Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

This is an appeal of a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by permitting extensive cross-examination of the s. 752.1 expert by the Crown after the defence had cross-examined him, which allegedly undermined the fairness of the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the procedure was unusual, it did not result in unfairness or affect the outcome.

The sentencing judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable expectation that measures other than an indeterminate sentence would adequately protect children, given the offender's history of refusing treatment, was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Waseem Khan, was convicted of child luring and communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services from a person under 18.

He appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the trial judge's mens rea analysis and the dismissal of his abuse of process application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mens rea ground, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Morrison framework.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the abuse of process ground, concluding the trial judge erred in her interpretation of the "genuine offer" element under s. 286.4 of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the convictions were vacated, findings of guilt upheld, and a new trial ordered solely to complete the abuse of process application.

This appeal concerned the enforcement of Minutes of Settlement that resolved prior litigation between two factions of a church, Bethel Restoration Ministries.

The motion judge had ordered enforcement, requiring Bethel to make overdue payments and allowing a property registration.

The appellants challenged this order on three grounds: lack of jurisdiction due to the internal church dispute, the Minutes being void as prohibited by Bethel's constating documents, and the respondents having unclean hands.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Minutes created legally cognizable civil rights (contractual and property rights), thereby grounding the court's jurisdiction.

It also found that the Minutes were not prohibited by the church's by-laws, as they represented a valid exercise of the Elders' power to compromise claims.

The unclean hands argument was rejected as it pertained to conduct resolved by the Minutes.

The appellant, Thanuja Dhuruvasangary, appealed her removal as attorney for property for her mother, Logaranee Dhuruvasangary, and the appointment of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as Logaranee’s guardian of property.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by refusing an adjournment, failing to apply the correct test, reversing the burden of proof, and concluding there was sufficient evidence of misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the denial of the adjournment given the urgency and overwhelming evidence of misconduct.

The court also affirmed that the application judge properly understood and applied the two-part test for terminating a power of attorney and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The appellant, Juleth Dawson, appealed a motion judge's judgment for payment and possession under a mortgage, primarily challenging the calculation of interest owing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision not to reduce the contractual interest rate from 7.5% to 2% due to the respondents' failure to deliver a mortgage statement.

The court distinguished the case from Cheung v. Moskowitz Capital Mortgage, affirming that the discretion to reduce interest is fact-driven and requires evidence of the mortgagee seeking an advantage or the mortgagor suffering prejudice.

As no such advantage was sought or prejudice suffered, and payments had not been made for four years, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that ordered payment on a mortgage and granted a writ of possession.

They argued the motion judge erred in rejecting their defence of unconscionability and in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis.

The court affirmed that the mortgage renewal was discretionary, no agreement to renew on original terms existed, and the doctrine of unconscionability was inapplicable as there was no new contract to set aside.

The court also found summary judgment appropriate as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

This is an appeal from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appellant, Jason Eamer, had a history of violent offenses against intimate partners.

Two psychiatrists opined that his risk of re-offence could be controlled in the community with strict measures, including a prohibition on romantic relationships.

The sentencing judge rejected this, finding the risk intractable and the proposed measures insufficient to adequately protect the public.

On appeal, Eamer argued the sentencing judge erred by not considering intractability at the designation stage (a "Boutilier" error) and by improperly departing from expert psychiatric opinions regarding risk management.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of intractability or in his conclusion that the proposed community controls were not feasible or realistically capable of protecting the public, given the appellant's history of non-compliance.

The appellant, Aliesha Verma, brought a motion to stay an order of Stewart J. pending appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The underlying order declared that a dog, Rocco Jr., was owned by the deceased Leonard Carvalho and formed part of his estate, ordering Ms. Verma to return the dog to the estate trustee.

The motions judge applied the three-part test for a stay from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General): serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

The court found that the grounds of appeal had little prospect of success, that Ms. Verma failed to establish irreparable harm related to the denial of the stay, and that the balance of convenience favoured the estate trustee due to Ms. Verma's past conduct and social media campaign.

The motion for a stay was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the responding party.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined that the appeal was not devoid of merit or frivolous, and there was no partial success or misconduct by the respondent.

Consequently, the respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The appellant, convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the appellant's evidence by appearing to place a persuasive burden on him to explain why the allegations were false and by misapprehending his evidence regarding his relationship with the complainants.

Additionally, the trial judge failed to adequately address the evidence of potential collusion between the complainants and its impact on credibility.

