Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant, Justice Okojie, appealed his convictions for importing and possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal concerned when the offence of importing is complete, particularly in controlled delivery scenarios, arguing it was complete before his involvement.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, asserting that his knowledge of the package containing a controlled substance was not the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, clarifying that importing is complete when the contraband is no longer under the control of customs authorities, and upholding the trial judge's finding of knowledge based on circumstantial evidence.

This is an appeal from a common issues trial judgment in a class proceeding.

The class, comprising former boarding students of Grenville Christian College, alleged systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duties due to abusive practices including corporal punishment and public humiliation.

The trial judge found class-wide breaches and awarded punitive damages.

The appellants sought to set aside the judgment, arguing errors in the trial judge's use of expert evidence and treatment of defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings of systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, and that punitive damages were warranted, concluding that the trial judge's assessment of evidence and application of legal principles were sound.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, a key Crown witness recanted her videorecorded police statement in which she described witnessing the respondent sell cocaine.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine the witness under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act but dismissed the Crown's application to admit the statement for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made multiple errors in his hearsay analysis, including improperly assessing necessity based on the overall strength of the Crown's case, failing to recognize the witness's availability for cross-examination as a procedural safeguard, and improperly exercising his residual discretion.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Gordon Dunk Farms Ltd., appealed a summary judgment decision that found its action for negligence and breach of contract against the respondents (designers, contractors, and concrete workers) was statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The action stemmed from the collapse of a hog barn.

The motion judge found that the appellant's principals knew or ought to have known the material facts constituting their claim by May 12, 2014, more than two years before the action was commenced on May 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that a "claim" under the Limitations Act, 2002, does not require knowledge of every specific act or omission, but rather sufficient facts to draw a plausible inference of liability.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the action was statute-barred against all respondents.

This appeal addressed whether pension payments divided at source for family law purposes can continue to a non-member spouse's estate after their death for the balance of the retired member spouse's life.

The motion judge had ruled this was precluded by the Pension Benefits Act (PBA).

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that nothing in the PBA, Family Law Act (FLA), or the Family Law Matters Regulation (O. Reg. 287/11) prevents such an arrangement.

The court emphasized that the "Family Law Matters" sections of the PBA (ss. 67.1-67.9) and the Regulation govern these issues, not general pension provisions.

The appeal was allowed, clarifying that such continuation is permissible if provided for by agreement, court order, or arbitration award.

The appellant, Patricia Ann Smith, appealed the dismissal of her medical malpractice action against Dr. Brenda Kane.

The trial judge found no breach of the standard of care by Dr. Kane in her treatment of the appellant's foot complaints.

The appeal raised three main issues: misapprehension of expert evidence, failure to apply the "ordinary knowledge and common sense" exception to expert evidence, and error in failing to find a breach of the duty to diagnose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of expert evidence, rejecting the application of the "common sense" exception as it was not raised at trial and the issues were complex, and clarifying that there was no freestanding duty to diagnose in this context given the specific concessions and causation findings.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed an Ontario Review Board (ORB) disposition ordering his detention at a forensic psychiatry program, arguing for a conditional discharge.

The ORB had vacated his previous conditional discharge due to concerning behaviours and a deteriorated mental state, supported by psychiatric and risk assessment evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision reasonable and supported by evidence, noting that a detention order was necessary to allow the Hospital to approve accommodation, consistent with the least onerous and restrictive disposition.

The appellant, Rejean Perron, appealed the imposition of a ten-year long-term supervision order following convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the sentencing judge not explicitly detailing why a ten-year order was imposed over a shorter term, the record and the psychiatrist's report, which indicated a high risk of recidivism and an undiagnosed behavioural pattern, justified the maximum period of supervision.

The court also noted the possibility of future reduction or termination of the order.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a six-month sentence for aggravated assault stemming from a road rage incident.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, finding the sentencing judge erred by relying on an incomparable precedent, leading to an unduly harsh sentence.

Considering the appellant's troubled background, efforts at rehabilitation, and the trial judge's findings on self-defence factors, the court reduced the sentence to time served, emphasizing that the fact of incarceration, rather than its length, sufficiently achieved deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant, 2161907 Alberta Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that found it had wrongfully terminated agreements with the respondent, 11180673 Canada Inc., and acted in bad faith, ordering payment of a $2 million branding fee.

