William V. Reid

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his battery claim and awarding the respondent $50,000 on a defamation counterclaim.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under section 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act because the original claim exceeded $50,000 and the jury did not indicate what damages would have been awarded had the claim succeeded.

Applying the Dunnington factors, the court exercised its discretion under section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal rather than dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant landlord appealed an order granting the respondent tenant relief from forfeiture of a commercial sublease.

The appellant had issued notices of termination alleging the tenant permitted stolen hardwood flooring to be stored on the premises, constituting criminal activity.

The application judge found no admissible evidence of criminal activity by the tenant and granted relief from forfeiture for a minor breach regarding storage by a related company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and a motion to admit fresh evidence, finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual exploitation involving a 17‑year‑old relative who lived with him, and received a custodial sentence with probation and ancillary orders.

On summary conviction appeal, he challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including misapprehension of evidence, improper credibility analysis, misuse of prior incidents as grooming evidence, and erroneous reliance on his police statement as a confession.

The court held that the trial judge misapprehended and inadequately analyzed the accused’s statement to police, treating it as a confession to criminal conduct without identifying the conduct admitted or explaining the reasoning.

Because the statement played a central role in rejecting the accused’s testimony and assessing credibility, the error could not be cured under the proviso.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from two school-based sexual touching allegations involving young complainants and eyewitnesses whose accounts contained significant conflicts and evidence of pre-disclosure discussions among the girls.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not explain how the possibility of collusion affected the admission and use of similar fact evidence, nor how conflicting evidence and reasonable doubt were assessed.

Applying the adequacy-of-reasons framework and the principles governing similar fact evidence and credibility findings, the court found that meaningful appellate review was not possible.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The young offender appealed their conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that there was evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion and that she properly directed herself on the elements of the offence.

As the appeal did not raise a question of law alone, leave to appeal was refused.

On appeal from an order striking portions of a statement of claim, the court held that the fraud claim was not tenable.

However, the pleading against the individual defendants disclosed a cause of action based on unjust enrichment and should not have been struck out on that basis.

The appellant was granted leave to amend within 30 days to remove references to fraudulent conduct and properly plead unjust enrichment.

Given the divided success, the court ordered no costs at the appeal or below.