Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

This appeal concerned the jurisdiction of the Ontario court in a family law dispute over parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and child support.

The appellant father argued that the motion judge erred in finding the child habitually resident in Ontario, claiming he did not tacitly consent or acquiesce to the child's move from Montreal to Ottawa.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite a minor error by the motion judge in considering post-application conduct, sufficient evidence supported the finding of the father's tacit consent or acquiescence to the child's habitual residence in Ontario.

The appellant, Guarav Tewari, appealed the striking out of his statement of claim against the respondent lawyer and law firm, who had represented his former employer.

The motion judge had struck the claim, finding it disclosed no reasonable cause of action due to absolute privilege for litigation conduct and the absence of a solicitor-client relationship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, deeming it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court noted the appellant's history of relitigating similar claims against opposing counsel, which had been repeatedly found untenable.

The appellants and respondents own subdivided properties near Lake Ontario.

The appellants own a strip of land subject to an easement granting the respondents pedestrian access to use and enjoy the shores of Lake Ontario.

The appellants sought a declaration that the easement restricted the respondents to ingress and egress, and that 'shores' meant the area between the high and low water marks.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the respondents could use the grassy area of the strip for recreational activities.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred by relying on inadmissible subjective intent evidence.

The Court declared the easement restricts the respondents to pedestrian access for ingress and egress to the shores, defined as the land between the high and low water marks.

The Estate of Ivo Lepan appealed a motion judge's order that found the Estate had waived non-pecuniary damages claims related to statutory accident benefits and tort settlements.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge misapprehended the pleading and counsel's statements, concluding that the Estate had only given up pecuniary claims related to those settlements, not non-pecuniary damages.

The court emphasized that the amendments to the Statement of Claim were intended to address the issue of counsel disqualification, not to waive broader non-pecuniary claims.

The appeal was allowed, and the litigation was directed to proceed on the merits.

The appellant sought a review of a single judge's order refusing to stay a case management judge's order pending appeal and refusing to stay other proceedings.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's request for review, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the stay principles, particularly regarding the lack of a serious issue given the case management judge's lack of jurisdiction to grant criminal declarations in a civil action.

The Court also granted the respondents' motion to quash the appeal, confirming that the case management judge's order was interlocutory and thus appealable to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed a judgment dismissing their claim regarding a conflict of interest by their former counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the respondents, acting as counsel for both the appellant company and its insurer, were not in a conflict of interest because they timely withdrew their representation of the plaintiffs.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

This appeal concerned a contempt finding from the Superior Court of Justice.

Based on a settlement reached by the parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

The requirement for an apology letter, as stipulated in the original order, was set aside.

Instead, the appellant was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine to the Minister of Finance.

No costs were awarded for the appeal.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against an insurer (Ivari) for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The original action alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence related to an unsuitable financial retirement plan involving life insurance.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding no duty owed by the insurer regarding product suitability and refusing leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by treating the Rule 21 motion as a summary judgment, and by concluding there was a general principle that insurers never owe a duty regarding product suitability.

While agreeing the pleadings were deficient in distinguishing duties among defendants, the Court found no reason to deny leave to amend, as the proposed claims were tenable and there was no prejudice.

The appeal was allowed in part, restoring the action against the respondent and granting leave to amend the statement of claim.

The Estate Trustee of T.O. brought a motion to amend a notice of appeal to add two corporations, The Ridgeway Education Rec Centre Ltd. and 2012023 Ontario Limited, as respondents.

The original appeal, initiated by T.O. before his death, sought repayment of loans from these corporations, but the notice of appeal inadvertently named only D.O. as the respondent.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, applying the five-factor test for amending a notice of appeal after perfection.

The court found that the appellant had the requisite intention to appeal against the corporations, the delay was due to counsel's inadvertence and promptly addressed, there was no relevant prejudice to the respondents (who shared counsel and were aware of the claim), the appeal had arguable merit regarding the Limitations Act, and the justice of the case favored determining the matter on its merits.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender him to the United States for trial on charges of sexual exploitation of children and interstate communication-extortion.

The applicant argued the surrender was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, and violated his Charter rights under sections 7 and 6, and that the Minister unreasonably declined to seek assurances regarding potential civil commitment in the U.S. The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding it reasonable and entitled to substantial deference.

