Lois B. Roberts

The appellant landlord appealed an order granting the respondent tenant relief from forfeiture of a commercial sublease.

The appellant had issued notices of termination alleging the tenant permitted stolen hardwood flooring to be stored on the premises, constituting criminal activity.

The application judge found no admissible evidence of criminal activity by the tenant and granted relief from forfeiture for a minor breach regarding storage by a related company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and a motion to admit fresh evidence, finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed from two orders: one striking his statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and another declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the statement of claim lacked factual underpinnings and that the appellant's history of numerous lawsuits supported the vexatious litigant declaration.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding consent and bodily harm, and brought a fresh evidence application alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and rejecting the appellant's credibility regarding his trial counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 13-month reformatory sentence for attempted rape.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing trial unfairness.

At trial, Crown counsel breached an agreement not to cross-examine the appellant about his post-arrest conduct, specifically his departure from the jurisdiction and subsequent conviction for failing to attend court.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's ill-advised question opened the door to this evidence, prejudicing the appellant's credibility in a case that turned entirely on credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the rule in Browne v. Dunn was violated when he was not confronted with an alleged motive to fabricate, and that the trial judge erred by failing to give an Oliver instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant testified after his co-accused and had ample opportunity to respond to the evidence.

Furthermore, an Oliver instruction was not requested at trial, and its absence did not amount to misdirection.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault as a party to a robbery and sentenced to an effective term of five and one-half years.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by capping pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5 days without considering the harsh lockdown conditions he endured, and by imposing a longer sentence than his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law regarding the cap on credit for harsh conditions, but declined to grant enhanced credit due to a lack of evidence showing an adverse impact on the appellant.

The court also found no error regarding parity, noting the co-accused's guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed only to correct a 23-day calculation error in the pre-sentence credit.

The appellant appealed a March 2016 disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the March order had been overtaken by a subsequent order made in August 2016, which the appellant had also appealed.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought trial costs of over $200,000.

The respondent opposed, arguing the appellant failed to provide detailed dockets and that costs should be reduced for various reasons, including the extra time required for a bilingual proceeding.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant's costs outline provided sufficient detail and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The Court applied a 20% discount to the claimed fees, deducted costs for a motion the respondent had won, and excluded one unsupported disbursement.

The Court awarded the appellant $162,239.25 in trial costs and amended the previous appeal costs order to include $16,683.65 in disbursements.

The appellant, 407 ETR, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the application of the Limitations Act, 2002 to unpaid toll debts.

The Court of Appeal held that a civil action to collect unpaid tolls is not an 'appropriate means' under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act until the statutory licence plate denial process has run its course and the debtor's vehicle permit expires.

The Court also held that a 15-year limitation period in a transponder lease agreement is enforceable under s. 22(3) of the Limitations Act, even though it is a consumer agreement, because s. 22(3) permits parties to extend the limitation period.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual offences against child complainants, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The court held that trial counsel's performance fell far below the standard of reasonably competent representation, including inadequate trial preparation, failure to use prior inconsistent statements, failure to bring or properly address a s. 276 application, and failure to respond competently to similar fact or discreditable conduct evidence.

The Crown conceded that the convictions relating to one complainant were unreliable, but argued the assault conviction involving another complainant should stand.

The court rejected that distinction, finding the incompetence pervasive and the miscarriage of justice engaged both verdict reliability and trial fairness.

All convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking after being found at a marijuana grow-op.

He told police he believed his boss had a licence to produce marijuana at that location.

The trial judge convicted him as an aider and abettor, finding the defence had an onus to establish the honest belief defence and could only do so if the appellant had seen a licence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in placing an onus on the appellant and that the Crown was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew his boss did not have a licence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction entered by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no strong arguments that the lower court fell into legal error and declining to repeat the analysis performed by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion to review an order of a chambers judge, which had denied her requests for further trial transcripts at public expense, extended her release pending appeal to the scheduled hearing date, and refused to adjourn the appeal.

At the hearing of the motion, the applicant also sought an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request, noting a history of last-minute requests.

The Court also dismissed the motion to review the chambers judge's order, finding no reason to interfere with the decisions regarding the transcripts, release terms, or the peremptory hearing date.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having sexual intercourse with a highly intoxicated complainant.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly account for his use of an interpreter when assessing his credibility and finding he feigned confusion during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or her conclusion that the appellant's evidence was replete with inconsistencies.

The appellant sought a review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion for bail and refusing to expedite an appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding.

The appellant had since been released on bail, rendering the habeas corpus proceeding moot.

The appellant also sought to have outstanding criminal charges dismissed due to alleged improper solitary confinement, which the court noted was a matter for the trial court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to review and dismissed the underlying appeal as moot.

The appellant appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence and arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's motivation to lie to immigration authorities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence inadmissible as it was available at trial and added nothing.

The Court also held the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, having reasonably concluded the complainant's only agenda was to tell the truth about the abuse.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

On the sentence appeal, the parties agreed the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the fitness of the sentence based on the actual record, which included 11 prior convictions for break and enter over 25 years.

The Court concluded the total sentence of 820 days was fit and dismissed the appeal.

The parties, who were partners in a land development project, disputed the interpretation of their Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA) and a subsequent 2005 document regarding the allocation of building lots.

The application judge declared the 2005 document enforceable and held that actions against a defaulting partner under Article 8.2 of the LPA required unanimous consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the enforceability of the 2005 document, finding it clarified an unclear term and was supported by functional consideration.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding Article 8.2, concluding that interpreting it to require unanimous consent would render other provisions meaningless and lead to commercially absurd results.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and breach of probation arising from a domestic dispute.

At trial, the judge erroneously excluded exculpatory statements made by the appellant to a police officer.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal held that the error was not harmless or trivial, as the convictions relied heavily on the complainant's credibility, which was contested.

The curative proviso could not be applied, and the convictions were quashed.

The plaintiff was injured when she fell off an elevated dance floor at a nightclub.

She sued the nightclub, but later learned during discoveries that the landlord may have been involved in renovating the dance floor.

She subsequently sued the landlord, who moved for summary judgment arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the discovery of the nightclub's representative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the landlord's appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the plaintiff had not shown a lack of diligence in investigating the claim.