Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

Richard Aguilar appealed his convictions for child luring and communicating for sexual services, and his sentence.

The convictions stemmed from text message conversations with an undercover officer believed to be a 14-year-old girl, part of 'Project Raphael'.

Aguilar alleged errors in the trial judge's findings regarding the offences and rejection of his innocent explanations.

He also argued the sentence was unfit, lacked parity, and did not adequately consider his health or sentencing delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in credibility findings, and no reversal of the burden of proof.

The court also found the sentence fit and that the principle of parity was not disregarded.

The appellant, J.A., appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting the appellant's police statement as voluntary evidence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge, after finding an inducement, failed to adequately consider all oppressive circumstances in determining if his will was overborne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test for voluntariness and considered all relevant circumstances, and that the finding of voluntariness was entitled to significant appellate deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple violent offences and his designation as a dangerous offender, which resulted in an indeterminate sentence.

The primary focus of the appeal was the dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which allows for designation based on the brutal nature of a single offence compelling a conclusion of future unrestrained behaviour.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment and weighing of conflicting expert psychiatric evidence regarding the appellant's future risk of violent reoffence.

The court affirmed that the sentencing judge was entitled to prefer the Crown's expert's opinion, which considered clinical factors in addition to actuarial tests, and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant constituted a threat to public safety requiring an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant, Feisal Noor, appealed his conviction on firearms-related charges, arguing that his s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention and s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure were violated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the police had reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention and that the handgun was found in plain view during a lawful struggle, thus dismissing the Charter application and affirming the conviction.

This appeal concerned whether taxes collected by Enterprise Rent-A-Car on insurance products were Retail Sales Tax (RST) or Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) for assessment purposes.

Enterprise had collected and remitted these taxes as HST to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).

The Minister of Finance assessed Enterprise for RST, arguing Enterprise had erroneously remitted RST as HST.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by focusing on Enterprise's belief about the tax collected, rather than the factual question of what tax was actually collected.

The Court concluded that Enterprise had, in fact, collected HST, based on its invoicing practices and remittances.

As the Minister's assessments were based on "tax collected" under the Retail Sales Tax Act, and Enterprise had collected HST, the assessments had no legal basis.

The appeal was allowed, and the Minister's assessments were set aside.

This decision addresses six consolidated appeals, all linked by the involvement of ASMIN Grand Chief Wabiska Mukwa, who purported to represent various appellants claiming membership in the Anishinabek Solutrean Métis Indigenous Nation.

The appeals sought to vacate court jurisdiction based on ASMIN laws and customs and compel Crown consultations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding them frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, characterized by unintelligible arguments and delay tactics.

The court further barred Mukwa from making future filings or communications in the Court of Appeal unless he is a direct party to an appeal and obtains prior leave.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the live issues, including the credibility of the key witness, and that the verdict was reasonable given the direct evidence presented.

The court reiterated the deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings and clarified that a W.(D.) analysis was not required as the case was based on direct, not circumstantial, evidence.

The appellants, Saidi Olufeko and Tajudeen Fanikayode, appealed their convictions related to the importation and trafficking of heroin.

Olufeko also appealed his 16-year sentence.

The appeals raised issues including the admissibility and caution for in-court identification, the adequacy of W.(D.) jury instructions, alleged improper criticism of counsel's closing address, and the reasonableness of the verdict and sentence parity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals against conviction and Olufeko's appeal against sentence, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or the sentence imposed.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of "energized exposed parts of electrical equipment" under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

O.1, specifically O. Reg. 213/91, ss. 184(1) and 190(4), following a worker's arc flash injury on a construction project.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the appeal judge erred in her interpretation of s. 190(4), concluding that the actus reus for that offence was established, as the provision applies when work entails exposing ordinarily energized parts.

However, the Court upheld the acquittals for s. 184(1), finding the Crown failed to prove the temporal link between exposed parts and uncontrolled room access.

The Court also accepted a concession regarding the s. 187 due diligence defence.

The matter was remitted for determination of due diligence and sentence appeals for ss. 190(4) and 187.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a six-month custodial sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The sentence was imposed after a miscommunication within the Public Prosecution Service of Canada led to the prosecution seeking a nine-month sentence at trial, despite an internal intention to propose a joint submission for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the custodial sentence, and substituted a conditional sentence of 150 days, finding it appropriate given the appellant's personal circumstances, efforts to address addiction, employment, family responsibilities, and remorse.

