Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant, a Markham city councillor, appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion (pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) against an action brought by a developer.

The developer's action alleged defamation and other torts arising from the councillor's opposition to a development and her report to the police regarding an incident with the developer.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of "expression relating to a matter of public interest" and by conflating the stages of the s. 137.1 test.

The Court clarified that reporting concerns to the police and a city councillor's actions related to their public duties are matters of public interest, warranting a broad interpretation at the initial stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a different judge to consider the second stage of the s. 137.1 test.

The appellant, Leslie Watson, moved to review and set aside a prior order from a Motion Judge that required her to provide $15,000 in security for costs for her appeal.

The original security for costs order was based on Rule 61.06(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant lacked sufficient assets to pay costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion, affirming the Motion Judge's application of the test and assessment of the overall justice of the case, and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of $5,000 for the motion.

The appellants brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal a judgment and for leave to add Jasmine Javid as a party to the appeal.

The responding party opposed the extension and sought security for costs.

The court dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that the appellants failed to demonstrate a continuing intention to appeal, provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay, or show compelling merits for the proposed appeal.

The court also found that granting the extension would prejudice the responding party due to a pattern of delay and obfuscation.

As a result, the other requested relief fell away.

The applicant sought release pending appeal of convictions for two counts of sexual assault, one count of making child pornography, and one count of voyeurism, along with a six-and-a-half-year custodial sentence.

The court assessed the application under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, considering whether the appeal was frivolous, the applicant would surrender, and detention was necessary in the public interest.

While the appeal was deemed not frivolous and the applicant would surrender, the court found that detention was necessary in the public interest.

This was due to the serious nature of the offences against a child victim, the imposition of a lengthy penitentiary sentence, and the preliminary assessment that the grounds of appeal, while not frivolous, did not clearly surpass that minimal standard.

The application for release pending appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties sought to review and set aside a chambers judge's order that dismissed their motion for an extension of time to review a previous order.

This previous order had also dismissed a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal an action that was originally dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal, applying the standard of review for a panel review of a chambers judge's decision under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, found no legal error or misapprehension of evidence by the chambers judge.

The court concluded that the request for an extension of time was properly denied at each stage and dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal originating from an application under the Land Titles Act, as appeals under that Act lie to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.

No costs were awarded.

Following the dismissal of an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appellant's claim for costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court found no exceptional circumstances to justify substantial indemnity costs and instead fixed the appellant's costs on a partial indemnity scale in the inclusive sum of $15,000.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their statement of claim in its entirety without leave to amend, in a product liability action concerning an implanted medical device (Essure).

The Court of Appeal set aside the order, granting leave to amend the statement of claim.

The court clarified that leave to amend should only be denied in the clearest of cases and that, in product liability claims, identifying a specific manufacturing or design defect is not always required at the pleading stage to disclose a cause of action.

The appellant, Ahmad Mohammad (also known as Ahmad Yousef), brought three appeals from Superior Court orders dismissing his actions under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal considered dismissing the appeals and revoking the appellant's fee waivers under the Administration of Justice Act.

The court found the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, lacking intelligible grounds or causes of action.

The panel review motions for two appeals (McMaster University and Chaimowitz) were dismissed under r. 2.1.02, and the third appeal (Google) was dismissed under r. 2.1.01 for failure to perfect.

The court also revoked the appellant's fee waivers and prohibited further fee waiver requests without judicial permission.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his action against the Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The original action alleged deliberate power cuts to his cell and sought damages and an order for an extension cord.

The Superior Court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting jurisdictional issues and a lack of cause of action, and ruled against the admissibility of the appellant's affidavit evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no clear error or misdirection by the motion judge, and affirmed that Rule 2.1.01 is intended for summary dismissal of such claims, precluding the need for affidavit evidence.

The appellants, C.I. and M.G., appealed their convictions for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: improper leading questions during examination-in-chief of the complainant, denial of cross-examination of a co-accused, failure to properly instruct the jury on the limited use of the complainant's prior consistent statements, and erroneous exclusion of video and photographic evidence under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some procedural errors occurred, they did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the trial judge's exclusion of the video and photographs was proper given their minimal probative value and significant prejudicial effect on the complainant's dignity and privacy.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action, assigned from a bankrupt estate, alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by the former bankruptcy trustee and its representative.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by reversing the onus of proof regarding discoverability and by failing to consider s. 12 of the Limitations Act, which applies to assigned claims in bankruptcy.

