Justin William Anisman

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory Mareva injunction against the defendants to freeze their assets pending trial.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants fraudulently induced him to invest approximately $350,000 in what was represented as a legitimate investment scheme.

The court granted the interlocutory Mareva injunction against one defendant based on a strong prima facie case of civil fraud, evidence of asset dissipation, and irreparable harm.

The motion was dismissed as against the other defendants due to insufficient evidence of a strong prima facie case against them.

The court considered whether to permit a motion for summary judgment in a real estate dispute involving the failed sale of three properties.

The plaintiff, Michelle Fraser, sought summary judgment against the defendant, Mathew Pearson, who in turn brought third-party claims against his former counsel and a title insurer.

The court declined to schedule the summary judgment motion at this stage, citing the likelihood of conflicting expert evidence and the need for a more complete record.

The parties were directed to develop an expedited trial preparation plan.

The plaintiff, Slave Paunovski, brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging fraud and dissipation of assets.

The court granted the injunction against Danny and Mara Risteski, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud and knowing receipt, but dismissed the motion against Donco Investments Ltd. due to insufficient evidence.

The decision reviews the procedural history, the legal test for Mareva injunctions, and the adequacy of disclosure and evidence provided.

This was a costs endorsement following two family law motions concerning release of sale proceeds held in trust to a moving non-party with an ownership interest in the property.

The court reviewed the purposes of costs under the Family Law Rules, including partial indemnification, encouragement of settlement, sanctioning inappropriate conduct, and the primary objective of dealing with cases justly.

Substantial indemnity costs were refused against two opposing parties because their positions, while unreasonable, did not amount to bad faith.

However, one respondent's changed position between the two motions justified a higher costs burden, resulting in fixed costs of $10,000 against that respondent and $7,000 jointly and severally against the other two respondents.

The moving non-party, Mohsen, brought a motion within a family law proceeding for the release of funds held in trust from the sale of a property he jointly owned with the respondent husband.

The applicant wife and respondent mother-in-law opposed the release, seeking preservation of the funds.

The court found that issue estoppel applied, as a prior order had already determined Mohsen was entitled to his share of the proceeds.

The court further held that Mohsen was not bound by a prior oral agreement to sell his share for a fixed amount, as that agreement had been repudiated, and that he was not liable for a second mortgage on the property.

The court ordered $144,185.13 to be released to Mohsen.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for production orders and examination of the defendants in aid of an existing Mareva injunction and Anton Piller order.

The only contentious issue was a request to order a non-party exchange to provide information regarding the defendants' assets.

The court granted the order, finding it necessary in aid of execution of the Mareva injunction, and rejected the defendants' argument that the request was an improper attempt to gather evidence for a contempt motion.

The plaintiff sought a two-year custodial sentence for the defendant, who was previously found liable for multiple acts of civil contempt, including transferring assets to put them beyond the court's jurisdiction and failing to disclose assets.

The defendant, who was already serving a 12-month sentence for prior contempt, requested a conditional sentence.

The court found the defendant's conduct to be a flagrant and repeated defiance of court orders, warranting a strong signal of deterrence and denunciation.

The defendant was sentenced to 16 months in jail without the possibility of parole, with conditions allowing for early release if the contempt is purged.

Manuel Neves brought a motion to be removed as a defendant in his personal capacity.

The motion materials had deficiencies, and Neves terminated his counsel's retainer.

Neves ultimately abandoned the motion.

The plaintiffs sought costs for defending the motion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $16,126.16 to the plaintiffs, payable within 30 days, noting that Neves's conduct warranted such an award and that self-representation does not shield a litigant from costs.

A timetable for the action was also endorsed.

This is an appeal from a contempt finding against the appellant for violating a non-dissipation and disclosure order.

The appellant was found to have failed to disclose beneficial interests in life insurance policies, concealed the whereabouts of a Ferrari, and disbursed funds contrary to the order.

The appellant argued errors of law and palpable and overriding errors of fact, including issues with pleading, the existence of assets, the drawing of inferences from circumstantial evidence, and the admissibility of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments, upholding the motion judge's findings, and affirming the application of the necessity and reliability test for hearsay and the principles regarding circumstantial evidence.

The plaintiffs in two related actions sought an interim Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging a fraudulent investment scheme involving the purchase and resale of used vehicles.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud, noting evidence of non-existent purchasers, missing funds, and the transfer of assets by the personal defendant.

The court granted the Mareva injunction in the standard form, rejecting the defendants' request for an adjournment and their proposed terms allowing discretionary withdrawals for living expenses and business operations.

