Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant, Freddy Mawick, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5000, arguing that evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights and should have been excluded.

The evidence included information from UPS and financial institutions, some obtained via production orders and some without judicial authorization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the UPS information, that the production orders were validly issued based on reasonable grounds, and that any alleged Charter breaches were minor and did not warrant exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court affirmed that the Crown does not need to show that records will afford evidence directly against the accused for a production order to be valid, only that they are relevant to the offence.

The respondent estate moved for an order for security for costs of the appeal and for an order permitting the release of $500,000 held in a lawyer's trust account.

The court denied security for costs under Rule 61.06(1)(a) but granted it under Rule 61.06(1)(c) for the appeal costs only ($25,000), citing the low prospect of success of the appeal, the appellant's pattern of litigation conduct, and limited financial disclosure.

The motion for the release of the funds from the trust account was dismissed, as the funds were held in place of a certificate of pending litigation and the appeal was still active.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will regarding the disposition of a cottage property and its sale proceeds.

The estate trustee sought directions on how to distribute the proceeds among the testator's grandchildren.

The motion judge ruled for equal distribution among the four surviving grandchildren.

The appellant, a grandchild, appealed, seeking a larger share based on a different interpretation of the will's clauses.

The respondents cross-appealed on the motion judge's reasoning, not the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the proceeds should be distributed equally among the four grandchildren alive at the end of the life interests, based on the testator's intention as determined through the "armchair rule."

The accused, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's improper use of judicial notice, including drawing on personal experience as counsel and relying on external social science research (a magazine article and parallels to battered woman syndrome from *R. v. Lavallee*), to assess the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial notice and violated procedural fairness by relying on information not put into evidence or subject to submissions.

The errors materially infected the credibility findings, which were central to the trial.

The curative proviso was not applicable due to the procedural unfairness.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The respondent, a Traditional Chinese Medicine practitioner, was acquitted of sexually assaulting three clients.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the relevance and probative value of a complainant's evidence regarding a phone call with the respondent, and in her similar fact evidence ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's determination on the reliability of the complainant's evidence was a finding of fact, not an error of law, and therefore not appealable.

The appellant, convicted of serious offences, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in holding she had no jurisdiction to allow the appellant to withdraw an earlier undertaking to plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and the Crown's concession, finding that a trial judge does have jurisdiction to permit an accused to withdraw an undertaking or admission when the interests of justice dictate.

As the Crown did not oppose the withdrawal, the appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, Angelina Codina, sought to re-open her conviction and sentence appeals, along with judicial interim release.

She had been convicted of four counts of providing unauthorized immigration advice/representation (s. 91(1) IRPA) and one count of counselling misrepresentation (s. 126 IRPA), receiving a net sentence of five years' imprisonment.

Her previous appeals were dismissed in 2019 (sentence) and 2020 (conviction).

Codina argued for re-opening based on claims that s. 91 IRPA was ultra vires, the CBSA lacked jurisdiction, her corporate structure precluded conviction, and the trial judge misdirected the jury.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to re-open the appeals, noting that all these points had been comprehensively addressed and dismissed in its prior decision, R. v. Codina, 2020 ONCA 848.

The court concluded there was no miscarriage of justice and dismissed both the application to re-open the appeals and the application for bail as moot.

This appeal was brought by George Peters.

Due to the appellant's death, the appeal was dismissed as abated on consent of the parties.

The appellant, Marcel Seip, appealed his conviction and sentence for multiple offences, including aggravated assault, stemming from a home invasion and kidnapping.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in convicting him of aggravated assault after acquitting him of discharging a firearm with intent to wound, arguing that the finding of a potentially accidental shooting precluded the necessary intent for aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the mens rea for aggravated assault requires only objective foreseeability of bodily harm, not specific intent to wound.

The court found no error in the trial judge's application of this principle or in her credibility findings, concluding that the appellant was a party to the aggravated assault as the mastermind of the home invasion who knew his accomplice had a gun.

The appellant, an employee, appealed a motion judge's order striking parts of his statement of claim in a wrongful dismissal action, which included claims against corporate directors for unpaid vacation pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA) and the Business Corporations Act (OBCA), and for oppression under the OBCA.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the ESA claim without leave to amend, finding the statutory preconditions were not met.

It also upheld the striking of the OBCA oppression claim with leave to amend, noting insufficient pleading of reasonable expectations.

