voluntary act.

The Court of Appeal overturned this, holding that the substance of the transaction was an advance of credit, the buyout payment constituted 'interest' under the broad definition in section 347, and a contractual 'Maximum Permitted Rate' clause prevented the application of the 'voluntary act' exception, ensuring a lawful rate.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination of the buyout amount under the adjusted rate.

The appellant, Sean Gibbs, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and uninformed due to mental illness exacerbated by segregation, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's plea was voluntary and informed, as he understood the nature and consequences of the plea.

The court also found that trial counsel's assistance was not ineffective, as the alleged deficiencies did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment requiring them to pay damages to the respondent, Rosehaven Homes Limited, for failing to complete an agreement of purchase and sale for a new home.

The appeal focused on the motion judge's admission and reliance on Rosehaven's expert report concerning property valuation and Rosehaven's mitigation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to admit and rely on the expert report, noting it was verified by affidavit and the appellants did not object or provide competing admissible evidence.

The court also found no palpable and overriding errors in the assessment of Rosehaven's mitigation efforts or the quantification of damages.

The National Organized Workers Union appealed the denial of an interlocutory injunction to prevent Sinai Health System from enforcing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The union argued that the policy compelled vaccination without informed consent, constituting irreparable harm not remediable by arbitration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in declining to exercise the Superior Court's residual jurisdiction in labour relations.

The court affirmed that the potential harm of unpaid leave or termination due to non-compliance with a workplace policy is fundamentally related to employment and is remediable by a labour arbitrator through reinstatement and compensation for lost wages, thus not creating a 'remedial gap' that would warrant Superior Court intervention.

The appellant, convicted of dangerous driving and arson, appealed only the arson conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the cause of the fire, specifically in excluding the possibility that a cigarette accidentally caused it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to accept or reject expert testimony and to conclude, based on the evidence, that the fire was intentionally set by the appellant.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred in her analysis of circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the analytical framework by examining evidence in a piecemeal fashion, scrutinizing individual pieces against a reasonable doubt standard, and requiring the Crown to negate speculative inferences.

The court held that the trial judge failed to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence as a whole and that alternative inferences inconsistent with guilt must be reasonable, not merely speculative.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Joseph Grant-Stuart, appealed his conviction for importing cocaine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking, and sought leave to appeal his nine-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued errors in the trial judge's response to a jury question on reasonable doubt and improper Crown closing submissions.

The sentence appeal argued the sentence was unfit due to insufficient weight given to mitigating factors like age and health.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions or the Crown's submissions, and that the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range for drug importing cases.

The appellant, Kevin Drizen, appealed an order confirming he was the party to a retainer agreement with MBM Intellectual Property Law LLP.

Drizen argued the agreement was with his company, GlycoBiosciences Inc., not him.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's decision, upholding that the plain wording of the agreement, addressed to and signed by Drizen, made him responsible for legal fees, despite the work potentially benefiting his company.

The court also declined to address a bias claim against the assessment officer, stating it was not properly before the court.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, theft under $5,000, and unlawful confinement, stemming from an altercation with a complainant in a hotel room.

The trial judge had acquitted on other charges (sexual assault, robbery, choking, threatening death) where proof depended entirely on the complainant's uncorroborated evidence.

The appellant argued misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and error in the self-defence analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension, noting the trial judge's reasoned rejection of the appellant's evidence.

It also found no uneven scrutiny, as the trial judge carefully examined both sides and properly applied rules of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the aggressor, which negated the self-defence claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a conviction appeal where the appellant died during the appeal process.

The Crown requested the appeal be dismissed as abated.

The court accepted the Crown's submission and dismissed the appeal as abated, thereby upholding the original conviction.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The motion judge had awarded the appellant damages equivalent to six months' reasonable notice, reduced by two months for failure to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in reducing the appellant's damages for failure to mitigate.

Specifically, the motion judge erred in principle by suggesting the appellant should have sought lesser-paying jobs and made a palpable and overriding error by concluding the appellant "aimed too high" based solely on job titles without considering comparable duties.

The Court emphasized that the employer bears a heavy burden to prove both that the employee failed to take reasonable steps and that comparable employment would have been found.

The appeal was allowed, and the damages were based on an eight-month notice period without the two-month reduction.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged s. 11(b) Charter breach due to delay in the dangerous offender hearing, and an error in the interpretation and application of s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code regarding assessor designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no s. 11(b) infringement as it was a transitional case with exceptional circumstances (dangerous offender proceedings and Crown illness).

While the trial judge erred in applying a presumption for the Crown's proposed assessor under s. 752.1, this error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the fairness of the proceedings and the overwhelming evidence supporting the dangerous offender designation.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after striking the complainant, causing severe brain injuries.

He appealed his conviction on five grounds, primarily challenging the trial judge's self-defence analysis, including misapprehension of evidence, defensive purpose, reasonableness of actions, and application of R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the appellant's actions were not reasonable in the circumstances, particularly considering his role in initiating the confrontation and available alternatives.

The appellant, Gurkirat Rai, appealed his conviction following guilty pleas to multiple driving-related offences, including dangerous operation and driving while disqualified, which resulted in a permanent licence suspension by the Ministry of Transportation under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant argued his pleas were uninformed because his counsel erroneously advised him that his licence could be reinstated after 10 years, and he was unaware of the automatic lifetime suspension under the HTA or the cumulative effect of consecutive two-year suspensions.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to admit fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish subjective prejudice.

The court concluded that it was not credible that the appellant would have acted differently had he received accurate advice, given his primary motivation to be released from pre-trial custody quickly, his willingness to plead guilty despite knowing a lifetime Criminal Code prohibition was possible, the strong Crown case, and his subsequent conduct of re-offending.

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and uttering a threat.

He appealed his sentence of five years for sexual exploitation, six months for sexual assault, and 90 days for uttering a threat, all concurrent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by misapprehending the timing of the complainant's pregnancy and by relying on his lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's misstatement regarding the pregnancy timing did not affect the sentence, as the pregnancy's impact was intrinsically connected to the exploitation.

The court also found the trial judge merely commented on the appellant's lack of insight and remorse, not using it as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence fit and within the appropriate range for sexual offences against children.

The appellant, Dennis Rhodes, appealed his convictions for voyeurism, prowling, and indecent act, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal concerned Charter challenges related to arbitrary detention (s. 9) and unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8), specifically regarding the search of his vehicle and cell phones.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 9 appeal as abandoned and found no error in the application judge's Garofoli review or nexus analysis for the search warrants.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 18-month custodial sentence appropriate given the serious invasion of privacy.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to apply Gladue principles because his defence counsel did not inform the court of his Indigenous background.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the trial judge as there was nothing on the record to suggest he was aware of or required to inquire into the appellant's Indigenous claim.

The court also declined to consider a submission regarding trial counsel's duties in the absence of an ineffective assistance of counsel ground of appeal.

The appellants sought an interpretation of their retainer agreement with the respondent law firms, arguing it was a contingency fee agreement capped at one-third of any favourable result.

The respondents contended it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement based on hourly rates, with a potential premium.

The application judge found it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement with a reduced hourly rate and a premium, where only the premium was capped, not the hourly fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation.

The Court affirmed that the application judge correctly applied principles of contract interpretation, including considering surrounding circumstances while ensuring they did not overwhelm the clear wording of the agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.