The Court concluded that the potential sentence disparity and civil commitment process in the U.S. did not render the surrender unjust, oppressive, or a violation of Charter rights, and that the Minister's decision to not seek assurances was also reasonable.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the defence of a third party and accident, arguing there was no air of reality to the former and the latter was inadequate, thereby undermining his primary defence of identity.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period, alleging misapprehension of evidence regarding aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the defences, which had an air of reality and did not prejudice the appellant's primary defence.

The court also found no reversible error in the parole ineligibility period, concluding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by evidence and the sentence was proportionate.

The appellants appealed an order vacating their possessory lien on an aircraft under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The application judge had erred by vacating the lien without fully determining whether the repair work was authorized and if any amounts were owing, despite acknowledging that litigation on these issues was possible.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge failed to make necessary findings and improperly applied the RSLA.

The appeal was allowed, the original order set aside, and the appellants' possessory lien was declared to exist until further court order, with the issues of authorization and amounts owing remitted to trial.

The appellant, A.J., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge engaged in prohibited stereotypical reasoning and uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's credibility was firmly rooted in the evidence and not based on stereotypes.

The court also found no uneven scrutiny, as the trial judge provided detailed and reasoned explanations for his credibility findings regarding both the complainant and the appellant.

The appellant, Ontario Place Corporation, appealed a trial judge's decision finding them liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for injuries sustained by the respondent, Patrick Lyng, on their premises.

The trial judge found Ontario Place 75% liable and the respondent 25% contributorily negligent for a knee injury sustained after jumping down a wet, slippery hill when a pedestrian bridge was closed.

The appeal raised issues regarding the theory of liability, causation, breach of duty under the Act, contributory negligence, and the award for loss of competitive advantage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on all grounds, including the "train of events" causation and the damages award.

The mother appealed an order returning her three-year-old child to Pakistan and recognizing a foreign divorce.

The motion judge had summarily determined, based solely on conflicting affidavit evidence, that the child was habitually resident in Pakistan and faced no serious risk of harm if returned.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the mother was denied procedural fairness because the conflicting evidence regarding parental intention and domestic violence required a more robust evidentiary hearing.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a proper evidentiary hearing.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for robbery in 2005, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB).

The appeal concerned two conditions: the addition of "supervised accommodation" and the geographical scope of community living.

The appellant argued the "supervised accommodation" condition was unilaterally and unreasonably added without sufficient exploration, citing *Elster (Re)*.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, distinguishing *Elster* on procedural fairness grounds, noting counsel had the opportunity to address the issue.

The appellant also argued the geographical scope was inconsistent with the Board's reasons, as the disposition limited community living to "Hamilton" post-transfer, while the Board intended "Greater Toronto Area and Hamilton".

The Court agreed with the appellant on this point, finding the Board and parties assumed GTA included Hamilton, and ordered the geographical scope for both pre- and post-transfer accommodation to be "the Greater Toronto Area and Hamilton".

The appellant appealed his convictions for numerous offences, including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, incest, and child pornography, committed against his biological daughter.

The grounds of appeal included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge, material misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias due to the trial judge's strong language.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible error.

The court affirmed that credibility findings are entitled to significant appellate deference, that any misapprehension of evidence was not material to the outcome, and that while the trial judge's language was strong, it did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed in the context of a thorough and even-handed analysis.

The Crown appealed T.L.'s acquittal for sexual assault.

The trial judge had a reasonable doubt regarding the first alleged incident.

For the second incident, the trial judge found the complainant was too intoxicated to consent.

The Court of Appeal found reversible legal error in the trial judge's analysis of the second incident, specifically the failure to address whether T.L.'s admitted actions (kissing, stroking, masturbating) constituted sexual assault and the lack of reasons for not finding party liability for the sexual assault carried out by another individual.

The acquittal was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment for sexual assault and other offences, appealed his sentence and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying Gladue principles by requiring a causal link between his Indigenous ancestry and offending behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it unreliable and insufficient to undermine the sentencing decision.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied Gladue principles, finding no direct link between the appellant's Indigenous background (discovered later in life) and his moral culpability, and that public protection remained the paramount objective justifying an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for six counts of sexual assault due to mental disorder, appealed an Ontario Review Board (ORB) disposition of conditional discharge, seeking an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety, citing his stability under strict bail conditions and improved insight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the ORB's finding that a foreseeable and substantial risk of serious harm remained, considering the nature of his illness, past non-compliance, and the recency of his improved insight, despite his recent stability.