Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment concerning parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and child support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed her motion to introduce fresh evidence, upholding the trial judge's parenting order which included shared parenting time and the father having final decision-making responsibility.

The court also affirmed the trial judge's calculation of the father's income for child support purposes.

However, the Court of Appeal remitted the issue of child support arrears for a six-month period (September 2019 to February 2020) to the trial judge for further consideration, as it was not addressed in the original reasons.

The appellants were convicted by jury of second-degree murder and aggravated assault arising from a parking lot altercation in which one victim was fatally stabbed and another was wounded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the first appellant's murder conviction was not unreasonable given multiple available routes to liability under ss. 21(1) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the second appellant's s. 11(b) application was properly dismissed under the Jordan transitional exception.

The court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, after-the-fact conduct, manslaughter under s. 21(2), and the Vetrovec caution regarding a mixed witness.

The mother appealed an order granting sole custody of the children to the father, which was issued after the trial judge concluded the mother had engaged in parental alienation.

The appeal challenged the finding of parental alienation, the terms of the custody reversal and access restriction, and alleged a lack of fair trial due to ineffective counsel and judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's conclusions on parental alienation, the necessity of the custody order for the children's best interests, and finding no evidence of ineffective counsel or judicial bias.

The Society of United Professionals appealed a Divisional Court decision affirming the Ontario Labour Relations Board's (OLRB) rulings regarding New Horizon System Solutions' refusal to disclose a Master Services Agreement (MSA).

The Society alleged violations of ss. 17 (duty to bargain in good faith) and 70 (interference with union representation) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the OLRB's decisions were reasonable, concluding that the MSA was not necessary for the Society to carry out its representational duties under s. 70 and that the s. 17 application was premature when initially brought.

The court also found the OLRB's partial disclosure order under s. 17 and its reliance on counsel's representation regarding a specific MSA article to be reasonable.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault, sexual assault, and uttering threats, and the custodial sentence.

The appeal against conviction argued the trial judge erred in applying R. v. W.(D.) by failing to find a reasonable doubt due to alleged inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the timing of disclosure to her brother.

The appeal against sentence argued it was excessive and that enhanced credit for COVID-19 conditions was warranted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no material inconsistency in the evidence and no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis or the fitness of the sentence.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment awarding damages for the appellants' failure to close a residential real estate transaction.

The appellants challenged the damages amount, arguing failure to mitigate and issues with expert evidence.

The respondent cross-appealed the prejudgment and postjudgment interest rates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal, finding the appellants failed to discharge their onus on mitigation, and the cross-appeal, affirming the motion judge's discretion to depart from the contractual interest rate due to special circumstances (respondent's delay in marketing the property).

The appellant, Phyllis Johnson, appealed a motion judge's order granting summary judgment and dismissing her dental malpractice action.

The appellant sought to adduce fresh expert evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that it satisfied the Palmer test.

The court concluded that with this new evidence, the motion judge would have adjourned the summary judgment motion to allow the appellant to cure deficiencies in the expert report.

The appeal was allowed, and the dismissal of the action was set aside.

The appellant, E.M.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The trial judge had convicted him after finding the sexual activity was not consensual, despite the complainant and a witness having consumed drugs.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider innocent collusion and misapplied the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed reliability and applied W.(D.).

The court also dismissed the application to adduce fresh evidence regarding sentence, stating it did not meet the Palmer criteria and that reducing the sentence would not reflect the gravity of the offence, especially given the victim's age and vulnerability.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for attempted murder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) decision to continue his conditional discharge, seeking an absolute discharge.

He argued the ORB's finding of a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and presented fresh evidence of improved stability and a developed therapeutic relationship with his community psychiatrist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's original decision reasonable at the time it was made.

While admitting the fresh evidence, the majority declined to grant an absolute discharge, preferring that the ORB, as the expert body, make that determination at an already scheduled early review hearing.

A dissenting judge would have granted the absolute discharge based on the fresh evidence.

This is a motion to quash an appeal brought by Andrew Henry Ting against two orders made in the bankruptcy proceedings of his father, James Henry Ting.

The orders included an enforcement of a Hong Kong letter of request for production and examination, and a subsequent contempt finding and penalty for non-compliance.

The appellant argued he had a right of appeal under s. 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) on the basis that the point at issue involved "future rights" specifically procedural fairness regarding a recusal request.

The Court of Appeal held that the orders were subject to BIA appeal routes and that issues of procedural fairness engage present, not future, rights.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The appellant, BSAR (Eglinton) LP, appealed a trial judgment that awarded a real estate commission to the respondent, Harvey Kalles Realty Inc. The appellant argued that a condition for the commission, related to the definition of "Tenant" in a Commission Agreement and the automatic termination of an offer to lease, was not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors or errors in law in the trial judge's interpretation of the agreements.

