3 total
The court upheld a trial judgment awarding a real estate commission based on contractual interpretation.
The appellant, BSAR (Eglinton) LP, appealed a trial judgment that awarded a real estate commission to the respondent, Harvey Kalles Realty Inc. The appellant argued that a condition for the commission, related to the definition of "Tenant" in a Commission Agreement and the automatic termination of an offer to lease, was not met.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors or errors in law in the trial judge's interpretation of the agreements.
The court affirmed the trial judge's finding that the objective intention of the parties was for the commission to be paid if a lease was concluded with any Loblaw entity, and that the offer to lease had not terminated.
Plaintiff's lawyers removed from record as they were likely to be called as material witnesses.
The defendants in a solicitor's negligence action brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's lawyers of record, arguing they had a conflict of interest and would likely be called as witnesses at trial.
The plaintiff's lawyers had represented the plaintiff in the underlying bankruptcy matters both before and after the defendants' retainer.
The court found that the lawyers' evidence regarding the advice they gave the plaintiff and the steps they took or failed to take was significant to the defendants' defence and mitigation arguments.
Applying the relevant principles, the court concluded that a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would find the proper administration of justice required the lawyers' removal.
The motion to remove counsel was granted, while motions for production and leave to examine non-party witnesses were adjourned.
Summary judgment set aside as partial summary judgment was inappropriate for factually intertwined companion actions.
The appellants and respondents, real estate developers, were engaged in two companion actions arising from a joint venture and shareholders' agreement.
The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the appellants' action, finding a right of first refusal clause in the agreement to be an unenforceable restrictive covenant.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the summary judgment, holding that partial summary judgment was inappropriate given the intertwined facts of the companion actions and the need for a factual matrix to interpret the contract.
