Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant, Quinnton Drake, appealed an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

He had pleaded guilty to multiple violent offences, including robbery with a firearm, and had a lengthy criminal record.

At sentencing, he conceded dangerous offender criteria but sought a long-term supervision order instead of an indeterminate sentence, arguing the judge failed to adequately consider his remorse and willingness to participate in treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge correctly applied sentencing principles, including public protection as primary, and properly weighed the appellant's evidence against expert testimony indicating a very poor prognosis for treatment success and high risk of reoffending.

The appellant, Kyle Firlotte, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The victim was abducted, severely beaten, and left in a remote field in cold temperatures, leading to his death.

Firlotte argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the "common sense inference" was improperly applied, and the abandonment of the victim was erroneously treated as dispositive of intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable based on the totality of circumstantial evidence, the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the common sense inference appropriately used as a tool, and the consideration of abandonment as a factor in determining murderous intent was correct.

The appellants sued the respondent for false imprisonment and Charter breaches after the appellant was unconstitutionally denied accelerated parole review, resulting in her spending an extra 26 months in custody.

Following a court declaration of unconstitutionality, it took 43 days to process her release.

The appellants sought partial summary judgment for the 43-day delay, but the motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, finding no negligence or s. 7 Charter breach.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the delay claims but allowed the appeal in part to amend the order, clarifying that the 43-day period could still be claimed as part of the broader 26-month false imprisonment action.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her claims regarding the respondent mortgagees' taking of possession of a house after default on a mortgage she guaranteed, and challenging certain fees and charges.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the peaceable taking of possession was not contrary to s. 42(1) of the Mortgages Act, as no action or proceedings were commenced.

The court also upheld the factual findings that the property was vacant and possession was peaceable.

While the main appeal on the legality of possession and associated fees was dismissed, the respondents conceded a credit of $8,616.49 for three months' interest charges.

The appeal was allowed only to reflect this credit, and otherwise dismissed.

The appellant sought to appeal a trial judge's decision regarding spousal support, arguing that the indefinite support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, subject to review, constituted an error.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the significant deference owed to family support decisions.

The court found no material error, serious misapprehension of evidence, or error in law in the trial judge's reasoning or result, noting that the appellant's objection primarily concerned the weighing of factors, which is not a basis for appellate intervention.

The appellant moved to amend the notice of appeal to clarify that relief is sought against two corporations added as parties below.

The respondent opposed due to late notice.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal and cross-appeal, ordering the motion to amend to be heard in writing with a set schedule for submissions.

Costs were reserved to the disposition of the motion, and the panel remained seized of the motion but not the main appeal.

The appellant, Rees Kozoubenko, appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication in 2018.

The Court of Appeal considered a motion by the respondent, Dr. Milena Gosk, to dismiss the appeal as moot due to the passage of time and the appellant no longer being an in-patient or having proposed treatment.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the appeal as moot, finding that a decision on the merits would not have a practical effect on the appellant's rights given the time- and treatment-specific nature of capacity assessments under the Health Care Consent Act.

This is an amended costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs of the appeal to the respondents Burns Hubley LLP, Paul Gribilas, and J+W Foods Inc., inclusive of disbursements and interest, payable by the appellants.

The appellant, S.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The majority found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the appellant's evidence regarding the complainant's capacity to consent, constituting a W.(D.) error.

MacPherson J.A. also found an error in the rejection of the honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent defence.

The appellant, Mustaf Yusuf, was on judicial interim release pending his appeal, with conditions including remaining in Ontario and surrendering for the appeal hearing.

His counsel advised the court that he failed to surrender because he was in prison in Somalia, breaching his release conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned, in accordance with the terms of the release order, and issued a warrant for his arrest.

The Court of Appeal considered appeals regarding the priority of claims in the receivership of Bridging Finance Inc. and its investment funds.

The motion judge had previously granted priority to Statutory Rescission Claims but denied it to Redemption Claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by Redemption Claimants, affirming that their claims had not crystallized and were subject to Bridging's discretion, thus lacking priority.

It allowed the appeal by General Unitholders, reversing the priority granted to Statutory Rescission Claims.

The court held that neither the language of the Ontario Securities Act (s. 130.1) nor the inherent nature of the rescission remedy provided a basis for statutory or de facto priority.