The dispute arose when 216 refused to fund 111's rent, leading 111 to threaten not to open its cannabis store. 216 terminated the license agreement, citing a "threat to cease carrying on business." The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that 216's termination was invalid, interpreting the "threat" clause objectively in context.

However, the Court of Appeal set aside the finding of bad faith, clarifying that an incorrect belief in a valid termination right, even if motivated by a desire to end the relationship, does not automatically constitute bad faith when there is no knowing misrepresentation or deliberate creation of the breach.

The appeal regarding the sublease termination was dismissed as practically resolved.

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact and inciting sexual contact with a person under 14.

He appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, particularly regarding inconsistent statements about childhood events.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's age and health, and finding no exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic to warrant a reduced sentence.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following the dismissal of an appeal.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and fixed costs in favour of the respondent at $22,500, inclusive of disbursements and HST, rejecting the claim for substantial indemnity costs.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The Court of Appeal had previously awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondent father and the appellant's trial counsel, payable by the appellant mother.

As the parties could not agree on the amounts, the court reviewed submissions and fixed the respondent father's costs at $22,500 and the appellant's trial counsel's costs at $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The court rejected the appellant mother's arguments for no costs or nominal costs, finding no circumstances to justify such an award, and noted that her offer to settle on different terms was irrelevant to the costs determination.

The moving party, Lawrence Dale, sought an extension of time to appeal a vexatious litigant order issued by Diamond J. on July 5, 2019.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion, finding that Dale failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the required period, provided an unreasonable explanation for the two-year delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked arguable merit.

The court also considered the significant prejudice to the responding party, Elise Teitler, and the children, noting Dale's non-compliance with existing support and parenting orders.

Consequently, the motion for a stay pending appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats to property, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's use of prior consistent statements, explanation of the complainant's conduct (Stockholm Syndrome), burden of proof, and reliance on the "ring of truth." The appellant also challenged the dangerous offender finding, arguing the trial judge failed to consider treatability and intractability at the designation phase and misapprehended expert evidence regarding recidivism and "burnout." The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reversible error in the conviction or the dangerous offender designation and sentence.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of her appeal for failure to perfect on time.

The delay was primarily caused by the moving party's initial appeal counsel, who failed to address fee waivers and properly serve documents.

The Court of Appeal applied the Paulsson factors and found that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the dismissal, as the moving party should not suffer the consequences of her lawyer's oversight, the appeal materials were essentially ready, and there was no prejudice to the children's best interests.

The motion was granted and the appeal was permitted to proceed.

The moving party (mother) sought an extension of time to appeal a final parenting order and a stay of that order pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the extension of time, finding the three-day delay was minimal and an appeal right existed.

However, the court refused the stay, emphasizing that it was not in the child's best interests to disrupt the therapeutic program and living arrangements established by the trial judge's order, which aimed to rebuild the child's relationship with the father.

The Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed the "Student Choice Initiative" framework, which mandated an opt-out system for non-essential student ancillary fees at Ontario colleges and universities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the framework was unlawful.

For colleges, the framework conflicted with section 7 of the Ontario Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Act, 2002, which protects student governing bodies' normal activities.

For universities, the framework interfered with their statutory self-governance and institutional autonomy, a fundamental principle implicit in their establishing Acts.

The court clarified that the Minister's action was an exercise of executive authority, not prerogative power, and must yield to conflicting legislation.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a 1988 agreement between a school board and a municipality for snow and garbage removal services provided in exchange for the sale of a school property for $1.

The municipality unilaterally terminated the services in 2017, arguing the contract was terminable on reasonable notice.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in characterizing the agreement as a personal services contract and in his analysis of surrounding circumstances.

The Court concluded that the agreement was perpetual in nature, given the upfront transfer of an enduring capital asset by the school board and the public nature of the parties' mutually beneficial arrangement, which was not primarily commercial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario partially allowed an appeal by the family of a deceased First Nations child, Brody Meekis, who died of strep throat following an allegedly flawed coronial investigation.

The family's civil claim, which included allegations of misfeasance in public office, negligent supervision, and Charter s. 15 discrimination, had been entirely struck by the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal reinstated the misfeasance in public office and Charter claims, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding they had no reasonable prospect of success.

The court clarified that discriminatory conduct, even within discretionary powers, can constitute unlawful action for misfeasance, and that adverse impact discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter can arise from the application of seemingly neutral laws that disproportionately disadvantage protected groups.

The claim for negligent supervision remained struck.