The court affirmed the trial judge's finding that the objective intention of the parties was for the commission to be paid if a lease was concluded with any Loblaw entity, and that the offer to lease had not terminated.

The appellant, R.C., appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and assault.

The primary issues on appeal were whether the trial judge's oral reasons for conviction were sufficient, and whether subsequently released "edited reasons" could be considered.

The Court of Appeal held that the edited reasons, released nearly two years after the oral reasons and after the appeal had commenced, could not be relied upon due to their substantive changes.

The court then assessed the sufficiency of the original oral reasons, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and properly applied credibility principles, including those from R. v. W.(D.).

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the convictions.

The appellant, Simplicity Air Ltd., appealed a jury award of punitive damages to the respondent, Daniel Eynon, for workplace injuries.

The jury had awarded general damages and lost wages, reduced by 75% for contributory negligence, and $150,000 in punitive damages.

The appeal addressed whether punitive damages were properly left to the jury, errors in instructions, employer liability for employee conduct, and the quantum of the award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were adequate, the employer was liable for supervisory misconduct, and the punitive damages award was not irrational or inordinately large, especially given the employer's instruction to falsely report the accident.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favour of the Bank of Montreal against Granville Cadogan, a lawyer.

The Bank alleged Cadogan made a knowingly false "law statement" in Ontario's electronic land registration system regarding a writ of seizure and sale.

The motion judge awarded damages and punitive damages.

Cadogan appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in refusing an adjournment and in relying on an incomplete evidentiary record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's discretionary decision to refuse the adjournment, given Cadogan's pattern of obfuscation and lack of supporting evidence for his illness.

The court also found the evidentiary record sufficient to support the motion judge's conclusion that Cadogan's statement was false and knowingly made, noting his conduct was inconsistent with any belief of a settlement or release.

The appellants, comprising an individual and two corporations, appealed a lower court decision that dismissed their application for specific performance.

They sought to compel the respondent, a separated spouse, to execute a Non-Solicitation and Non-Competition Agreement (NCA) as part of a corporate share sale.

The application judge found no evidence that the respondent had agreed to the NCA.

The respondent cross-appealed the costs award from the lower court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's finding regarding the NCA.

Leave to cross-appeal costs was denied, as the appellate court found the original costs award to be reasonable despite a potential misdirection by the application judge.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offenses including assault, pimping, and material benefit from sexual services.

He sought leave to appeal his 55-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of evidence regarding the appellant's strategy to induce the complainant back into sex work as an aggravating factor.

The Court also found the sentence was not demonstrably unreasonable, considering both aggravating factors (domestic violence, significant injuries) and mitigating factors (limited duration of events, complainant's prior involvement in sex work, low financial gain), and the appellant's extensive criminal record indicating a high risk of recidivism.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his $2,000,000 copyright infringement action against the respondent transit commission.

The appellant claimed copyright over transit route maps based on an unpublished U.S. copyright registration.

The Court of Appeal rejected the respondent's preliminary objection that the appeal belonged in the Divisional Court, noting the claim amount exceeded $50,000.

The Court upheld the motion judge's findings that there was no originality in the appellant's maps and no evidence the respondent used them, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, Cindy Ali, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder in the death of her profoundly disabled daughter.

The Crown alleged the appellant suffocated her daughter and fabricated a home invasion story to cover it up.

The defence argued the death was seizure-related or caused by a home invader, and that the home invasion was real.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in narrowing the jury's consideration of the cause of death to only suffocation and in unduly restricting the jury's consideration of alternative explanations for the fabricated home invasion narrative.

The trial judge's instructions effectively invited the jury to convict of murder if they found the home invasion story fabricated, without adequately considering other culpable acts (like failure to provide necessaries) or innocent explanations for the fabrication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted against them in a failed real estate transaction.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial regarding defences of non est factum, failure to tender (due to anticipatory breach), and the appropriateness of summary judgment despite an outstanding third-party claim.

The appeal also challenged the assessment of damages, specifically the foreseeability of bridge financing costs and mitigation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings and reasoning.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action, which was brought against the respondent under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation.

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the respondent's expression (a complaint to a volunteer organization about the appellant's conduct) related to a matter of public interest, the appellant's action lacked substantial merit as the respondent had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege), and the harm to the appellant did not outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion judge also awarded damages and full indemnity costs, characterizing the defamation action as a reprisal brought in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings of fact and application of the anti-SLAPP test, dismissing the appeal and affirming the damages and costs awards.