Due to these cumulative errors, the conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered on the charges involving S.L.

This endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario addresses a request for directions regarding its prior decision.

The respondent sought clarification, arguing the previous decision might have inadvertently set aside parts of the application judge's order that were not appealed or were abandoned.

The court clarified that its decision to set aside the application judge's order was due to identified errors affecting lien rights and PPSA registration.

It affirmed that the appellants (respondents in this endorsement) did not abandon any relief sought in their notice of appeal and factum, including payment for storage/rental costs intertwined with repairs.

The court confirmed the appellants' possessory lien over the aircraft, encompassing both repair and storage/rental costs, and remitted these intertwined issues to the Superior Court for determination.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms-related offences.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) Charter analysis by refusing to exclude evidence (firearm and ammunition) despite a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in downplaying the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's Charter rights, as the police completely denied access to counsel for a prolonged period due to carelessness.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors afresh, the Court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and acquittals entered on all counts.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less one day imposed for sexual assault, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The respondent had sexually assaulted the complainant four times while she feigned sleep.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying an inappropriate sentencing range and failing to justify the conditional sentence with "exceptional circumstances." The court clarified that the appropriate sentencing range for penetrative sexual assault is three to five years, regardless of the victim's state or relationship to the offender, and that "forced penetration" refers to lack of consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional sentence set aside, and a three-year term of imprisonment imposed, with credit for time served.

The court declined to impose a SOIRA order due to lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The appellant, David E. Wires, appealed a Superior Court judgment that recognized and enforced an arbitration award obtained by the respondent, La Française IC 2.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal due to alleged bias, lack of standing of the respondent, and errors in the arbitrator's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly determined that relitigating the bias issue was an abuse of process, that the respondent had standing, and that the costs award was properly recognized and enforced without double-counting.

The appellant property owner appealed a judgment granting the City's application to enforce a Heritage Easement Agreement.

The appellant had made unauthorized alterations to his property, including cutting down trees and building a hockey rink and cabana.

The application judge found the appellant breached the Agreement and granted a permanent injunction.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge misinterpreted the Agreement and that the City's enforcement was motivated by bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's decision and concluding that the City had exercised its contractual discretion in good faith.

This appeal concerned the rectification of a will.

The Estate Trustee sought to rectify the will of the deceased, John Ihnatowych, to exclude his biological son from a prior relationship and that son's children, arguing John intended to benefit only his children from his marriage and their offspring.

The application judge granted rectification, finding the will did not accurately reflect the testator's instructions to his lawyer.

The appellants (the biological son and his children) appealed, arguing the judge applied an incorrect test for rectification and misassessed the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the application judge correctly applied the test for will rectification, which permits correction when a testator's instructions are not carried out.

The court distinguished the test for rectification of agreements from that of unilateral wills and found the evidence of the testator's clear instructions to his lawyer was sufficient to support the rectification.

This is a Crown appeal of an 18-month custodial sentence imposed on the respondent for making child pornography, distributing child pornography, and voyeurism involving two child victims.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by elevating the offender's age and rehabilitation potential over denunciation and deterrence, and by failing to recognize a breach of trust.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly balanced the sentencing objectives, including the principle of restraint for young first offenders, and did not err in not finding a breach of trust.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, arguing the sentencing judge erred in principle by prioritizing the offender's age and failing to address aggravating factors like the familial relationship, resulting in an unfit sentence.

The appellant, Richard Jackman, appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and attempted extortion, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the rejection of his not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR) defense, the consideration of treatability at the dangerous offender designation stage, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal tests, reasonably rejected the NCR defense, properly considered treatability in the dangerous offender analysis, and reasonably imposed an indeterminate sentence given the appellant's poor prospects for treatability and risk to the public.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim due to their persistent failure to answer undertakings, produce relevant documents, and comply with multiple court orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The court found no reversible error, emphasizing the fundamental importance of disclosure, the prejudice caused by non-compliance, and the court's authority to impose proportionate remedies, including striking pleadings, for flagrant disregard of court process and orders.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal.

The Court of Appeal had previously allowed the appeal, set aside the application judge’s order, and remitted certain issues for trial, declaring that the appellants had a possessory lien.

The appellants, having prevailed on the appeal and related motions, were awarded all-inclusive costs for the appeal, a panel motion, three pre-appeal motions, and the original application, totaling $143,977.79.