Stefanija Savic

The plaintiff, a second mortgagee, sought a declaration that an amended first mortgage held by the defendant was unenforceable against it due to alleged fraud.

The plaintiff claimed the defendant concealed increased interest rates and a U.S. dollar conversion clause when it took assignment of the first mortgage.

The court found the plaintiff failed to prove the elements of civil fraud or that the defendant wrongfully concealed the terms.

The plaintiff's claims were dismissed, and the amended first mortgage was held to maintain priority.

The plaintiff, Nedaneg Financial Corporation, brought a motion seeking certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) over four properties and, in the alternative, a preservation order.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant Pedram Talebzadeh was the beneficial owner of the properties and that mortgages over them constituted fraudulent conveyances, intended to defeat a prior judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the balance of convenience favored the defendants.

The court noted that the properties were not unique, damages were quantifiable and a satisfactory remedy, and the plaintiff had delayed in enforcing its judgment.

The court also found that a preservation order under Rule 45.01 was not the appropriate remedy, as the plaintiff was essentially seeking a Mareva injunction without meeting its higher test, and the plaintiff's prior improper caution registrations weighed against granting equitable relief.

The Applicant sought to amend its Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim in a trial of an issue concerning fraud allegations related to a prior summary judgment.

The court granted leave to amend for clerical errors and some factual expansions, but denied the bulk of the proposed amendments, including new causes of action and irrelevant/evidentiary allegations, finding them beyond the scope of the directed trial of an issue and that the delay caused presumptive prejudice.

The applicant sought to re-open a prior decision regarding mortgage priorities to raise a new legal argument under s. 93(4) of the Land Titles Act, which it had neglected to raise at the original hearing.

The court had previously determined the priority issue but reserved jurisdiction solely for a trial on allegations of fraud.

The court dismissed the applicant's request, holding that allowing a new legal argument on an issue already determined would offend the public policy goal of finality and the doctrine of functus officio.

This case involves a motion to quash an appeal in a mortgage priorities dispute.

The appellant, a second mortgagee, sought to appeal an application judge's determination regarding the enforceability and priority of charges under the first mortgage.

The respondent, the first mortgagee, moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the order was interlocutory because the "very subject matter" of the litigation, specifically the enforceability and priority of the mortgage, had not been finally determined, as a trial of an issue regarding fraud was still pending.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The respondent brought a motion seeking payment into court by the applicant for accrued and future interest under the Mortgages Act and for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d).

The applicant opposed, arguing the initial consent order for payment into court was sufficient and that security for costs was unwarranted.

The court found the applicant's financial disclosure insufficient to rebut the presumption for security for costs and ordered the applicant to pay an additional sum for interest shortfall and a sum for security for costs into court.

The applicant second mortgagee sought a determination of the legitimacy and priority of certain charges and an increased interest rate claimed by the respondent first mortgagee under a renewed first mortgage.

The court held that the disputed charges and the increased interest rate were enforceable and held priority over the second mortgage, as the second mortgagee was deemed to have notice of the standard charge terms permitting such increases.

However, the court adjourned the final allocation of funds to a trial of an issue to address the applicant's late allegations of fraud.