The appellant law firm appealed a Superior Court order that set aside an Associate Judge's decision to reinstate their action, which had been dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly identified legal errors in the Associate Judge's application of the Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. test for reinstating actions dismissed for delay.

Specifically, the Associate Judge erred by treating periods of delay in isolation and by focusing on whether delay was "forgivable" rather than "sufficiently explained" despite evidence of egregious and unexplained delays.

The Court affirmed the motion judge's appropriate application of appellate jurisdiction and deference principles.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in not excluding evidence (a shotgun and cell phone) under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

This evidence was obtained following a s. 8 Charter breach due to a one-year delay in filing a s. 489.1 Criminal Code report after a search incident to arrest.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the R. v. Grant factors, concluding that the seriousness of the breach was lessened by officer oversight and the impact on the appellant's Charter interests was minimal, as the items would have been lawfully detained for trial regardless.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Christian Masci, sought leave to appeal the total five-year sentence imposed following his convictions for pointing a firearm, possessing a firearm, and attempting to obstruct justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's decision to impose consecutive sentences for the separate events, particularly the firearm possession offences, emphasizing that such decisions are entitled to deference and that the total sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, I.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation.

The central issue at trial was whether the sexual relationship with the complainant began before she turned 16, as she could not legally consent before that age.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's instruction regarding the complainant's outbursts, the admission of a prior consistent statement, and the correction of a Crown misstatement of facts.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the fresh evidence application, upholding the convictions.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, following an appeal where the lower court's judgment and costs order were set aside and the application remitted for rehearing.

The parties were unable to agree on the disposition of the original application costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the fairest approach was to leave the issue of the application costs to the trier of fact on the rehearing, whether before a Superior Court judge or in an arbitral process.

Appeal costs had previously been awarded to the appellants.

The appellant, Dia 'Eddin Hanan, appealed his conviction for manslaughter and firearms-related offences, and his sentence, following a jury trial.

The appeal raised two main grounds: an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge regarding the burden of proof and self-defence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

They upheld the trial judge's assessment of delay, including the attribution of defence delay and the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance under R. v. Jordan.

They also found no reversible error in the jury instructions, concluding that the charge, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the burden of proof and the W.(D.) rule.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding a s. 11(b) breach and serious errors in the jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding a business partner and sentenced to 18 months incarceration and restitution.

He appealed his conviction, arguing a s. 11(b) Charter violation (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and an error in the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found a s. 11(b) violation, concluding that the trial judge incorrectly applied the presumptive ceiling for delay.

The court dismissed the Crown's request to impose a remedy other than a stay of proceedings, reaffirming that a stay is the appropriate and only available remedy for a s. 11(b) breach.

The conviction for fraud was stayed.

The appellant's other grounds of appeal, including the W.(D.) analysis and the sentence appeal, were dismissed.

The appellant, Dwayne Campbell, appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

The total delay was 28 months and 26 days, below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the application judge erred in assessing the appellant's "meaningful steps to expedite" the case did not "markedly" exceed the reasonable time requirements, largely due to the co-accused's actions and the Crown's reasonable decision not to sever the trials.

The moving party, 11534599 Canada Corp., sought review of a motion judge's order that granted an extension of time to perfect its appeal on terms that suspended the payment of per diem interest for a specific period.

The original appeal stemmed from an order finding 115 in unlawful possession of a property and requiring mortgage assignment and payment with interest.

The motion judge had imposed the interest suspension to address prejudice caused by 115's delay and attempts to impose preconditions on the mortgage assignment. 115 argued that the motion judge, as a single judge, lacked jurisdiction to vary the original order by suspending interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, holding that the motion judge's order merely suspended interest pending the appeal's hearing and did not permanently alter the substance of the original order.

This term was deemed necessary in the interests of justice to grant the extension.

This is an appeal from a contempt finding against the appellant for violating a non-dissipation and disclosure order.

The appellant was found to have failed to disclose beneficial interests in life insurance policies, concealed the whereabouts of a Ferrari, and disbursed funds contrary to the order.

The appellant argued errors of law and palpable and overriding errors of fact, including issues with pleading, the existence of assets, the drawing of inferences from circumstantial evidence, and the admissibility of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments, upholding the motion judge's findings, and affirming the application of the necessity and reliability test for hearsay and the principles regarding circumstantial evidence.