Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed an order declaring her a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, which also discontinued her action against the respondents and prohibited further proceedings without leave.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the appellant's history of multiple, unsupported, and vexatious proceedings stemming from a rental dispute, including fraudulent affidavits, numerous appeals of procedural orders, and incredible claims.

The court found ample evidence that the appellant conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner and for improper purposes, upholding the application judge's decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a landlord, appealed a trial judgment that found it liable for conversion of chattels belonging to its former tenant's chattel mortgagee (the respondent).

The trial judge awarded compensatory damages based on the chattels' market value and punitive damages.

The appellant argued the compensatory damages should have been limited to the outstanding chattel mortgage balance, claiming an ownership interest in the abandoned chattels, and that punitive damages were unwarranted or excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's ownership argument was a new theory not raised at trial and was contradicted by evidence.

The court affirmed that market value was the appropriate measure of damages for conversion and upheld the punitive damages award as a rational response to the appellant's high-handed conduct.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency against his sister and appealed the conviction.

The appeal raised five issues, all concerning the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's conclusions.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings and affirmed that the judge correctly applied principles regarding witness demeanor and the theory of recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal concerning a coverage dispute.

The appellants challenged the lower court's finding that Proturf was an essential party to the original application.

The appellate court affirmed that determining the existence of an implied contract between the appellants and Proturf was central to the coverage issue, and procedural fairness necessitated Proturf's inclusion as a party, even without direct relief sought against them.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after strangling a man during a sexual encounter in a park.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made several errors in the jury instructions, specifically regarding the required state of mind for murder, the appellant's mental health, intoxication, the application of reasonable doubt to exculpatory statements, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, when read as a whole and in the context of the trial, properly equipped the jury to decide the case and contained no reversible errors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting cash seizure evidence as discreditable conduct without proper notice, provided confusing jury instructions, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cash seizure evidence was contemporaneous circumstantial evidence not relying on propensity reasoning, thus not requiring a Rule 30 application.

The jury instructions were deemed sufficient, and the verdict was reasonable given the compelling circumstantial evidence of the appellant's involvement in drug trafficking.

The appellant, A.A., appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing that the trial judge did not make a finding that the complainant's life was endangered and that the evidence did not support such a finding.

The conviction stemmed from an incident where A.A. sprinkled ignitable fluid on the complainant's hair while holding a lit torch.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the actus reus of aggravated assault, specifically "endangerment of life" was met.

The court found there was a "realistic possibility" that the complainant's hair would ignite, even if the appellant's intent was merely to scare.

The court affirmed that the mens rea for aggravated assault was also established, as the risk of bodily harm from the dangerous conduct was objectively foreseeable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, primarily challenging the lawfulness of a strip search conducted in the presence of a female officer, arguing it violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that exigent circumstances justified the female officer's continued involvement during the appellant's violent resistance, and that the evidence obtained from the search was admissible.

The appeal was dismissed.

The municipality appealed a judgment finding it liable for negligence in granting a building permit and conducting inspections of the Breens' cottage, which resulted in significant structural and code deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on duty of care and causation, affirming that the municipality owed a duty to inspect even without a builder's request and was liable for major deficiencies (crawl space, roof ventilation, structural issues) due to its unreasonable conduct.

However, the Court found the trial judge applied an excessively strict standard of care regarding minor deficiencies (stair headroom, insulation gaps), reducing the damages awarded.

The appellant, J.G., appealed verdicts of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, entered in 2005 when he was 16.

The appeal, consented to by the Crown, was based on fresh evidence indicating the appellant, who has significant intellectual disabilities, did not understand the consequences of an NCR verdict at the time.

The Court of Appeal found the process leading to the NCR findings unfair and a miscarriage of justice.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the NCR verdicts, substituted findings of guilt for the original offences, and imposed a concurrent sentence of one day, with execution stayed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two appeals concerning a priority dispute over accelerated interest in closed mortgages and a costs order in a receivership.

The primary issue was whether the first mortgagee, First National Financial GP Corporation (FN), was entitled to future, unearned, accelerated interest upon the early discharge of its closed mortgages due to the mortgagors' default and court-ordered sale.

