Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The parties separated in 2019.

After two years of the appellant failing to provide financial disclosure despite multiple court orders, his pleadings were struck and the matter proceeded to an uncontested trial.

The trial judge imputed an annual income of $150,000 to the appellant for child support and ordered the matrimonial home transferred to the respondent to satisfy the equalization payment.

The appellant appealed, arguing the process was unfair and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the uncontested trial was a proper consequence of the appellant's blatant non-disclosure and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The employee was constructively dismissed from her position as Chief Operating Officer after requesting a salary increase.

The employer alleged cause but later withdrew the defence, though it continued to assert performance issues throughout the litigation.

The motion judge awarded 12 months' notice, $50,000 in aggravated damages for bad faith in the manner of dismissal, and $25,000 in punitive damages for reprehensible litigation conduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the notice period and the aggravated and punitive damages awards, but reduced the damages in lieu of notice to six months' compensation because the employee had unreasonably rejected a comparable job offer seven months post-termination.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and sought leave to appeal his eight-year sentence.

The conviction appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by using a 911 call to corroborate Crown evidence, and whether the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the time required to stash a firearm and move a vehicle.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge double-counted breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or sentencing approach.

The appellant, Anibal Rivera, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was consent, specifically regarding condom use.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: the trial judge's application of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis, the alternative finding of fraud vitiating consent, and the use of the complainant's hospital attendance to support her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard, the fraud analysis was superfluous but not inconsistent with the primary finding of non-consent, and the complainant's hospital visit was appropriately used to corroborate her evidence regarding condom use and not to suggest that pursuing charges enhanced credibility.

This appeal arose from the claims process of a class action settlement concerning price-fixing in the cathode ray tube (CRT) market.

The appellant, Class Action Capital Recovery LLC (CAC), a third-party claims filer, appealed the supervising judge's dismissal of its motion for directions regarding the reconsideration of rejected claims.

CAC argued that the Claims Administrator failed to follow a deficiency notice process as per the Distribution Protocol and that the supervising judge exceeded jurisdiction by effectively amending the protocol.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the supervising judge's order did not contemplate further deficiency notices and was within the broad discretionary power granted by section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, during the settlement administration stage.

The court also noted that the appeal constituted a collateral attack on an unappealed prior order.

The moving parties (original respondents) sought a stay of execution of judgments totalling over $33 million, pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The judgments were for transfers at undervalue under the BIA and CCAA.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience).

The motion was dismissed because the moving parties failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, especially given the responding parties' undertaking not to distribute seized assets, and because no security was offered for the judgment.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the dismissal of his "faint hope" application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had applied the 2011 amendments, which increased the judicial screening threshold from "reasonable prospect" to "substantial likelihood." Relying on R. v. Dell, the appellant argued this retrospective application violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the violation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling that the "reasonable prospect" threshold applies to s. 745.6 applications for offences committed between January 9, 1997, and December 2, 2011, and remitted the application for a new screening hearing.

The appellant, Marcy McMahon, appealed her eight-month custodial sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine, which was imposed after a guilty plea and joint submission.

Fresh evidence was admitted, demonstrating that the appellant was unaware of the legal availability of a conditional sentence at the time of her sentencing due to a recent change in law (R. v. Sharma).

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, substituting the custodial sentence with a 23-month conditional sentence followed by one year of probation, finding the proposed sentence fit given the circumstances and the appellant's rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession and making available child pornography, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The proceedings spanned approximately 50 months and involved disclosure disputes concerning forensic images of hard drives, bifurcation of the trial to accommodate an expert witness, and numerous defence applications.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the net delay exceeded the 18‑month Jordan ceiling and that the trial judge erred in characterizing the case as particularly complex.

However, because the charges were laid before the release of Jordan, the court applied the transitional exceptional circumstance analysis and concluded that the Crown had justified the delay in light of the parties’ reliance on the pre‑Jordan Morin framework, the modest excess over the Morin guidelines, the defence’s limited diligence in advancing the case, and minimal prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions were upheld.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from convictions for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault, for which he received a seven-year sentence.

The convictions related to historical sexual assaults on his niece.

The Crown opposed the application on the public interest ground, specifically concerning public confidence.

The court, applying the test from R. v. Oland, found that at least one ground of appeal regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility might have merit, and that the appeal was not weak.

Considering the historical nature of the offences and the applicant's prior compliance with bail conditions, the court granted bail pending appeal with stricter terms, including provisions restricting his access to persons under the age of 16, satisfying public safety concerns.

