Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellants, Derek Oppong and Akido Thomas, appealed their convictions and sentences for kidnapping-related offences with a firearm, committed for the benefit of a criminal organization.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence on gang activity, claiming it was unnecessary and biased, and in refusing to reconsider its admissibility after proposed factual admissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's discretion in admitting expert evidence for contextual understanding and finding no material change in circumstances that would warrant its exclusion.

The court also upheld Mr. Oppong's sentence, finding evidence supported his leadership role in the offence.

This is an appeal from a judgment awarding damages in lieu of specific performance for a failed residential real estate transaction.

The appellants (vendors) argued that the respondents (purchasers) were not entitled to specific performance or damages in lieu after accepting the return of their deposit, and that the motion judge used the wrong appraisal date for calculating damages.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the deposit argument as it was a new issue on appeal.

However, the Court found that the motion judge erred by not using the actual sale price of the replacement property as the best indication of its value for damages calculation, instead relying on an earlier appraisal.

The appeal was allowed, and the damages awarded to the respondents were reduced from $150,000 to $56,000.

The appellant, Marcia Chambers, appealed her conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine and marijuana.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding police opinion evidence on the appellant's demeanour and her post-detention silence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to clearly instruct the jury to disregard inadmissible opinion evidence and by not providing a clear instruction that the appellant's silence could not be used against her.

These deficiencies rendered the trial unfair, leading to the quashing of the convictions and the ordering of a new trial.

The court rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable, finding sufficient evidence to support a conviction if the jury had been properly instructed.

The appellant appealed an order striking his application challenging an Ontario Securities Commission regulation that allows individuals to purchase stocks in the "exempt market" based on minimum income and net worth thresholds.

The appellant argued that "economic class" should be recognized as an analogous ground under s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The motion judge struck the application, finding the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, agreeing that the appellant failed to plead sufficient facts to establish "economic class" as an analogous ground, as it lacked the characteristics of immutability or constructive immutability, and the group had not suffered historic disadvantage or stereotyping.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This case involves a motion to quash an appeal in a mortgage priorities dispute.

The appellant, a second mortgagee, sought to appeal an application judge's determination regarding the enforceability and priority of charges under the first mortgage.

The respondent, the first mortgagee, moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the order was interlocutory because the "very subject matter" of the litigation, specifically the enforceability and priority of the mortgage, had not been finally determined, as a trial of an issue regarding fraud was still pending.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The appellant was convicted of numerous offences, including carjacking and home invasion.

The defence argued the incidents were staged robberies intended to steal money from a third party, not actual robberies of the alleged victims.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's ruling on reply evidence, the reference to co-accused guilty pleas, and the assessment of evidence inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no miscarriage of justice despite a minor error in considering one co-accused's guilty plea.

This is an appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board concerning a restriction of liberty hearing for an appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) for aggravated assault.

The appellant, who has schizophrenia, had his liberty restricted and was transferred to a more secure forensic unit after his mental health deteriorated due to discontinuing medication.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to consider his liberty interests and other needs, including a request for a lateral transfer to another unit, and that the Board's findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board considered all required factors and that there was sufficient evidence to support the transfer to a more secure unit, including testimony from the treating psychiatrist regarding the appellant's unmanageability and risk of harm.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the restriction of liberty was necessary to be reasonable.

The appellant, Trevor Jesse Herdman, appealed his convictions for possession of stolen property, possession of cocaine for trafficking, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 8 Charter challenge to the validity of a telewarrant, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds as it was based on a confidential informant's (CI) tip that did not meet the Debot criteria.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that despite the CI's low credibility, the tip was "highly compelling" and "significantly corroborated" by police investigation, providing reasonable grounds for the warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against his niece and appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the absence of a motive to fabricate, the use of prior consistent statements, the evaluation of inconsistencies in testimony, and the weight given to the complainant's demeanor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which properly considered the complainant's age and the context of the defence's arguments.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal against sentence was also dismissed, as the sentence of two years less a day was deemed reasonable given the nature of the offences and the appellant's position of trust.

The appellant appealed convictions for a shooting, arguing misapprehension of evidence, unreasonable verdicts, and that several convictions should be stayed under the rule against multiple convictions (Kienapple).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis of the evidence or the reasonableness of the verdict regarding identification.

