Lois B. Roberts

The appellants advanced $600,000 to the respondents during negotiations to purchase a 25 per cent interest in the respondents' business.

When the transaction failed, the appellants sued to recover the funds, arguing they were a refundable deposit or loan, while the respondents claimed they were a non-refundable down payment.

The trial judge dismissed the action in very brief reasons.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge mischaracterized the central issue and failed to provide sufficient reasons to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault following a stabbing, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding residue on a gate and erred in finding certain evidence confirmatory of the victim's testimony.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge reasonably relied on a police officer's opinion that the residue was blood.

Furthermore, the court found that the trial judge, who treated the victim as a Vetrovec witness, was justified in concluding that multiple independent items of evidence cumulatively confirmed the victim's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought to appeal an October 1 order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order in question was interlocutory.

Under the Courts of Justice Act, the Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of interlocutory orders.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for numerous gun-related offences arising from a seizure of firearms and explosives.

He argued the trial judge erred by not staying the charges due to Charter breaches, including a 15-day detention without a bail hearing and the destruction of seized explosives.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Babos test, agreeing that exclusion of evidence and sentence remission were adequate remedies.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's status as a former RCMP officer against his deliberate defiance of court orders.

The appellant sought costs for two trials and an appeal regarding a property dispute involving adverse possession and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was largely successful and that the respondent's actions in maintaining an erroneous claim to the entirety of the disputed property were unreasonable.

The Court awarded the appellant $282,000 in costs for the two trials and set off the $25,000 appeal costs against a previous costs order in favour of the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against her former co-operative housing provider, its lawyers, a court employee, and a Landlord and Tenant Board member.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action was an attempt to re-litigate her eviction and rent subsidy proceedings, and that the claims against the lawyers, court employee, and Board member were bound to fail due to lack of duty of care and statutory immunity.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted to the respondent for unpaid invoices on a construction project.

The appellant argued it was entitled to set-off monies related to alleged deficiencies on unrelated projects under s. 12 of the Construction Lien Act or by way of equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 12 did not apply because no trust funds were retained, and equitable set-off was unavailable because the projects were entirely separate and unrelated.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action.

He had been terminated for cause after bypassing a safety device on a machine, following a history of progressive discipline for safety violations.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge relied on unpleaded grounds, made palpable and overriding factual errors, and failed to resolve evidentiary conflicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors and concluding that the trial judge's findings on the appellant's misconduct were well-supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that the name 'Domestic Violence Court' violated his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the appellant failed to demonstrate serious state-imposed psychological harm, cruel and unusual treatment, or discrimination.

The court noted that such applications risk trivializing important Charter rights.

The plaintiff commenced a professional negligence action in Small Claims Court.

The deputy judge dismissed the claim under r. 12.02 for failure to produce formal expert reports.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, finding the dismissal was a denial of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that under Westerhof v. Gee Estate, treating physicians can provide expert opinion evidence without formal reports, and this principle applies equally to Small Claims Court proceedings to ensure accessible justice.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment decision finding that the defendant had cancelled her automobile insurance policy with the respondent insurer prior to a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred regarding the onus of proof, relied on hearsay evidence, and failed to draw an adverse inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's conclusion that the policy was cancelled was amply supported by the record, including business records showing the cancellation request and a corresponding credit.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The amicus curiae argued the appeal judge improperly considered the appellant's subsequent involuntary patient status, the Board's decision was unreasonable, and the appellant was denied a fair hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appeal judge only used the subsequent status as background, there was ample evidence of the appellant's inability to appreciate the consequences of his treatment decisions due to delusions, and any curtailment of cross-examination was on tangential matters.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her appeal from a Crown wardship order regarding three of her children.

She argued the children should be placed with their maternal grandmother, that she received inadequate representation at trial, and that the respondent society failed to investigate the grandmother as a placement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the inadequate representation claim and agreeing with the trial judge's concerns about the grandmother's suitability given her own child protection history.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's dismissal of their motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss the respondent's claims as statute-barred.

The motion judge had found that the respondent lacked standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance claim prior to the appointment of a receiver, and that the appellants had concealed facts necessary to support the claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's findings on discoverability and concealment were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action for catastrophic injury Statutory Accident Benefits as statute-barred under s. 281.1(1) of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge had distinguished the Divisional Court's decision in Do v. Guarantee Insurance Co., finding that the insurer's denial of catastrophic status included language denying increased benefits, thereby triggering the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the insurer's language merely indicated a lack of status to claim increased benefits and did not constitute a denial of specific benefits.

The motion judge's order was set aside.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order enforcing the terms of a settlement agreement regarding the respondent's claim for amounts owed upon termination of employment.

The appellants argued the settlement should not be enforced due to the respondent's alleged post-termination breach of a non-compete clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the alleged breach was not part of the settlement and that a boilerplate preamble could not reasonably be interpreted to include it.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against the Toronto Police Services Board for mass detentions and arrests during the 2010 G20 summit.

After the motion judge dismissed the certification motion, the plaintiff narrowed her claims on appeal.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and certified two separate class actions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, upholding the certification of the location-based subclasses and the detention centre class, finding that the narrowed claims met the certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's cross-appeal on costs, increasing the costs award for the certification motion to $315,000 to reflect the legislative goal of access to justice.

In supplementary reasons, the Court of Appeal addressed two issues regarding a fine in lieu of forfeiture that were omitted from its original endorsement.

The court agreed to amend the trial judge's order to prioritize the restitution order, directing that any amount paid toward the fine be redirected to the victims.

However, the court declined to decide whether a fine in lieu of forfeiture may be ordered payable jointly and severally, as the issue was raised for the first time on appeal and lacked sufficient adversarial context.

The appellant, a secondary insurer, paid for a claimant's expensive prescription drug after the respondent, the primary insurer, denied coverage.

The appellant later sued the respondent for reimbursement.

The motion judge found the appellant's claim was partially statute-barred because it was discovered when the appellant first learned of the denial in October 2009.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant could not have reasonably discovered its claim until the respondent finally produced the policy wording in September 2011.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was ordered to fully reimburse the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued the application judge erred by denying his request for an adjournment due to illness and by failing to consider his self-represented status, language barriers, and alleged brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge reasonably exercised his discretion to deny the adjournment given the appellant's history of unpaid costs and lack of proper medical evidence.

The Court also found no error in the application judge's decision to declare the appellant a vexatious litigant based on his repeated, meritless litigation against his former lawyers.