The appellant, William Soroka, appealed the dismissal of his motions to set aside foreclosure judgments and default notations in three mortgage foreclosure actions.

The judgments were obtained in December 2014 and registered in April 2018, but Soroka moved to set them aside in October 2019, approximately five years after judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in applying both the test for setting aside default judgments and relief against forfeiture.

The court agreed that the motions were not brought promptly and the appellant's explanation for delay was not credible.

The court also found no error in considering whether the appellant had an arguable defence on the merits, noting he never sought to convert the claims to judicial sales until the motions to set aside.

The appeal was dismissed, emphasizing that granting the relief would amount to a substantial windfall for the appellant and would not enhance the integrity of justice.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay unpaid royalties to the respondent franchisor.

The written franchise agreement expired in 2014, but the appellants continued to operate using the franchisor's branding, purchase from exclusive suppliers, and initially pay royalties.

The motion judge found the agreement was continued by conduct and granted summary judgment for royalties owed within the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the agreement continued by conduct and that the matter was appropriate for summary judgment.

This appeal concerned a family law dispute arising from the breakdown of an 18-year relationship, focusing on decision-making responsibility, parenting time for their child, and allegations of family violence.

The appellant mother challenged the trial judge's order for joint decision-making, arguing a lack of effective communication and a failure to properly consider family violence.

She also appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that joint decision-making was in the child's best interests despite communication challenges, that family violence allegations were thoroughly considered and rejected, and that the costs award was a proper exercise of discretion.

This is a panel review of a single judge's order refusing an extension of time to appeal a summary trial judgment.

The moving party sought to introduce fresh evidence, which was denied due to lack of satisfactory explanation for its delay and minimal impact on the outcome.

The panel upheld the single judge's decision, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of material evidence in applying the test for extending time to appeal.

The panel agreed that the moving party had not formed an intention to appeal within the prescribed time and that the proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit.

The review motion was dismissed.

The appellant, H.P., appealed his sexual assault conviction, raising three grounds: whether his s. 276 voir dire testimony was compelled and improperly used against him contrary to s. 13 of the Charter; whether the cross-examination on the voir dire was overly broad; and whether the trial judge erred in finding corroboration of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that s. 276 voir dire evidence is not compelled, the cross-examination was not unfair given the scope of the affidavits, and the trial judge's assessment of corroborative evidence was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2003, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that continued his detention at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing the Board failed to apply the "significant threat" test and consider all relevant factors for a necessary and appropriate disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly applied the "significant threat" test and reasonably concluded that a detention order was required given the appellant's ongoing mental illness, lack of insight, and risk of aggression, despite some progress.

The appellant was convicted of arson to property for setting fire to a Jeep Cherokee.

The appeal challenged the reasonableness of the conviction, arguing misapplication of circumstantial evidence and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence, which included GPS data placing the appellant's tow truck at the scene and the appellant's suspicious post-offence conduct.

The Court also found the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient given the straightforward nature of the case and the lack of contradictory evidence or complex legal issues.

The appellants, convicted of sexual assault, appealed their convictions.

They argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's memory gaps due to intoxication, reversing the burden of proof, and failing to consider an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's analysis of consent and memory gaps was reasonable, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the exculpatory statement lacked probative value regarding the complainant's subjective consent.

The appellant, Philip Grandine, appealed his conviction for manslaughter and his 15-year sentence in the drowning death of his wife, Karissa Grandine.

This was his second trial, the first conviction having been overturned.

The appeal raised three grounds against conviction: error in leaving a criminal negligence by omission theory of liability to the jury without evidentiary basis, error in refusing to exclude evidence based on issue estoppel (computer searches for "autopsy"), and inadequate jury instruction on the use of the appellant's out-of-court statements.

The appellant also argued the sentence was excessive and based on an unproven aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding sufficient evidentiary basis for the criminal negligence theory, no issue estoppel error, and adequate jury instructions.

The court also found the sentence was fit and reasonable, rejecting the "almost murder" characterization argument and the breach of trust argument.

The appellant's property was destroyed by fire caused by tenants extracting marijuana resin, and his insurer denied coverage based on exclusion clauses.

After the loss, section 129.1 of the Insurance Act was enacted, limiting such exclusions for innocent persons.

The appellant sought to apply this new provision retroactively to his claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that section 129.1 does not apply retroactively to losses that occurred before its enactment.

The court distinguished between retrospective and retroactive application of legislation, emphasizing the strong presumption against retroactivity.