The court held that the limitation period analysis must account for the dual roles of the creditor as an inspector and the need to obtain court orders (s. 38 and s. 215 BIA) before commencing action against a trustee.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal set aside, and the limitation period issue was directed to proceed to trial.

The appellant, Robert Collette, appealed a motion judge's order that, while striking out most claims under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, allowed a claim for harassment and intentional infliction of emotional harm to proceed.

The core issue on appeal was whether a successful s. 137.1 motion requires dismissal of the entire action or permits dismissal of only specific claims.

The Court of Appeal found that, based on the motion judge's finding that the entire action was motivated to silence public interest expression, the entire action should have been dismissed.

The appeal was allowed, and the entire action was dismissed.

The respondent, Nordik Windows Inc., brought a motion to quash an appeal by the appellants, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada et al., arguing the underlying order was interlocutory and required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Aviva contended the order was final as it determined a limitation period issue.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge's order was interlocutory, as it did not finally determine the limitation period defence, but rather dismissed the motion without a final conclusion on that issue.

The appeal was therefore quashed.

The Business Development Bank of Canada (the bank) brought a motion to quash an appeal initiated by 170 Willowdale Investments Corp. (the appellant).

The appellant subsequently abandoned its appeal.

The court found that a contractual term between the parties entitled the bank to full indemnity costs.

Consequently, the bank was awarded its costs of the abandoned appeal in the amount of $19,791.95.

Sase Aggregate Ltd. appealed a lower court decision that largely dismissed its claims against Michelle Langdon, wife of a former pit manager who defrauded Sase of over $2.1 million.

Sase sought a constructive trust over the proceeds of sale of a property owned by Langdon, alleging knowing receipt, knowing assistance, and unjust enrichment.

The application judge found Langdon had no knowledge of the fraud and that Sase failed to properly trace its funds into the property, except for an admitted amount of $177,632.38.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Sase's appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that Sase failed to establish the elements for knowing receipt, knowing assistance, or to properly trace the bulk of the funds into the property, and that Langdon's legitimate sources of funds were adequately explained.

The appellants, former truck drivers for the corporate respondent, initiated a public campaign alleging unpaid wages while their Canada Labour Code complaints were ongoing.

The respondents sued for defamation, trespass, and other torts.

The appellants moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in his s. 137.1(3) analysis by focusing on motive rather than the expression's subject matter, but ultimately upheld the dismissal under s. 137.1(4), finding the respondents' claims had substantial merit, the appellants had no valid defence, and the harm to the respondents outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

This appeal concerned a failed residential real estate transaction where the buyers' financing fell through, leading the sellers to terminate the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) and retain the deposit.

The sellers subsequently resold the property for a higher price.

The buyers sought specific performance, damages, or relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the sellers were entitled to terminate the APS as they were ready, willing, and able to close, and that relief from forfeiture was not warranted, despite the sellers realizing a profit on the resale.

The court also addressed the duty of honest performance and the effect of anticipatory repudiation.

Claude Séguin appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for trafficking, possession of methamphetamine pills, and possession of criminally obtained property, as well as his 12-year incarceration sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged violations of his linguistic rights (right to a French trial), inaccurate transcription of proceedings, an erroneous finding of fact regarding his control over a storage room where fentanyl was found, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that Séguin had explicitly chosen to proceed in English, the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable and supported by evidence, and there was no merit to the claims of transcription errors or ineffective counsel.

The court also found no error in the imposed sentence, noting the serious nature of the offences and the large quantity of fentanyl involved.

The appellant was convicted of possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The police arrested him based on a mistaken identity, relying partly on observations from a warrantless covert hallway camera.

The Crown conceded breaches of the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) due to the unlawful camera installation and subsequent arrest and search, as well as a late Report to Justice.

The trial judge admitted the fentanyl evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith based on their understanding of the law at the time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the police's mistaken belief as to the appellant's identity did not, in itself, render the arrest unlawful, and that the s. 24(2) analysis for admitting the evidence was sound, particularly regarding police good faith.