However, the Crown conceded the Kienapple argument, leading to stays of conviction on six of the eleven counts.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The appellant's appeal from an order striking out pleadings was dismissed.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the respondent, finding that the appellant's conduct, including misogynistic attacks and continuing allegations of fraud, was reprehensible and warranted such an award, consistent with the motion judge's original costs order.

The appellant, J.K., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his two-year prison sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of evidence regarding a lodged tampon and the dismissal of a Charter application for pre-conviction delay.

The sentence appeal contested the finding of no unreasonable post-conviction delay and sought a sentence reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence on the tampon issue, finding it inadmissible under Palmer criteria.

It upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the s. 11(b) application, justifying the nine-month pre-conviction delay (due to an outstanding bench warrant) under the transitional exceptional circumstance and the 13-month post-conviction delay (related to a Gladue report) by deducting six months for administrative error as a discrete exceptional event and justifying the remainder under transitional exceptional circumstances.

The two-year sentence was found fit, with the trial judge having appropriately considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the appellant's personal circumstances and the impact of bail conditions.

The appellants, the Attorney General of Canada and the Ontario Provincial Police, appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondents' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were not statute-barred.

The core issue was the application of the "appropriate means" element of the discoverability test under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was premature for the respondents to commence their actions until related civil forfeiture proceedings and an appeal of a costs order (which addressed Crown misconduct) were concluded.

The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the limitation period had not expired.

The appellant, Andrew Bielli, appealed his conviction for possession of proceeds of crime for the benefit of a criminal organization.

The case centered on a police ruse designed to search the appellant and his vehicle without disclosing the true nature of the investigation, leading to the seizure of evidence.

The application judge found breaches of the appellant's Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding no s. 8 or s. 9 breach and police good faith.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in concluding there was a de facto arrest, thus finding a s. 8 breach.

The Court also found errors in the s. 24(2) analysis, particularly regarding the police's good faith and reliance on prior case law, as the Charter violations were planned and deliberate.

The Court concluded that the impugned evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

This is a second appeal concerning a child protection order, specifically the "no access" portion of the order.

The mother (appellant) sought a rehearing or virtual access to her child, D.R., who was found in need of protection due to serious injuries inflicted by a parent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal judge's decision to deny access, finding no palpable and overriding error in the best interests analysis under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The court emphasized the significant risk that led to the protection finding and the lack of a beneficial and meaningful relationship between the mother and child, noting the child's thriving in foster care.

The appellant sought to overturn a lower court order terminating her spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in treating the proceeding as a variation rather than a review, in terminating spousal support based on the appellant's failure to achieve economic self-sufficiency, or in admitting an expert report without the author's testimony.

The court emphasized the trial judge's holistic assessment of evidence and credibility.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a lower court order that declared his debts would survive bankruptcy and lifted a stay of proceedings.

The respondent opposed the extension, arguing there was no right to appeal without leave and that the appeal lacked merit.

The respondent also brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding that the appellant had a right to appeal under sections 193(c) and 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and that the proposed appeal had arguable merit.

The court dismissed the respondent's cross-motion for security for costs, concluding that the "other good reason" test under Rule 61.06(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure was not met, given the appellant's impecuniosity and the arguable merit of the appeal.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claims, asserting a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal found no evidentiary basis to support this serious legal claim or the suggestion that counsel behaved inappropriately.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the appellants.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that largely struck out his pleadings for fraudulent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of mental distress, and negligent infliction of mental distress, and transferred his unjust enrichment claim to Family Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions that the claims lacked reasonable cause of action, that no duty of care existed for negligent infliction of mental distress, and that the unjust enrichment claim was properly transferred.

The costs award on a substantial indemnity basis was also upheld.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on sexual assault charges.

The trial judge had found both the complainant and the respondent credible but had a reasonable doubt, partly due to the complainant's inability to explain her entry into an abandoned trailer and her communication with her father after the alleged assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by applying stereotypical views about sexual assault victims' behavior, specifically by inferring consent from the complainant's entry into the trailer and by judging her credibility based on her communication with her father.

The court also found an error in the exclusion of the complainant's prior consistent statement and demeanour evidence to her friend.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as these errors had a material bearing on the acquittal.