Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant, AOD Corporation, appealed the dismissal of its application seeking a declaration that a patent agreement was invalid.

The appellant argued that the agreement required shareholder approval under s. 189(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act and that the indoor management rule did not apply because the respondent, Miramare Investment Incorporated, had knowledge of internal irregularities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the s. 189(3) argument was a new issue raised for the first time on appeal without sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court also upheld the application judge's finding that Miramare had no knowledge of any irregularities, thereby affirming the application of the indoor management rule under common law and s. 18(1) of the CBCA.

The appellant, Tharani Holdings Inc., appealed the dismissal of its application challenging the administration of a condominium corporation (MTCC 812) and its directors.

The original application alleged numerous technical breaches of the Condominium Act and regulations, seeking remedies such as director removal, inspector appointment, and the oppression remedy.

The application judge dismissed the claims, finding no evidence of substantively harmful conduct.

On appeal, Tharani Holdings Inc. argued that the application judge showed reasonable apprehension of bias and failed to grant warranted remedies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the bias claim and upholding the application judge's discretion to refuse remedies for technical breaches in the absence of actual harm or prejudice.

This appeal concerned the reasonableness of a motion judge's exercise of enhanced powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in granting summary judgment to enforce guarantees.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in finding no genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding credibility issues arising from new evidence about representations limiting the guarantees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's careful application of the Hryniak framework, his findings on credibility, and his interpretation of the agreements, concluding there was no basis to interfere with the summary judgment.

The Crown brought a motion to cancel D.L.'s bail pending appeal or, alternatively, for a bail review, after D.L. was charged with new sexual offences while on release.

The court determined the matter was properly a bail review based on a material change in circumstances.

The motion to cancel bail was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction under s. 524 of the Criminal Code, as the undertaking had expired.

However, the court ordered D.L.'s release under more restrictive terms and conditions, including "house arrest" with a surety, to address public safety and public confidence concerns, finding the existing release order inadequate.

The appellant, Dik Lee, appealed an order refusing him leave to amend his statement of claim to add a claim of gross negligence against the directors and officers of Magna International Inc., his former employer.

The proposed amendments sought to assert a duty of care based on s. 32 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, related to a workplace harassment investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that there is no tort of negligent investigation by an employee against an employer in Ontario, nor tort liability for breach of a statutory duty.

The court also upheld the refusal to permit claims against unnamed defendants using pseudonyms due to lack of material facts.

P.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his four-year sentence.

The appeal raised grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge, specifically the language used to refer to the unrepresented accused's evidence versus his submissions, and the sufficiency of assistance provided to the unrepresented appellant.

Additionally, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings at sentencing, particularly regarding penetration, and the weight given to mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury charge, that sufficient assistance was provided to the appellant, and that the sentencing judge was entitled to make factual findings not explicitly determined by the jury's verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, committed to trial for second-degree murder, successfully appealed a judicial review order that had quashed their preliminary inquiry judge's decision and directed committal for first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found the reviewing judge erred by substituting his view of the evidence for that of the preliminary inquiry judge, incorrectly identifying jurisdictional errors.

The preliminary inquiry judge had correctly applied the law and did not commit jurisdictional error by finding insufficient evidence for first-degree murder.

The appeal was allowed, the judicial review decision quashed, and the original committal for second-degree murder reinstated.

The appellant, Wendy Sin Ming Ho, appealed the dismissal of her action against the Crown and four tribunals.

She alleged psychological harm from harassment and threats at an Ontario hospital (1999-2000) and subsequent failures by various tribunals to provide redress.

The motion judge dismissed her amended pleading, finding no vicarious liability for the Crown regarding hospital employment issues or quasi-judicial decisions, no Charter breaches, and no basis for a civil court to compel a criminal investigation by the RCMP.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error, no viable cause of action against the Crown, and that fresh evidence did not assist her claim.

The appeal and a motion to file fresh evidence were dismissed.

This appeal concerned a failed condominium purchase where the central issue was the vendor's compliance with the Tarion Warranty Corporation Addendum, specifically regarding the delivery of an occupancy permit or confirmation of occupancy conditions.

The application judge found that no occupancy permit was required and that a letter from the builder was sufficient.

The Court of Appeal found a palpable and overriding error in the application judge's finding that the letter was *delivered* as required by the Addendum.

The evidence showed the letter was merely available for pick-up, not delivered.