However, the Court set aside the striking of the OBCA s. 131 claim for unpaid vacation pay without leave to amend, finding material facts were pleaded, and allowed it to proceed with amendment.

It also set aside the striking of certain paragraphs (14-23) related to the reprisal claim and varied the striking of paragraph 40, only removing irrelevant allegations.

The original costs award against the appellant was reduced to reflect his partial success on appeal.

This is an appeal of the dismissal of a medical malpractice claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review, failing to analyze essential components of the plaintiff's theory of liability and explain his findings on the standard of care.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in his contradictory treatment of a formal admission regarding the abscess location, effectively disregarding it despite having previously denied a motion to withdraw it.

This resulted in an unfair trial for the plaintiff.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and five-year sentence for importing opium and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings regarding Crown witnesses.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the five-year sentence was not unreasonable, especially considering the appellant's previous convictions for similar drug offences.

The appellant, Pierre Labelle, appealed his convictions for indecent acts, criminal harassment, and communicating for sexual services with a minor.

The primary issues on appeal were the trial judge's treatment of non-identification evidence, the reasonableness of the criminal harassment conviction against one complainant (J.V.), and the alleged improper use of the appellant's willingness to fabricate evidence as positive evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the non-identification evidence lacked probative value, the criminal harassment conviction was reasonable based on the evidence, and the trial judge correctly used the appellant's fabrication as a basis for rejecting his evidence, not as positive evidence of guilt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding the complainant had no motive to fabricate and using this to assess her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinction between a "proven absence of motive to fabricate" and an "absence of evidence of motive to fabricate." The court held that while a proven absence of motive is a high bar, the absence of evidence of motive can be considered as one factor among many in assessing credibility, provided it is not given undue weight or used to reverse the burden of proof.

The trial judge's approach was found to be consistent with established legal principles.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial after a juror brought internet articles into the jury room.

She also argued her s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by post-conviction delay and her right to make full answer and defence was compromised by lost airport surveillance video.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inquiry into the jury issue was sufficient, the post-conviction delay was justified by a Gardiner hearing which constituted an exceptional circumstance, and the jury instructions regarding the lost video were fair.

Roch Longueépée, largely successful in his appeal, sought partial indemnity costs from the University of Waterloo and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found Longueépée entitled to costs against the University, fixing them at $25,000.

The court also awarded costs against the HRTO, fixed at $7,500, because its arguments on the standard of review and request for a five-judge panel expanded the scope of the appeal, even though its position was not taken in bad faith.

This appeal concerned which party should bear the cost of interim preservation of vehicles in a damages action.

BMW claimed total loss of 2,966 vehicles due to Autoport's negligence and sought to dispose of them, while Autoport required their preservation for inspection.

The Master and Divisional Court ordered Autoport to bear the costs, but the Appeal Judge reversed, placing the burden on BMW.

The Court of Appeal found errors in the lower courts' application of Rule 45.01, emphasizing that the test for interim preservation of evidence should focus on trial fairness, not a rigid "balance of convenience" test.

The court concluded that BMW, as the party in possession of the evidence and with the information needed for Autoport's inspection, must bear the costs of preservation until it provides the necessary disclosure.

The appellant sought to bring a Canadian class action against the respondent BP p.l.c. for securities misrepresentations.

His 2019 amended statement of claim, which introduced a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, was struck out by the motion judge as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

This appeal addressed four key issues: the elements of a "claim" for fraudulent misrepresentation under the Limitations Act, the appropriateness of the motion judge's factual findings regarding discoverability based on U.S. litigation, whether the fraudulent misrepresentation claim was a new claim or an alternative theory, and the propriety of deciding a limitations issue on a Rule 21.01(1)(a) motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the motion judge erred in his discoverability analysis and reliance on U.S. pleadings, the fraudulent misrepresentation claim was indeed a new, statute-barred claim, and the limitations issue was appropriately decided on a Rule 21.01(1)(a) motion due to undisputed facts.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent fixed costs of $20,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, with the provision that these costs could be considered support payments for Family Responsibility Office purposes.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of a restricted firearm knowing possession is unauthorized.

He appealed his four-year sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing an expert report regarding his post-traumatic stress disorder and in applying Gladue factors.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in assessing the expert's report, which was relevant to the circumstances of the offences and rehabilitation prospects.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to three and a half years.