Johanna Drennan

These supplementary reasons correct a previous decision regarding liability under s. 192 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court, upon discovering a Court of Appeal decision (Mazur v. Elias et al.), clarified that co-owner consent is not required for liability to attach to both owners under the Act.

This correction amends paragraph 29 of the original reasons, affirming that liability attaches to co-owners regardless of consent flow.

The plaintiff and her insurer brought a motion for a determination of a question of law regarding whether the "personal" consent of a co-owner is required for a motor vehicle policy to provide insurance coverage for liability arising from the use of an insured automobile.

The court examined the interplay between section 239(1) of the Insurance Act and section 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, particularly in light of the 1990 amendment to the Insurance Act which removed the word "personally." The court determined that the personal consent of the co-owner was not required, as consent could flow through an intermediary, and the two statutory schemes operate independently.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their statement of claim in its entirety without leave to amend, in a product liability action concerning an implanted medical device (Essure).

The Court of Appeal set aside the order, granting leave to amend the statement of claim.

The court clarified that leave to amend should only be denied in the clearest of cases and that, in product liability claims, identifying a specific manufacturing or design defect is not always required at the pleading stage to disclose a cause of action.

The defendant, Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, mental distress, and wrongful/constructive dismissal.

The court granted the motion, finding the claims statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as they were discovered by February 3, 2014, but the action was commenced on February 5, 2016, exceeding the two-year limitation period.

Additionally, the court found that the claims constituted workplace grievances falling under the comprehensive grievance process of the RCMP Act and Commissioner’s Standing Orders, thus deferring jurisdiction to that administrative scheme.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police was removed from the style of cause as it is not a separate legal entity.