Consequently, the court ordered that all Unitholders, including Redemption Claimants, Statutory Rescission Claimants, and General Unitholders, shall rank pari passu with respect to the distribution of proceeds from the Bridging Funds.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

The only issue raised on the sentence appeal concerned the amount of credit allowed for stringent bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision to allow two months credit.

Consequently, the conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment order for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) of a cottage property.

The sellers (appellants) asserted the APS had terminated, refusing to close.

The buyers (respondents) sued and obtained specific performance.

The appellants argued the APS terminated on November 5, 2020, due to a consent to sever condition, or on December 22, 2020, due to a "finality clause" and Planning Act non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that the severance condition was satisfied or waived by the sellers' lawyer's representations and the sellers' subsequent conduct.

The court also upheld that the sellers could not rely on the "finality clause" as they were in breach of their obligation to diligently obtain necessary consents under the Planning Act.

The transaction had already closed, and the property transferred to the buyers.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt and dismissing his action for persistently refusing to attend court-ordered medical examinations in Toronto.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not treating contempt as a last resort and by failing to accept his legitimate excuse for non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to find the appellant in contempt and to dismiss the action, emphasizing the appellant's deliberate non-compliance and the futility of further opportunities to comply.

The appellants, estates and family members of victims of the downing of Ukrainian Airlines flight PS752 by Iran, sought to enforce a default judgment against Iranian properties and bank accounts in Canada.

The motion judge dismissed the enforcement, finding the properties enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, ruling that the Canadian Executive's determination, via a s. 11 certificate under the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, that the Iranian property retains diplomatic status is conclusive and not subject to judicial review based on the property's current "use" for diplomatic purposes, even after diplomatic relations were severed.

The court affirmed the Executive's exclusive prerogative in foreign relations and diplomatic immunity matters.

The appellant, convicted of five counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking, one count of simple possession, and two counts of breach of probation, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a pre-trial Charter application, arguing that his warrantless arrest and subsequent search violated his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge erred in concluding that seized fentanyl and fentanyl/cocaine mixture were for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including confidential informant information and police surveillance.

The court also upheld the trafficking convictions, finding the evidence overwhelming despite a minor error by the trial judge regarding a concession.

IBM Canada Inc. appealed a summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal claim, challenging the 26-month reasonable notice period and the award of damages for Restricted Stock Units (RSUs).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that non-transferrable skills and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted exceptional circumstances justifying a notice period exceeding 24 months.

The court also upheld the RSU damages, finding the termination clause ambiguous and thus ineffective in limiting common law rights.

The Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms (JCCF) appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to pay $156,461.99 in costs following an unsuccessful interlocutory injunction motion brought by students against Seneca College's COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The Court of Appeal found the costs order fundamentally flawed because the motion judge failed to determine if the litigation was public interest litigation and did not apply the correct legal tests for awarding costs against a non-party (the "person of straw" test or abuse of process).

The Court clarified that fundraising or promoting a case on a website does not constitute abuse of process.

The Court also stated that JCCF's refusal to disclose whether it was indemnifying the students was a relevant consideration for costs.

The appeal was allowed, the costs order set aside, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for a fresh determination.

The appellants, William Fehr Sr. and Dorothey Fehr, appealed a lower court order that permanently stayed their professional negligence action against Paul Gribilas (lawyer) and Burns Hubley LLP (accounting firm) based on a "no-claims-over" provision in a mutual release.

The release settled previous disputes, including the Fehrs' purported interest in J+W Foods Inc. The professional negligence action alleged that Gribilas and Burns Hubley LLP failed to protect the Fehrs' shareholdings.

The motions judge found the action to be an abuse of process because it contravened the no-claims-over clause, which prevented claims against parties who might seek contribution from the releasees (J+W Foods Inc., William Fehr Jr., Steven Trougakos).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Fehrs' appeal, affirming that the motions judge had the inherent authority to stay the action as an abuse of process and that the defendants had a viable claim over, thereby triggering the no-claims-over provision.

The cross-appeal by Gribilas and Burns Hubley LLP was dismissed as moot.

The appellant, a manual osteopathy practitioner, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

He argued that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was breached and that the trial judge misapprehended his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in treating delay related to Bill C-75 as an exceptional circumstance, she correctly deducted the delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

After deducting the COVID-19 delay, the total delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.