The applicant brought motions to convert a condominium application and counter-application into an action, consolidate them with an ongoing defamation action, permit the use of discovery evidence across proceedings, and strike a defamation pleading in the counter-application.

The court found the matters were deeply interwoven, involving the same factual matrix regarding the applicant's conduct and social media posts about the condominium board.

To avoid inconsistent findings and multiplicity of proceedings, the court ordered the conversion and consolidation.

The court also granted leave to use discovery evidence and struck the defamation pleading with leave to amend for failing to provide adequate particulars.

The plaintiff brought a motion to find the defendant in civil contempt for violating a non-dissipation and disclosure order.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally breached the clear and unequivocal order by failing to disclose his ownership of certain life insurance policies, dissipating the proceeds of those policies by directing a third party to disburse funds, and failing to disclose the whereabouts of a Ferrari.

The court dismissed the defendant's evidentiary objections, admitting a third-party bank statement and an affidavit the defendant had sworn in a foreign proceeding.

The defendant was found in contempt.

The plaintiff employer sued two former salespeople and their new employer for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence after the employees resigned and began soliciting the plaintiff's customers.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court found that the former employees were ordinary salespeople with no managerial power or discretion, and therefore were not fiduciary employees.

The court also found no evidence that the employees misappropriated or misused any confidential information.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees.

Shortly after being served, the client granted a mortgage on her property to her former brother-in-law.

The plaintiff sought leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) alleging a fraudulent conveyance.

The Master denied the CPL, finding insufficient evidence of fraudulent intent.

On appeal, the Superior Court found the Master erred in law by applying a higher standard of proof to the second part of the test for a CPL and usurping the function of a trial judge.

The appeal was allowed and the CPL was granted.

A court-appointed receiver sought directions regarding the distribution of proceeds from the sale of a property.

The Applicants, who held a second mortgage, claimed priority over the alleged first mortgagee, Pillar Capital Corporation, arguing that the first mortgage had been paid in full and therefore the subsequent assignment to Pillar Capital was a nullity.

The court found that the first mortgage was indeed paid in full on August 15, 2014, and there was no contemporaneous agreement to assign it.

Consequently, the May 5, 2015, assignment of charge to Pillar Capital was deemed a nullity.

The Applicants' claim for priority was upheld, and the Receiver was directed to pay the remaining amount due on the second mortgage from the sale proceeds.

Claims by Pillar Capital for property management fees, maintenance fees, and certain legal fees were rejected due to lack of proof and contractual basis.

The plaintiff, a law firm, moved for leave to amend its statement of claim to add a defendant and claims for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) regarding a property.

The CPL was sought on the basis that a second mortgage granted by the defendant to her brother-in-law was a fraudulent conveyance or an unjust preference.

The court granted leave to amend the claim but denied the motion for a CPL, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a "high probability" of fraudulent intent or unjust preference, as required when judgment has not yet been obtained.

The court found sufficient consideration for the mortgage and no clear evidence of insolvency or intent to defraud.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing their action regarding a property sale.

The appellants challenged the sale on multiple grounds, including that procedures in a manual were not followed, that the motion judge was biased, that no auction occurred, and that the sale was improvident.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the lower court judgment, holding that the manual procedures did not have the force of law, the bias argument lacked merit, the motion judge properly accepted evidence that the auction occurred, and the appellants had adequate notice and failed to provide credible evidence of impropriety.

The applicants sought to set aside a sheriff's sale of their property, which was conducted to satisfy outstanding costs awards.

They alleged the sale was improvident, the required process was not followed, and they did not receive proper notice.

The court found that the sale price was not improvident based on a realtor's opinion, the auction was properly conducted, and the applicants had actual notice of the sale despite a minor procedural non-compliance with posting requirements.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued the application judge erred by denying his request for an adjournment due to illness and by failing to consider his self-represented status, language barriers, and alleged brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge reasonably exercised his discretion to deny the adjournment given the appellant's history of unpaid costs and lack of proper medical evidence.

The Court also found no error in the application judge's decision to declare the appellant a vexatious litigant based on his repeated, meritless litigation against his former lawyers.

The plaintiffs agreed to purchase a commercial property from the defendants, intending to use the entire space as a restaurant.

The plaintiffs refused to close the transaction after discovering zoning restrictions limited restaurant use to half the space.

They sued for the return of their deposit and damages, alleging the vendor made oral representations and a collateral agreement guaranteeing the zoning and promising to return the deposit if issues arose.

The vendor counterclaimed for breach of contract.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, finding they did not reasonably rely on the vendor's representations and that the written agreement expressly excluded collateral agreements.

The vendor's counterclaim was allowed, and damages were awarded based on the property's subsequent sale by the mortgagee.