The court found that the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a full contractual analysis of the mortgage provisions and by relying on a standalone common law entitlement to accelerated interest.

The Court of Appeal held that the mortgage terms explicitly provided for FN's entitlements upon default, which did not include accelerated interest.

The appeal regarding accelerated interest was allowed.

The appeal concerning the receiver's costs was dismissed, as the trial judge's discretion was properly exercised.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence following a dangerous offender designation.

He had pleaded guilty to sexual assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, choking, and uttering threats.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by focusing on whether his addictions could be cured rather than managed, and by failing to adequately consider a long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's intractable substance abuse, which was directly linked to his violent offending, and reasonably concluded his risk could not be safely managed in the community.

The appellant, L.T., appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the imposition of a s. 161 order under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's discretionary decision.

The court emphasized that s. 161 orders are entitled to substantial deference on appeal and do not require the underlying offence to have been committed in prescribed circumstances.

The absence of an objection to the order at the time of sentencing was also noted as relevant to its fitness.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order granting certiorari, which overturned a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the appellant on charges of impaired operation and dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm, and instead committed the appellant for trial.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the reviewing judge's finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors in discharging the appellant and upheld the decision to commit the appellant for trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, William James Epp, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of penetration was reasonable given the overwhelming evidence and the appellant's failure to testify.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the seven-year imprisonment sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's age, the appellant's age and prior record, and the harm caused.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a default judgment against them for unpaid freight services and breach of statutory trust.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal was convened to reconsider its prior decision in Umlauf v. Umlauf regarding deemed admissions on default.

The Court overruled Umlauf, holding that while facts pleaded in a statement of claim are deemed admitted when a defendant is noted in default, conclusions of law and mixed fact and law are not.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge made no error in refusing to set aside the default judgment because the appellants failed to file an adequate record and the evidence supported the findings of a 2% monthly interest agreement and the director's personal liability for knowing assistance in the corporation's breach of statutory trust.

This is an appeal concerning confidentiality orders in a civil action involving a minor plaintiff (P1), two minor defendants (D1, D2), and a school (XYZ School) with its employees.

The original motion judge had issued broad sealing and publication ban orders to protect the identities of the minor parties, extending to the school and its employees.

The appellants (P1 and Toronto Star) argued these orders were overbroad.

The Court of Appeal, applying the reformulated Sherman Estate test, found that while protecting the minors' identities was an important public interest, anonymizing the school and its employees was not necessary.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the broad sealing order and limiting the anonymity and publication bans to only the minor parties and their litigation guardians, along with specific identifying information, while allowing the school's identity to be public.

This appeal concerns the application of a non-publication order under section 486.5(9) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario analyzed the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate test for discretionary publication bans, balancing privacy interests against the open court principle.

The court confirmed that the mandatory publication ban under section 486.5(9) applies to information related to the application for the ban itself, and amended the lower court's order to explicitly include this mandatory ban.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for sexual assault and choking.

He argued the sentencing judge committed a 'Boutilier error' by failing to consider his treatment prospects and intractability at the designation stage, and misapprehended psychiatric evidence regarding his antisocial personality disorder diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the judge erred by not considering intractability at the designation stage, there was no reasonable possibility of a different outcome given the judge's findings at the penalty stage that the appellant posed a grave, intractable threat with no reasonable treatment prospects.

The court also found no misapprehension of the psychiatric evidence.

The appellant, David Wong, representing a class of shareholders, appealed the summary dismissal of a secondary market misrepresentation class action against Pretium Resources Inc. and its former CEO.

The claim alleged that Pretium failed to publicly disclose concerns about its Brucejack mining project's resource estimate and feasibility study, which had been conveyed by Strathcona Mineral Services Ltd. The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Strathcona's concerns were not material facts requiring disclosure because they were unsolicited, inexpert, premature, and unreliable opinions, not undisputed facts.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's alternative finding that the respondents had conducted a reasonable investigation.

The appeal was dismissed.