The Court allowed the appeal, declared the vendor in breach of the agreement of purchase and sale, and ordered a reference to determine damages, along with costs to the appellants.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a commercial lease termination provision, specifically whether proposed remodelling rendered continued possession by the tenant "impracticable." The motion judge had granted summary judgment to the landlord, finding the renovations bona fide and that the premises would cease to exist.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in construing the termination provision too narrowly and in isolation from other lease provisions, failing to consider whether the tenant could remain in possession during renovations.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment and costs order were set aside, and the action was remitted to the Superior Court for continuation.

The moving parties sought to review an order dismissing their motion to extend time to perfect an appeal of an Independent Review Order concerning St. Anne's Indian Residential School claims.

The Independent Review Order had appointed an independent special advisor to review certain concluded claims.

After the motion was heard, the independent review was completed, and its report approved.

The court found the appeal moot because the factual substratum had disappeared, and there were no grounds to exercise discretion to hear a moot appeal.

Consequently, the review motion was dismissed, and no extension of time to appeal was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal brought by the respondent, Ms. LaFontaine.

The appellant, Mr. Froom, had appealed an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice.

The motion judge had adjourned Ms. LaFontaine's motion to trial, imposing terms including a requirement for Mr. Froom to deposit US$475,000 into court.

The Court of Appeal determined that the underlying order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore an appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave, not directly to the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed, and Mr. Froom's request to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court was denied.

Costs were awarded to Ms. LaFontaine.

The appellant, Anita Csizmazia, appealed an order refusing to set aside a final order made after an uncontested trial.

She alleged misrepresentation and concealment of facts by the respondent, Zoltan Csizmazia, and a significant miscarriage of justice.

The review judge had dismissed her motion, noting that her financial issues were moot due to her bankruptcy and rejecting her claim of lack of notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the review judge's reasons sufficient and affirming that the appellant's bankruptcy rendered her equalization claims moot, thus making it unnecessary to address the fraud allegations.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after a jury trial.

The complainant, who was in a long-term relationship with the appellant, recanted her initial allegations at the preliminary hearing and trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on prior consistent statements, the admission of prior disreputable conduct evidence, and the admission of the complainant's police statement for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, particularly regarding the principled exception to hearsay and the use of prior bad acts to understand the relationship.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application against the Law Society of Ontario and various individuals.

The motion judge had found the appellant's pleadings to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to their rambling, racist, and misogynistic content.

The Court of Appeal, exercising its authority under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the appellant's notice of appeal and factum continued the abusive conduct and raised no arguable grounds.

The appellants restructured family trusts, incorporating "Child Corporations" and subscribing for shares without actual payment, leading to a significant tax reassessment by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) for taxable benefits.

They sought a declaration from the Superior Court that the shares were invalidly issued under the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) and an order for rectification of share registers, aiming to negate the tax assessment.

The Superior Court declined jurisdiction, deferring to the Tax Court of Canada, and also indicated it would not have granted the requested relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Superior Court's discretionary decision to decline jurisdiction, finding no reviewable error.

The Court emphasized that the primary dispute was between the appellants and the CRA, falling within the Tax Court's specialized expertise, and that the corporate parties did not require a binding order from the Superior Court to resolve internal corporate issues.

The appellants sought to appeal an order denying a certificate of pending litigation and requested interim relief.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order denying the certificate was an interlocutory order, not a final one, meaning jurisdiction for the appeal lay with the Divisional Court, requiring leave.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal or grant interim relief pending an appeal it could not hear.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to sit as the Divisional Court, noting the appellants already had a leave motion pending there.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant, Shirmati Singh, appealed an order striking her pleadings for non-compliance with previous orders to pay occupation rent, which led to a default judgment for possession of a home.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in the motion judge's initial decision.

However, during the appeal hearing, the appellant's representative offered to pay the outstanding arrears.

The court made a conditional order, allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders striking pleadings and granting default judgment, provided the arrears were paid.

The payment was made, and the court determined that striking the pleadings was no longer a proportionate response given the removal of prejudice to the respondent.

The appellant, Shawn Clyke, appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the Crown's closing submissions at trial contained serious improprieties that rendered his trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's closing submissions improperly invited the jury to engage in propensity reasoning, used inflammatory language to evoke sympathy for the complainant and revulsion for the accused, and attempted to bolster the complainant's credibility through unsupported theories and personal endorsement.

Despite the trial judge's corrective instructions, the cumulative effect of these improprieties was deemed to have prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial, particularly given the non-overwhelming nature of the Crown's case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package from China.

On appeal, she raised several grounds, including errors in jury instructions on importing, circumstantial evidence, and after-the-fact conduct, as well as the unreasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on two errors: the trial judge improperly permitted the Crown to invite an adverse inference against the appellant for testifying after another defence witness, and the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's application to adduce evidence of a known third-party suspect.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.